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REVISING OUR “COMMON INTELLECTUAL
HERITAGE”: FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS IN
OUR FEDERAL SYSTEM
Judith Resnik*
ABSTRACT
This Essay pays tribute to Daniel Meltzer’s insight that, to the extent “lawyers have a common
intellectual heritage, the federal courts are its primary source.” I do so by analyzing how that
heritage is made and remade, as political forces press Congress to deploy federal courts to protect a
wide array of interests and state courts absorb the bulk of litigation.
The heritage that Meltzer celebrated and to which he contributed was the outcome of twentieth-century social movements that focused on the federal courts as hospitable venues, serving as
vivid sources of rights and remedies. A competing heritage has since emerged, as the Supreme
Court shaped new doctrines constricting judicial powers and rendering courts unavailable and
unavailing.
Despite the Court’s reluctance to welcome claimants, Congress continues to endow the federal courts with new authority and significant funds. But what the federal government has thus
far ignored are the needs of state courts, where 100 million cases are filed annually and states
struggle to honor constitutional commitments to open courts and rights to counsel for criminal
defendants.
Once state courts come into focus, two other and competing understanding of courts come to
the fore. One merits the term “enabling courts,” as judges aim to equip litigants with lawyers
and resources for conflicts related to families, housing, and health. From “Civil Gideon” movements and self-help forms to drug and reentry courts, new initiatives underscore the goals of
using courts to be responsive to social needs. But another vector of court activities falls under the
© 2016 Judith Resnik.
* Thanks are due to Dennis Curtis, Kristin Collins, Richard Fallon, Abbe Gluck, Tara
Grove, Vicki Jackson, and Patricia Moore for reviewing drafts; to Sean Farhang, Richard
Jaffe, Dan Cunningham, David Insigna, Jennifer Gibson, and to Yale Law Librarian
Michael Vanderheidjen for research advice; to the co-panelists at the AALS meeting at
which this draft was given; to Yale Law students David Chen, Kyle Edwards, John
Giammatteo, Kate Huddleston, Marianna Mao, Adam Margulies, Katie Munyan, Heather
Richard, and Emily Wanger for careful, insightful, sophisticated, and tireless research; and
to Bonnie Posick for expert editorial guidance. As others have discussed, Daniel Meltzer
knew of the plans for this program before he died. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss
the degree to which I, like so many others, am lucky to have benefitted from his insights
and his intellectual generosity. As we mourned his absence at the symposium where we
studied in his honor, it was plain that we continue to have much to learn from, and in
some senses with, him.
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nomenclature of “exploitive courts,” using discriminatory fines, fees, and threats of jail for those
unable to pay to turn courts into profit centers to augment localities’ budgets.
Inequality and racial tensions are the leitmotifs of this decade; it is neither surprising nor
inappropriate that these issues are played out in public courts as well as in electoral politics. But
these very inequalities counsel the need to develop a new intellectual heritage, premised on the
interdependencies of state and federal courts, sharing the common purpose of fulfilling constitutional obligations in this democratic polity to enable access to their public services.
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Insofar as modern lawyers have a common intellectual heritage, the federal
courts are its primary source.
—Daniel Meltzer, 19891
I. THE PRIMACY

OF THE

FEDERAL COURTS

Daniel Meltzer wrote that sentence in 1989, when he reflected on the two
hundredth anniversary of the First Judiciary Act.2 Each year as I teach Federal Courts, I am struck anew by how right he was. The image of and the
doctrine produced by the federal courts shapes the imagination and understanding of law students as well as that of the legal academy, lawyers, judges,
and the public at large. Honoring Daniel Meltzer by continuing to study the
federal courts in his memory, I explore the forces that contributed to the
changing contours of, and the gaps in, our “common intellectual heritage.”
First, I trace the early years of the federal judiciary that Meltzer
esteemed, as it became a vivid form of national authority. Article III is the
iconic statement of federal judicial power, but it is Congress that has brought
that charter to life by endowing the federal courts with jurisdiction, judgeships, and courthouses and hence propelled the federal courts to the fore.
Yet that impact is obscured by the difficulties of tracking the bits and pieces
of legislation, riders, and appropriations that cumulatively authorize and
fund federal judicial work.
In contrast, case law is readily accessible and offers narratives embedded
in individual stories alleging violations of specific legal rules and resulting in
reasoned explanations of their applications. Fixing attention on the U.S.
Supreme Court has become easy by its production of a predictable and tidy
corpus, down to fewer than ninety opinions annually and concluding major
pronouncements each year by July 1.3 Hence, the Court is the lens through
which our “common intellectual heritage” has generally been seen.
Second, I provide a brief overview of Meltzer’s analyses of the work of
the twentieth-century federal judiciary—called upon repeatedly to identify
1 Daniel J. Meltzer, The Judiciary’s Bicentennial, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 427 (1989)
[hereinafter Meltzer, The Judiciary’s Bicentennial]. The article reflected on the 200 years
since the First Judiciary Act, and the degree to which (despite Erie) the federal judiciary
served as a “nationalizing force”—from constitutional and statutory interpretation to the
ways in which legal education used federal law as exemplary. Id.
2 Id. at 427.
3 The Supreme Court decided seventy-four merits cases in the October 2014 term.
See Kedar S. Bhatia, Merits Cases by Vote Split, SCOTUSBLOG (June 30, 2015), http://
sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/SB_votesplit_OT14.pdf.
Recall that in 1877, the Supreme Court averaged “over 1,200 cases each year on its
docket,” and on average, determined “a little more than 400,” its backlog was in excess of
750. See PETER CHARLES HOFFER, WILLIAMJAMES HULL HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: AN ESSENTIAL HISTORY 183 (2016) [hereinafter THE ESSENTIAL FEDERAL COURTS
HISTORY]. In 1891, Congress created the intermediate appellate courts to ease that backlog. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (the “Evarts Act”). In 1925, Congress authorized the Court to choose most of its cases. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (the
“Certiorari Act”).
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rights and fashion remedies. Again, the iconic moments, such as Brown v.
Board of Education, involve constitutional interpretations, yet Congress is the
wellspring of judicial action. Between 1974 and 1998, Congress turned to the
federal courts hundreds of times4 and deployed judges to work on an array of
topics. Some arenas are well-known and others obscure, as rights to file cases
range from legislation on truth-in-lending,5 fair-credit reporting,6 and clean
air7 in the 1970s; rail safety,8 hazardous and solid waste,9 safe drinking
water,10 wiretaps,11 video privacy,12 and equal access to justice13 in the 1980s;
4 See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Legislation Enacted in the Past TwentyFive Years Conferring Either Exclusive or Concurrent Federal Court Jurisdiction (Sept. 18,
1998) (on file with the Yale Law Library, which created a permalink at https://perma.cc/
MB3N-CEHD) (AOUSC List of Legislation Conferring Exclusive or Concurrent Jurisdiction) [hereinafter AO Federal Jurisdiction Legislation, 1974–1998]. The list numbers 474,
but not all of the statutes identified provide causes of action or new remedies in the federal
courts.
5 Truth in Lending Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 130, 82 Stat. 146, 157 (providing federal jurisdiction for consumer claims brought against creditors failing to disclose
information required by the act), amended by Truth in Lending Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-495,
§ 408, 88 Stat. 1500, 1518 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2012)) (prescribing that courts consider particular factors in determining class action awards).
6 Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681–81x).
7 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–604, § 113, 84 Stat. 1676, 1686
(amending the Clean Air Act to provide for federal jurisdiction over public enforcement
actions), amended by Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 111, 91 Stat.
685, 704–05 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (2012)) (providing expressly for
civil penalties).
8 Rail Safety and Service Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-468, § 606(c), 96
Stat. 2543, 2566 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 1205 (2012)) (providing for judicial review of
agency adjudications related to right-of-way claims in the United States District Court for
the District of Alaska).
9 Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, §§ 233, 403,
98 Stat. 3221, 3257, 3271 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928, 6973) (providing that
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may commence a civil
action in federal court for “appropriate relief, including a temporary or permanent
injunction”).
10 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-339, § 102, 100 Stat.
642, 647 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300g-3) (providing that the Administrator of
the EPA must bring a civil action in federal district court in order to assess a civil penalty
greater than $5,000, and that the Attorney General may recover the amount of an unpaid
civil penalty by filing an action in federal district court); id. § 108(c) (allowing the Administrator to bring a civil action in federal district court to impose a civil penalty “against any
person who tampers, attempts to tamper, or makes a threat to tamper with a public water
system”).
11 Electronics Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2420(a), 2707 (2012)) (amending the Wiretap Act and authorizing private civil enforcement by any “person whose . . . communication is intercepted,
disclosed, or intentionally used in violation” of the law, and in violation of the Stored
Communication Act, and providing for statutory damages).
12 Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 note, 2710, 2711). The Act provides remedies for individuals alleging
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to civil rights,14 the needs of soldiers and sailors,15 telephone consumers’
protection,16 and family and medical leave17 in the 1990s.
Such mandates worked to welcome both public and private litigants, and
the federal docket tripled between 1960 and 1990.18 During much of the
second half of the twentieth century, the judiciary enthusiastically responded
to calls for help—albeit tempered with managerial efforts focusing on augmenting resources.19 Meltzer parsed the resulting constitutional and statutory doctrines in search of appropriate balances between the courts and
Congress when calibrating remedies for alleged injuries. Meltzer was thus
both an heir to, and an expounder of, a common heritage, as he celebrated
the remedial contributions of the federal courts while appreciating the limits
of what courts could do. Hospitable courts is one way to capture the posture
Meltzer commended the federal judiciary to adopt.
information about rented videos is disclosed; the statute was enacted after criticism about
information obtained in relationship to Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork. See S. REP.
NO. 100-599, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4342-1, 4342-5.
13 Equal Access to Justice Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 1, 99 Stat. 183,
183–84 (1985) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2012)) (providing non-U.S. parties
with a right to appeal an adverse fee determination to the federal court having jurisdiction
to review the merits of the underlying agency adjudication).
14 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072–74 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a) (providing for punitive damages in cases of intentional discrimination); id. § 115 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626) (amending the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 by providing a cause of action to aggrieved persons under the Act
who exhaust administrative remedies through the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission).
15 Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-12, 105
Stat. 34.
16 Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 227, 105 Stat.
2394, 2395–96 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227) (providing a private right of action for violations of the statute and “to recover for actual monetary loss from each such violation, or to
receive $500 in damages for each such violation”).
17 Family and Medical Leave Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 107, 107 Stat. 6, 15–17
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 2617) (providing eligible employees with a right of
action in federal or state court for damages and equitable relief).
18 In 1960, there were 85,802 district court filings and, in 1990, 259,876 filings. ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1960 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT 61–62 (1960); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
1990 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 2 (1990). That mix included the staple of
diversity jurisdiction (whose parameters narrowed during this time period) as well as the
new and old statutory claims. See Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; Or, the
Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 921 [hereinafter Galanter, The Life
and Times of the Big Six].
19 At the prodding of Chief Justice Earl Warren, the American Law Institute (ALI)
created a project on federal jurisdiction. See AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF
JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 1 (1969). Interest in limiting diversity
jurisdiction, as well as prisoner filings, dated back to decades before. See Judith Resnik,
Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV.
924, 937–943 (2000) [hereinafter Resnik, Trial as Error].
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Third, I consider the last few decades, during which the Supreme Court
led a shift away from the heritage that Meltzer admired. The judiciary’s leadership became insistent that federal courts should be asked to do less, rather
than more. In place of the presumption of rights to remedies, a new and
competing intellectual heritage emerged, bent on constricting the relief that
federal judges provide. This approach has some of its seeds in Congress,
which in the 1990s enacted a few statutes limiting or “stripping” jurisdiction
in cases related to migrants and prisoners, and imposing new conditions in
securities cases.20 Yet Congress continued to dispatch the federal courts by
formulating new federal rights that opened the doors for other litigants.
Politics continued to produce the idea that giving (or limiting) federal jurisdiction was a “good” to bestow on constituents and on special interest groups.
This attitude continued to generate a haphazard and wide array of new rights
called “federal.”
The greater source of cutbacks came from the judiciary, reading narrowly or overruling what Congress has authorized courts to do.21 As judicial
overrides of new federal statutory rights and judge-made constraints on remedies become more frequent,22 new generations are being schooled to expect
unavailing courts, unwilling to provide claimants with effective opportunities
to respond in public venues.
Meltzer modeled the Court-Congress relationship as interdependent,
and he repeatedly called for judges to fill gaps in statutes. The Supreme
Court’s last decades have undercut that cooperative relationship through an
odd mix of decisions, sometimes abjuring equitable remedial power absent
congressional directions and other times asserting judicial authority to reject
congressional authorizations that courts could provide relief. The Court has
thus shaped a common heritage largely hostile to rights and often in conflict
with or untethered from Congress.
This body of law needs to be read in conjunction with three structural
facts reflecting the “machinery of jurisdiction” to which Meltzer repeatedly

20 See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-607 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252
(2012)); Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012)); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C. (2012)).
21 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional
Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543 (2014) [hereinafter Burbank & Farhang, Litigation
Reform]; Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal
Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223 (2003) [hereinafter Resnik, Constricting Remedies].
22 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). Before 1995, the Supreme Court struck 134 federal
statutes, while between 1995 and 2003 it struck 33, a quarter of the pre-1995 total. Jed
Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus and Deference on the Supreme
Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893, 893 (2003).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-5\NDL505.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 7

16-SEP-16

revising “our common intellectual heritage”

13:32

1837

drew our attention.23 First, certain forms of investments in the federal courts
are declining; federal filings have flattened since the 1980s and the mix of
cases has shifted.24 Second, about thirty percent of the plaintiffs bringing
cases now proceed pro se, without counsel, at the trial level;25 more than fifty
percent do so on appeal.26 These numbers include many people who are
not prisoners.27 Third, about forty percent of federal civil filings were, as of
2015, consolidated under the “multi-district litigation” statute, creating
aggregate litigation with court-approved lead lawyers representing a significant number of plaintiffs who had filed individual lawsuits.
That courts are now populated with individuals lacking the means to use
them well and in need of assistance is a phenomenon felt acutely in state
courts, teeming with litigants lacking lawyers. In 2010, California counted
more than four million and New York more than two million self-represented
civil litigants in their court systems.28 Furthermore, localities such as Ferguson, Missouri have become a shorthand for exploitation by courts, which
have been turned into revenue centers; that town used racially discriminatory
policing and unfairly imposed fines and fees on their users. But neither its
practices nor the problems they reflected were unique to any one locality.
Other jurisdictions, from upstate New York to New Orleans, have been sub23 Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537,
2537 (1998).
24 Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Civil Caseload of the Federal District Courts, 2015 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1177 [hereinafter Moore, The Federal Civil Caseload]; cf. Galanter, The Life and
Times of the Big Six, supra note 18.
25 The federal district court database details pro se filings back to 2005. See Judicial
Business, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/report-names/judicial-business?tn=C-13
&pt=all&t=all&m%5Bvalue%5D%5Bmonth%5D=&y%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D (last visited May 23, 2016); infra FIGURE 15.
26 U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES, PRO-SE CASES
FILED, BY NATURE OF PROCEEDING tbl 2.4 (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statis
tics/table/24/judicial-facts-and-figures/2014/09/30; see infra FIGURE 14. In 1995, about
40% of the total of about 50,000 appeals were pro se. In 2014, 51% percent of about
60,000 appeals were pro se. Prison petitions remained relatively stable with about
13,000–14,000 in 1995 and in 2014, and hence the rise in pro ses in 2014 comes from nonprisoner petitions. A few federal district courts have pilot programs to help find lawyers to
provide assistance; an example is the Pro Se Legal Assistance Project in the Eastern District
of New York. See Pro Se Centers Help Even the Odds for Litigants Without Lawyers, U.S. COURTS
(Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2015/08/20/pro-se-centers-help-evenodds-litigants-without-lawyers.
27 About 8% of the 27–30% pro se filings at the district court level during the last
decade were not prisoners. In 2014, non-prisoners filed 24,274 cases pro se. See Judicial
Business, tbl.C-13, ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.uscourts
.gov/report-names/judicial-business?tn=C-13&pt=all&t=all&m%5Bvalue%5D%5Bmonth%
5D=&y%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%.
28 Jonathan Lippman, New York’s Template to Address the Crisis in Civil Legal Services, 7
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 15 (2012) [hereinafter Lippman, New York’s Template]; see also
Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, 2009 Cal. Stat. 2498, discussed below, infra note 457.
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jected to lawsuits for failure to provide indigent criminal defendants with
constitutionally required counsel.29
My fourth and concluding comments are about the present and future
of the courts. Inequality and racial tensions are the leitmotifs of this decade;
it is neither surprising nor inappropriate that these issues are played out in
public courts as well as in electoral politics. But these very inequalities underscore the critical contributions that courts could make in building a sense of
common purpose cutting across the many divides.
Meltzer’s appreciation of the specific role that federal courts played in
shaping our heritage entailed his choice of the word “common.” The federal
courts, as well as state courts, are one of our “commons”—non-denominational spaces structuring opportunities for disciplined public exchanges
across bitter divides. The odd etiquette of the courtroom obliges disputants
to hear opponents’ claims and compels government, through its judges and
jurors, to accord respectful and dignified treatment to all participants,
regardless of their race, class, age, sexuality, and ethnicity.
While Meltzer counseled hospitality for federal courts, that posture is
insufficient to respond to the current challenges. Likewise, the more recent
embrace by the U.S. Supreme Court of unavailing courts is impoverished. To
conclude, I sketch the contours of developing another common heritage
about the role of courts, which I style “enabling” to reflect the transformation
of the twentieth century when “we” all became eligible to be in court and
turned state and federal courts into a remarkably relied-upon social service,
with some 100 million filings annually. To honor state constitutional obligations to provide “open courts” and federal guarantees of Article III requires
intellectual analyses built on the successes of courts during the last century
and the resultant challenges.
Political movements of the past centuries shaped both state and federal
court systems into potential havens for a diverse set of claims. Rather than
bemoaning the pressures of swelling dockets, the number of filings should be
understood as a tribute to a democratic concept of government officials—
judges—aspiring to deliberate fairly, to deal with individuals, and to demonstrate in public that equality of treatment is the goal, albeit unevenly
achieved in practice.
Given their resources and visibility, the federal courts have a special role
to play. Hundreds of congressional enactments during the last centuries
enable the federal courts to provide common ground for an eclectic set of
rights holders—from consumers to sailors to video purchasers to waste manufacturers to family members to discrimination claimants—authorized to
bring their arguments before judges empowered by and performing in front
of the public.
29 See Complaint—Class Action, Yarles v. Bunton, No. 3:16-cv-31 (M.D. La. Jan. 14,
2016); Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2010); see also Stipulation and Order
of Settlement, Hurrell-Harring v. New York, No. 8866-07 (N.Y. Oct. 21, 2014); State ex rel.
Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592 (Mo. 2012); State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def.
Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870 (Mo. 2009).
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Adjudication can therefore be one source of social solidarity,30 providing a resource for those in conflicts as well as for third parties, constitutionally endowed with rights to observe and critique the exchanges and the
outcomes.31 On this account, the problem is not that too many are asking
for help but that the responses in federal courts are distractingly focused on
alternative dispute resolution that privatizes processes, diffuses disputes, and
reduces opportunities for the public to see the utility of what courts do.32
Moreover, congressional funding continues to go disproportionately to the
federal courts, dealing with a tiny fraction of litigation. While in fiscal year
2016 the federal judiciary was offered a billion dollars for building courthouses,33 the State Justice Institute received some five million federal dollars
to support grants for innovations in state courts.34
Yet, adjudication in both sets of courts is increasingly becoming a luxury
good, as the costs of lawyers and of litigation outstrip the wherewithal of most
30 I do not argue the role of adjudication to be either exclusive or necessarily
preferable to other modes of generating shared commitments. One alternative is contract.
See Daniel Markovits, Arbitration’s Arbitrage: Social Solidarity at the Nexus of Adjudication and
Contract, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 431 (2010). As Markovits explained, both adjudication and
contract aim to “sustain stable integration in the face of the myriad competing aims” by
requiring “respectful recognition,” albeit while relying on different modes of doing so. Id.
at 469–70. Markovits detailed the distinction between gap-filling work by arbitrators, id. at
479, and the regulatory obligations of judges deciding statutory claims, id. at 482–83. He
argued therefore that statutory rights should not be located in arbitration because thirdparty supervision was required. Id. at 482–88.
31 See generally Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and
Public Sphere(s), 5 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1 (2011); Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts: Changing the Experiences and Logics of the Public’s Role in Court-Based ADR, 15
NEV. L.J. 1631 (2015); Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World,
127 HARV. L. REV. 2173 (2014).
32 See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private
in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015) [hereinafter Resnik, Diffusing
Disputes]; Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793 (2014) [hereinafter Resnik, Privatization of Process].
33 FY 2016 Funding Meets Judiciary Needs, ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS (Dec. 21,
2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2015/12/21/fy-2016-funding-meets-judiciaryneeds. Included was “$948 million to the General Services Administration, which is
expected to fund construction costs of the top eight courthouse construction projects on
the Judicial Conference’s courthouse priority plan, and partial funding for a ninth.” As
one judge explained, “This is an unprecedented infusion of resources for new courthouse
construction.” He continued,
Unsafe, overcrowded, and inefficiently designed courthouses threaten the ability
of courts to successfully carry out their Constitutional and statutory duties. We
are enormously grateful to Congress for recognizing both the integrity of the
Judiciary’s planning process, as well as the central role the courthouse occupies in
assuring the public’s confidence in its justice system.
Id.
34 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, H.R. 2029 div. B, tit. IV, 114th Cong. (2015)
(enacted as Pub. L. No. 114-113).
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disputants. Responses need to underscore the interdependence both of
courts and Congress and therefore of adjudication and politics, producing
the amalgam of rights and resources, as well as the interdependence of federal and state systems, required to find paths to serve the diversity of claimants now authorized to use the courts.
What results from this integrated narrative? The federal courts canon
on which Daniel Meltzer centered his teaching needs to be rethought so as to
clarify how much state practices and doctrine drive federal constitutional law
and bear the brunt of its impact. For example, the 1963 decision of Gideon v.
Wainwright should be read with an understanding of the role played by dozens of states, funding indigent defense in the decade before. Their initiatives
demonstrated the feasibility of providing counsel and therefore encouraged
the U.S. Supreme Court to declare a national Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.35 In the decades since, as prosecution rates soared, the challenges
and failures of state-level implementation were critical in the Court’s refusal,
in 2011, to require counsel in Turner v. Rogers before a civil contemnor could
be sent, at the behest of a private opponent, to jail for twelve months.36
Through this integrated narrative, the vulnerability of both court systems comes to the fore. Daniel Meltzer understood the role that federal law
played in shaping legal identity; doing so seemed both obvious and relatively
easy. In the twenty-first century, the challenges of sharing a sense of a “we,”
comprised of commitments to fair hearings and decisions anchored in facts,
appear daunting. Many methods of linking Americans together are needed,
and one is through sharing their identity as legal rights holders, able to share
places called “the courts.”
To continue to shape a common heritage of responsible and responsive
law requires the federal judiciary to locate its work in supportive relationships
with both Congress and state courts. The federal courts need to articulate
new agendas that not only adopt a posture of “hospitality” (for which Daniel
Meltzer called37) but also to become enabling courts by fashioning innovative
methods to facilitate and subsidize public participation from diverse segments of the body politic, bringing claims for and to justice.
II. NATIONAL NORMS, POLITICAL IDENTITY,
A.

AND

FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS

Developing National Services from Marine Hospitals and Post Offices to
Federal Courts

A brief historical overview is in order to underscore the work, ingenuity,
and political gumption that produced the common heritage that those of us,
coming of age in the latter part of the twentieth century, understood to form
35 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also infra text accompanying notes 451–55.
36 564 U.S. 431 (2011).
37 See, e.g., Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423, 424
(1974) [hereinafter Meltzer, Standing].
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the core precepts of “the federal courts.”38 To do so requires a baseline,
provided by this photograph of the first major federal building erected in
Galveston, Texas, in 1861, soon after Texas became a state.
FIGURE 1: UNITED STATES CUSTOM HOUSE, GALVESTON, TEXAS, 1861

United States Custom House, Galveston, Supervising Architect: Ammi B. Young, 1861; converted for
use as a federal courthouse in 1917.
Image reproduced courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration.

I came upon this image in a search for information about federal courthouse construction in the nineteenth century. But, as the title indicates, the
building was instead a Custom House. At the time, the U.S. government
owned about fifty buildings outside of Washington, D.C., and none of them
were courthouses. The early building types were, instead, custom houses and
marine hospitals, sheltering national government services that, along with
the American Post Office Department, steamboat inspectors, and a variety of
local government activities, created a swath of public sector activities shaping
the nation.39
38 My discussion relates to Judith Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary (Literally and
Legally): The Monuments of Chief Justices Taft, Warren, and Rehnquist, 87 IND. L.J. 823, 855
(2012) [hereinafter Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary]; see also JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING
THE JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2012)
[hereinafter CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY]; THE ESSENTIAL FEDERAL COURTS HISTORY,
supra note 3.
39 See BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF NATIONAL
AUTHORITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2009) [hereinafter BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT
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The most expansive early federal system was the post office. Just as the
Constitution authorizes the creation of federal courts, it also authorizes Congress to “establish Post Offices and post Roads.”40 Through the Post Office
Act of 1792 and many statutes thereafter, Congress expanded the system that
Benjamin Franklin had once headed.41
The nation-building function was plain; James Madison extolled the post
as a vehicle for uncensored and subsidized newspaper circulation that would
(he hoped) promote “public opinion.”42 The 1792 Post Office Act43 created
the system for the “conveyance of information” into “every part of the
Union.”44 An impressive infrastructure was thus put into place and, by 1828,
“the American postal system had almost twice as many offices as the postal
system in Great Britain and over five times as many offices as the postal system in France.”45 By 1831, the Post Office Department employed some 8000
people, about three quarters of the federal government’s civilian workforce
at that time.46
OUT OF SIGHT]; JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION (2012)
[hereinafter MASHAW, ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION]; RICHARD R. JOHN, SPREADING THE
NEWS: THE AMERICAN POSTAL SYSTEM FROM FRANKLIN TO MORSE (1998) [hereinafter JOHN,
SPREADING THE NEWS].
40 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8, cl. 7.
41 On debates about how to structure the postal system, see JOHN, SPREADING THE
NEWS, supra note 39, at 30–37. John credited the Post Office Act of 1792 with shaping
“American postal policy in three major ways”: by admitting newspapers “into the mail on
unusually favorable terms” (and in turn facilitating the growth of the press); by prohibiting
surveillance and censorship; and by creating procedures enabling the “extraordinarily
rapid expansion of the postal network” from the seaboard into Appalachia. Id. at 31.
42 James Madison, Public Opinion, NATIONAL GAZETTE, Dec. 19, 1791, reprinted in 14
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON (Robert Rutland & Thomas Mason eds., 1983). Whether the
goal was to enable Habermasian-style discourse or to shape and thereby obtain popular
approval is a source of dispute. See, e.g., Alan Gibson, Veneration and Vigilance: James
Madison and Public Opinion, 1785–1800, 67 REV. POL. 5 (2005); Colleen A. Sheehan,
Madison v. Hamilton: The Battle over Republicanism and the Role of Public Opinion, 98 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 405 (2004).
The postal service has not been free of all forms of state control. Rather, “tampering”
with the mails is a federal crime, and mailing “obscene” matters became a crime in 1865,
expanded in 1873 under the Comstock Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012); Comstock Act,
ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598-99 (1873); Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 89, § 16, 13 Stat. 507, 507; see also
Ron Nixon, Copy of Postal Service Audit Shows Extent of Mail Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/us/copy-of-postal-service-audit-shows-extentof-mail-surveillance.html.
43 An Act to Establish the Post-Office and Post Roads Within the United States, 2d
Congress, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 232 (1792).
44 See RICHARD R. JOHN, NETWORK NATION: INVENTING AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 19 (2010) [hereinafter JOHN, NETWORK NATION] (citing Julian P. Bretz, Some Aspects
of Postal Extension into the West, 5 AM. HIST. ASS’N ANN. REP. 145 (1909)).
45 JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS, supra note 39, at 5. The Postal System was self-sustaining until the 1830s, when it went into debt. See MASHAW, ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION, supra note 39, at 179–80.
46 BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT, supra note 39, at 220; see also JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS, supra note 39. At the time, payment came through commissions. BALOGH,
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“Access to courts” is a familiar phrase. When reflecting on “our common heritage,” equal attention should be paid to access to the economy, to
interpersonal connections, and to national identity through federally subsidized mail services. A campaign for “cheap postage” produced the Post
Office Acts of 1845, 1851, and 185547 that also marked a shift in services from
requiring collection of fees on receipt to pre-paid stamped letters, which was
a practice borrowed from English reforms.48 As David Henkin recounted,
once prices for letters dropped and paper and stamps were readily available,
a culture of letter writing became part of ordinary people’s lives—forging
personal relationships across wide expanses as well as enabling information
sharing about economics and land management.49
Newspapers benefitted from rate cuts in 1851, and provisions were made
for free distribution within counties where they were published. Bound
books were accepted for mailing in the same year.50 The post offices were,
famously, a conduit for abolitionists, even as the South sought to suppress
pamphleteering.51 The Civil War also provided the impetus for the “postal
money order,” a safe method of sending money home.52 Railway mail,
including sorting mail on moving trains, became common thereafter.53
In short, postal offices were commonplace long before federal courthouses; U.S. mail services were everywhere but federal judges were not. Single-purpose, dedicated buildings were not needed for the lower federal
judiciary which, in the 1850s, included fewer than forty federal judges sitting
A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT, supra note 39, at 220; see generally NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO,
AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT,
1780–1940 (2013).
47 JOHN, NETWORK NATION, supra note 44, at 15–20. The 1855 Act amended the
existing legislation to require prepayment on “all letters passing through or in the mail of
the United States.” Act of Mar. 3, 1855, ch. 173, 10 Stat. 641, 641–42.
48 See R.H. Coase, Rowland Hill and the Penny Post, 6 ECONOMICA 423 (1939); R.H.
Coase, The British Post Office and the Messenger Companies, 4 J.L & ECON. 12 (1961). In the
United States, stamps were not required but were a “convenience,” and supplemented the
“Postmasters’ provisional[ ],” which were in use in various localities. ARTHUR E. SUMMERFIELD, U.S. MAIL: THE STORY OF THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE 62 (1960). In 1855,
prepayment by stamps became obligatory. Id. at 63.
49 DAVID M. HENKIN, THE POSTAL AGE: THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN COMMUNICATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2006).
50 SUMMERFIELD, supra note 48, at 64–65. He credited Nathan K. Hall, the Postmaster
General in the Fillmore Administration, with these innovations. Summerfield also complained that as a consequence, in the 1950s, “the average piece of second-class mail pays
roughly a fifth of the cost of delivering it.” Id.
51 HENKIN, supra note 49, at 24–25; JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS, supra note 39, at
257–283.
52 SUMMERFIELD, supra note 48, at 79.
53 See JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS, supra note 39, at 75–76. The costs, controversies,
and conflicts over routes and politics are found in materials in 2 THE AMERICAN POSTAL
NETWORK, 1792–1914 (Richard R. John, ed. 2012). See, e.g., B.B. Meeker, Overland Mail
Route from Lake Superior to Puget’s Sound, in 2 JOHN, THE AMERICAN POSTAL NETWORK, supra,
at 103; Issac Hinckley, Postal Cars or No Postal Cars? A Question to be Settled by the Action or
Inaction of Congress (1874), in 2 JOHN, THE AMERICAN POSTAL NETWORK, supra, at 289.
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in the then-thirty-seven district courts around the country. California, for
example, had two federal judges after its admission as a state in 1850.54
None of the judges had a courthouse “of their own” (to borrow from Virginia
Woolf). Federal judges either used rooms in buildings such as the Custom
House in Galveston55 or relied on space provided in state courts or other
facilities. Indeed, the word “courthouse” was hardly mentioned in congressional materials addressing the authorization for federal buildings in the
pre–Civil War era.
The expansion of the federal government, both before and after the
Civil War, produced the changes that shaped “the federal courts” as we have
come to know them. In 1852, the Treasury Department created a unit called
the Office of the Supervising Architect and centralized decisionmaking about
federal buildings.56 Soon thereafter, government records included specific
calls for courthouse construction.57 After a hiatus because of the Civil War,
the Northern victory sparked new efforts to impose and demonstrate federal
authority. Thus, two creatures of the 1789 Congress, the lower federal courts
and the Treasury Department, came into closer contact because Congress
repeatedly turned to the federal courts as instruments of federal norm
enforcement.
As is familiar, in 1867, Congress gave federal courts authority to hear
habeas corpus petitions from individuals held in state custody.58 In 1871,
Congress authorized federal courts to hear cases alleging deprivations of civil
rights59 and, in 1875, Congress gave the federal courts what has come to be
known as “general federal question jurisdiction” to hear claims (if the
54 See Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships—District Courts, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, [hereinafter Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships in the U.S. District
Courts], http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/authorized-judgeships/chronological
-history-authorized-judgeships-district-courts (last visited May 19, 2016).
55 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1851, ch. 32, 9 Stat. 598, 609 (appropriating funds for a
custom house in Savannah, Georgia to be used for “furniture and fixtures for the accommodation of the officers of the revenue, as also for the post-office, and United States
courts”). Thanks are due to Marin Levy, now a law professor at Duke, for her innovative
research as a law student that taught me so much about early federal building programs.
56 No statutory authority supported the Secretary of Treasury when he first created the
Office of the Supervising Architect, but legislation in the 1860s and thereafter made mention of the job. DARRELL HEVENOR SMITH, INST. FOR GOV’T RESEARCH, THE OFFICE OF THE
SUPERVISING ARCHITECT OF THE TREASURY: ITS HISTORY, ACTIVITIES, AND ORGANIZATION 6–7
(1923). For example, the Act of Mar. 14, 1864, ch. 30, § 6, 13 Stat. 22, 27, provided for
“one superintending architect, one assistant architect,” several clerks, and a messenger.
57 In 1855, the Secretary of Interior and Postmaster General called for “sites for court
houses and post offices” in Philadelphia, New York, and Boston. S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 33-30
(1855). The decision by Congress to create an office of the Supervising Architect was both
evidence of the development of federal bureaucracy and (as Max Weber has taught us) an
example of how once in place, a bureaucracy generates agendas for its own growth.
58 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385, 385.
59 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13.
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amount in controversy sufficed) alleging a violation of rights arising under
federal law.60
Implementation came in part through better organization of federal lawyers. In 1870, Congress created the Department of Justice to add both
resources to and a measure of control over a dispersed system. The Justice
Department replaced the Interior Secretary by gaining “supervisory powers
. . . over the accounts of the district attorneys, marshals, clerks, and other
officers of the courts of the United States.”61
Another technique to instantiate federal authority was construction,
which gave the federal government a material presence in local communities.
“Between 1866 and 1897 . . . the federal government built nearly three hundred new buildings throughout the Union.”62 The 1892 U.S. Post Office and
Court house built in Denver, Colorado, depicted in Figure 2, is one example
of the combination buildings that became commonplace.63
FIGURE 2: UNITED STATES POST OFFICE AND COURT
DENVER, COLORADO, 1892

HOUSE,

United States Post Office (United States Post Office and Court House), Denver,
Colorado. Supervising Architects: Mifflin E. Bell and Will A Freret, 1892.
Photographer: Wm. Henry Jackson.
Image reproduced courtesy of the Denver Public Library, Western History
Collection, WH-1573.

60 Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470.
61 Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 15, 16 Stat. 162, 164. Crowe termed the post–Civil
War era the judiciary’s decades of empowerment. See CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY,
supra note 38, at 132–70.
62 LOIS CRAIG, THE FEDERAL PRESENCE: ARCHITECTURE, POLITICS, AND SYMBOLS IN
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BUILDING 163 (1978).
63 Note that the Denver Public Library catalogued the photograph in Figure 2 as a
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The joining of post offices and courts meant that individuals had firsthand
experiences of the utility of the national government as a service provider.
While investments in federal building in major hubs such as Denver
made sense,64 courthouse construction was not always tied to need. Appropriations for buildings rewarded loyal congressmen by giving their constituents “federal presents,” as one commentator put it.65 For example,
“Memphis received a courthouse even though no federal courts were held
there,”66 and needs-assessment surveys were not authorized until decades
later, in 1926.67 The U.S. Supreme Court garnered its first independent
building in 1935, as depicted in a photo taken in that year.
FIGURE 3: UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, WASHINGTON, D.C., 1935

United States Supreme Court, Washington, D.C. Architect: Cass Gilbert, 1935.
Archival image from 1935 reproduced courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration.

“Post Office”; the title “Post Office and Court House” comes from the Federal Judicial
Center’s archive of federal courthouses, which is a resource for all interested in the federal
courts’ history. Historic Federal Courthouses, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/
courthouses.nsf/getcourthouse?OpenAgent&chid=9574402A6E0FFDF28525718B0055BA
41 (last visited May 19, 2016).
64 The volume of mail as well as of litigation prompted the replacement of this building with a huge marble structure, running a full block in 1916—now known as the Byron
White Courthouse and housing the Tenth Circuit. Discussion of that facility can be found
in Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary, supra note 38, at 855.
65 THOMAS J. SCHLERETH, VICTORIAN AMERICA: TRANSFORMATIONS IN EVERYDAY LIFE,
1876–1915, at 76 (Richard Balkin ed., 1991).
66 CRAIG, supra note 62, at 163.
67 Id.
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Whenever I look at the Court’s early photographs, I am struck by the
dissonance between its façade and that era’s architectural styles (Art Deco
moving towards Modernism) that were then in vogue. The goal of this Greek
Revival building was to convey the impression that it had always been there.68
In short, whether in Denver or Memphis or Washington, the monumental edifices that housed the federal courts were built out of a mix of economic interests in nationalizing the economy, political efforts to enforce
federal norms, pork barrel earmarks, and successful lobbying by lawyers,
judges, and architects who were themselves forming national professional
groups between the 1880s and the 1920s. It was this confluence that enabled
the federal courts to become sources of our common narratives.
B.

Hospitable Courts: Meltzer’s Analysis of a Common Heritage of Constitutional
Rights and Remedies

By the time that Daniel Meltzer began in the 1970s to write about the
federal courts, the people laying claim to rights of entry were diverse.
Between the Court’s landmark civil rights cases and congressional legislation,
the federal courts had become venues for individuals alleging discrimination
based on race, ethnicity, gender, and age; laborers advancing Fair Labor
Standards claims; social security recipients seeking benefits; consumers claiming violations of fair credit obligations and federal securities regulations; prisoners protesting conditions of confinement or alleging unconstitutional
convictions; railroad workers seeking compensation for injuries; and environmentalists aiming to preserve wildernesses. Access for some of these claimants was facilitated by federal funding for the Legal Services Corporation,
attorney fee-shifting, and procedural rules authorizing class actions and
other forms of aggregation.
Meltzer’s scholarship, spanning the decades from 1974 through 2013,
focused on the doctrine produced by the federal judiciary as it elaborated its
role in responding to this array of claimants. Beginning with Daniel Meltzer’s unsigned 1974 Harvard Law Review note on third-party standing,69 one
finds the scholar who we (students of the federal courts) know well, aiming
to build coherent theories out of a patchwork of cases. What Meltzer argued
for, repeatedly, was a judicial posture of hospitality toward rights-seekers. He
urged courts to adopt a flexible, pragmatic approach to fashioning workable,
if limited, remedies.
The issue that Meltzer addressed in 1974 when he was still in law school
was the authority of individuals to raise or defend claims by referencing legal
rights of third parties. A then-current example was whether a white landowner could defend a damage action for breach of a covenant not to sell
68 See generally Paul Spencer Byrad, Representing American Justice: The United States
Supreme Court, in CASS GILBERT, LIFE AND WORK: ARCHITECT OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 272
(Barbara S. Christen & Steven Flanders eds., 2001); see also Judith Resnik & Dennis Curtis,
Inventing Democratic Courts: A New and Iconic Supreme Court, 38 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 207 (2013).
69 Meltzer, Standing, supra note 37.
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land to blacks by asserting that such an agreement violated the equal protection rights of the black purchaser; the Court permitted the vendor to do so.70
Meltzer’s point was that the Court’s responses to such third-party interests (a presumption against, plus exceptions) were grounded in whether a
specific litigant would prevail on the merits rather than in a general theory of
why Article III ought to be read to enable federal judges to hear such arguments, win or lose.71 Meltzer argued that as long as individuals were themselves injured, the Court ought to “adopt a rule considerably more hospitable
to the assertion” by such “dutyholder-claimants”72 of interests of those
beyond their own so as to ensure protection for the “constitutional rights of
third parties.”73
More than a decade later, in 1988, Meltzer returned to the topic of remedies; the context was the “chilly” reception of the Burger Court to cases
involving police misconduct.74 Meltzer distinguished between criminal
defendants’ allegations of police misbehavior in support of individual arguments to quash indictments or exclude evidence (“defensive” claims), and
plaintiffs’ affirmative (what he termed “offensive”) efforts to obtain structural
relief in cases like City of Los Angeles v. Lyons and Rizzo v. Goode.75 Meltzer
puzzled about why the Court was then relatively more receptive to defensive
remedies than to offensive ones.76
Meltzer counseled judges to be open to “offensive,” injunctive remedies
because they would be predicated on systemic information beyond an individual instance of police misbehavior. Moreover, such structural relief was
important because “large public bureaucracies” could threaten “a greatly
expanded list of individual rights,” not directed at “identifiable individuals
but at the public at large.”77
For example, he reminded readers that in Rizzo v. Goode, the district
court–level injunction dismantled by the Supreme Court had called on the
police department to develop “new complaint procedures designed to minimize recurrence of fourth amendment violations.”78 Meltzer argued that
judges, “drawing upon deep traditions in our legal culture,”79 had a special
70 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (discussed in Meltzer, Standing, supra note
37, at 425–26). Meltzer distinguished his concern from discussions of statutory overbreadth, in which litigants argue that, although their speech may not be protected, the
speech of others should be. Meltzer, Standing, supra note 37, at 438–39.
71 Meltzer, Standing, supra note 37, at 427–28.
72 Id. at 434–43 & n.96.
73 Id. at 423.
74 Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 250 (1988) [hereinafter Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations].
75 Id. at 250.
76 Id. at 327–28.
77 Id. at 328.
78 Id. at 289.
79 Id. at 288.
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competence to shape such “deterrent remedies.”80 Meltzer also disagreed
with the Court’s holding in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons that Mr. Lyons, who
survived a police chokehold, could not seek injunctive relief because he
could not show that he would again be a victim of the Los Angeles Police
Department chokehold policy.81 Meltzer argued that such hurdles of standing could be overcome, in part through congressional direction82 authorizing class actions to be brought by “plaintiffs who lack injury in fact”83 but
who could serve as private attorneys general.
The need for an expansion of the strictures on standing came from the
importance of the rights that were at stake and that were at risk. Thus, Meltzer called for courts to be open to private enforcement of rights through a
careful contextual approach that, as he put it, “resist[s] wholesale exclusion
of particular remedial techniques.”84
More generally, Meltzer thought that the idea of either a judicial or a
legislative monopoly on remedies was misguided.85 Repeatedly, he discussed
the “incompleteness” of legislative enactments. Yet, in lieu of seeing such
gaps as failures of bargaining,86 Meltzer thought that Congress could not,
and ought not to try to, resolve all issues ex ante. Rather than aspiring for
Congress to craft “all-complete statutory codes,”87 Meltzer posited that lacunae were necessary and useful facets of legislation. As problems emerged,
the judiciary could shape appropriate rules, extrapolating from statutes.
80 Id. at 287.
81 See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); see also Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations, supra note 74, at 309–12.
82 Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations, supra note 74, at 309–12.
83 Id. at 312. The examples included the Fair Housing Act. See id. at 313 n.374 (citing
Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (White, J., concurring)). Meltzer
also noted that “[o]n the other hand . . . the Court has at times said that article III imposes
a uniform requirement that the plaintiff have suffered distinct and palpable injury, which
cannot be avoided merely because Congress has authorized the suit.” Id. at 313 (citing
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982); Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979)).
84 Id. at 252. It is hard not to read these articles with the current array of policing
tragedies in mind. With the hindsight of the New York City “stop and frisk” litigation, and
the shootings and deaths—Michael Brown, Freddie Gray, and so many others—the question is whether, if federal courts had been permitted to lend help in the 1970s and 1980s,
fewer harms would have occurred.
85 Id. at 299–300.
86 Meltzer did not favor a checklist for Congress, as the Federal Courts Study Committee had proposed. Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT.
REV. 343, 395–97 [hereinafter Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity].
87 Id. at 396 (quoting D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 469–70 (1942)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
The question of gaps has been addressed more recently by Sean Farhang. Based on
an analysis of more than 200 statutes, Farhang found that Congress provided greater specificity and direction when authorizing enforcement of statutory rights in courts than when
relying on administrative implementation. Sean Farhang, Legislating for Litigation in the
Age of Statute 19–34 (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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As the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence became increasingly insistent on
not doing so, Meltzer saw such doctrinal developments as “threats to the
effectiveness of congressional legislation,”88 and “a significant departure
from historic norms.”89 Far afield from Jeremy Bentham’s hostility to the
common law and his preference for codification, Meltzer’s work reflected
ideas associated with the Legal Process School, extolling the institutional
competencies and interdependencies of the courts and Congress.
Meltzer’s commitment to judicially honed remedies can be found in several articles, including work on retroactivity and legal novelty, which he coauthored with Richard Fallon.90 They argued that questions about what new
laws applied to cases already decided were best understood as part of the law
of remedies.91 Writing in 1991, they voiced concern about doctrines
expanding sovereign and official immunity, which could undercut “effective
redress to individual victims of constitutional violations.”92 The need to
“keep government within the bounds of law” required more constitutional
remedies than existed.93
Meltzer also thought that federal courts could make special remedial
contributions because they were national institutions. He saw the need to
streamline transaction costs in large-scale litigation and argued that federal
judges could do so through the creation of “a single set of uniform federal
choice of law rules, binding in the state as well as the federal courts.”94 For
him, federal courts were an underutilized resource for complex diversity
cases because, as a “neutral arbiter,”95 the federal judiciary could harmonize
different legal rules and thereby lessen the challenges of litigation involving
large scale, multinational actors.96
Meltzer’s concerns grew as his measured approach diverged more and
more from that of the Court, which continued shutting down avenues of
relief. (As Professor Tara Grove reported, Meltzer told his students that his
Federal Courts class might well have been called “999 ways to kick a case out
of federal court.”97) In 1996, Meltzer wrote an essay for the Supreme Court
Review and focused on Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, which held that Congress could not rely on the Commerce Clause to authorize Indian Tribes to
88 Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, supra note 86, at 410.
89 Id. at 389.
90 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991) [hereinafter Fallon & Meltzer, New Law].
91 Id. at 1736.
92 Id. at 1736–37; see also Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified
Immunity, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 62 (2016).
93 Fallon & Meltzer, New Law, supra note 90, at 1736–37.
94 Meltzer, The Judiciary’s Bicentennial, supra note 1, at 438.
95 Id. at 439.
96 Id. at 438–40.
97 Email from Tara Leigh Grove, Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School, to
author (Jan. 16, 2016) (on file with author).
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bring lawsuits directly against states.98 Objecting, Meltzer discussed the need
for “retrospective state government liability.”99 He noted that, given the
instability (analytically and in terms of the close vote) of sovereign immunity
doctrine, Seminole Tribe might prove to be a “quixotic” decision, a “gesture in
the direction of a diffuse conception of state sovereignty that in the end will
not be generally enforced by the Court.”100
Yet in 1999, in Alden v. Maine, the Court concluded that its interpretation of state sovereign immunity precluded state probation officers from pursuing claims of violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act in state court.101
Meltzer bemoaned the inconsistency of the Alden Court’s discussion about
the legitimacy of federal regulation while making unavailable major mechanisms of enforcement.102 He criticized the Court for undervaluing the
importance of “organizational liability for damages”103 and for overvaluing
the federal government’s role in bringing enforcement actions. As Meltzer
reported, private lawsuits then outnumbered government lawsuits “by a ratio
of roughly ten to one,” providing evidence of the “considerable costs to holding private enforcement unconstitutional.”104
A few years later, Meltzer was heartened (as was Richard Fallon) by the
Court’s rulings involving detention at Guantánamo Bay.105 They praised the
embrace of what they described as a “Common Law Model” that recognized
the “broad rights” of American citizens not caught on battlefields to obtain
adjudication in regular courts.106 Boumediene v. Bush followed, and again
Meltzer underscored the significance of the constitutional remedy guaranteed by Article I’s injunction that, absent domestic insurrection or invasion,
the writ of habeas corpus could not be suspended.107
98 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign
Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 1 [hereinafter Meltzer, The Seminole Decision].
99 Meltzer, The Seminole Decision, supra note 98, at 47–60.
100 Id. at 65.
101 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 711–12 (1999).
102 See Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1026–28 (2000) [hereinafter Meltzer, Sovereign Immunity: Five
Authors]. Meltzer’s discussion of the role played by “dignity” in the development of immunity doctrine, see id. at 1038–47, piqued my interest, and the result was the essay I coauthored with Julie Suk. See Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury:
Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921 (2003).
103 Meltzer, Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors, supra note 102, at 1016.
104 Id. at 1022–23.
105 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction,
Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029 (2007) [hereinafter Fallon
& Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas
Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay on Law and Political Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352
(2010).
106 Fallon & Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, supra note 105, at 2111–12.
107 Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Guantánamo: The Boumediene Decision, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 1; see also Daniel J. Meltzer, The Story of Ex parte McCardle: The
Power of Congress to Limit the Supreme Court’s Appellate Jurisdiction, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES
57 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010) [hereinafter Meltzer, Ex Parte McCardle].
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As this symposium’s essays in honor of Meltzer reflect,108 the federal
courts that he admired and so brilliantly understood produced a complex
thicket of doctrine and practices. Meltzer sought rules that respected the
authority of both Congress and the states while providing avenues for the
articulation of new rights and remedies, responsive to individual violations of
constitutional rights and to what he saw as the threats posed by “large public
bureaucracies” whose practices put the “public at large” at risk.109 Time and
again, Meltzer’s signatures were sympathetic readings of everyone’s
problems, be they victims of police misconduct; congressional staffers trying
to craft language that inevitably needed judges to provide purposive interpretations to achieve statutory ends;110 or judges “straining under caseloads that
have increased far more quickly” than the number of judgeships.111
Meltzer’s vision of a vital role for the federal courts was predicated on
respect for individuals, for institutional actors, and for the needs of the judiciary itself. He aimed to generate legal doctrines that protected constitutional principles through avenues to judicial review while recognizing the risk
of overuse of both rights and remedies. The common intellectual tradition
that Meltzer not only inherited but also built was shaped by Marbury v.
Madison, insisting on the important role that judges played in naming legal
violations even when, pace Marbury, they could not provide remedies.112
Meltzer’s was a quest for principles, for responsible limits, and for identifying
when particular remedies were “constitutionally required.”113 And, as others
have noted,114 Meltzer’s optimism shines through.
C.

Investing in and Democratizing the Federal Courts

The twentieth-century intellectual tradition that Meltzer admired was not
inevitable but a product of social and political will that entailed intense conflicts. The rights-to-remedies ideology has deep roots, embedded in state
constitutions’ clauses115 and embraced in the early nineteenth century in
108 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., On Viewing the Courts as Junior Partners of Congress in Statutory
Interpretation Cases: An Essay Celebrating the Scholarship of Daniel J. Metlzer, 91 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1743 (2016) [hereinafter Fallon, On Viewing the Courts as Junior Partners]; Henry Paul
Monaghan, An Essay in Honor of Daniel Meltzer: A Cause of Action, Anyone?: Federal Equity and
the Preemption of State Law, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1807 (2016) [hereinafter Monaghan, An
Essay in Honor of Daniel Meltzer].
109 Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations, supra note 74, at 328.
110 Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 15 (2013) [hereinafter Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism].
111 Meltzer, The Judiciary’s Bicentennial, supra note 1, at 431–31.
112 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (discussed in Fallon & Meltzer,
New Law, supra note 90, at 1778–80).
113 Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, supra note 23.
114 Fallon, On Viewing the Courts as Junior Partners, supra note 108.
115 Examples come from ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14 (1819) (“All courts shall be open, and
every person, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered, without sale, denial, or
delay.”), and CONN. CONST. art. I, § 12 (1818) (“All courts shall be open, and every person,
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Marbury v. Madison. Yet the scope of rights-holding and of rights-holders was
constrained in both state and federal courts. When the U.S. Supreme Court
opened the doors to the first courtroom of its own in 1935, the now-familiar
words “Equal Justice Under Law” adorned the entry to its front door. But
that “equal justice” did not have the referent that it has today.
Courts were not then havens for all persons in the United States.
Rather, federal law famously created and tolerated profound inequalities, as
discrimination based on race, sex, gender, and much else was licit. One way
to make this point is to consider a large mural, called Justice as Protector and
Avenger, installed in 1938 behind a judge’s bench in a courtroom in Aiken,
South Carolina.
FIGURE 4: JUSTICE

AS

PROTECTOR

AND

AVENGER

Justice as Protector and Avenger, Stefan Hirsch, 1938, Charles E. Simons, Jr. Federal Courthouse, Aiken,
South Carolina.
Image reproduced courtesy of the Fine Arts Collection, United States General Services Administration.

The work was commissioned as part of the federal government’s Works
Progress Administration (WPA), supporting new buildings and artworks
around the country. The central female figure references the Renaissance
Virtue Justice,116 inflected by the artist’s appreciation for twentieth-century
Mexican muralists. As this WPA artist explained, his “figure of ‘Justice’”
for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.”). See generally Judith Resnik, Constitutional Entitlements to and in Courts: Remedial Rights in an Age of
Egalitarianism: The Childress Lecture, 56 ST. LOUIS. L.J. 917 (2012).
116 See generally JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 1–61 (2011).
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was “without any of the customary . . . symbolic representations (scale,
sword, book . . .).”117 Rather, the only “allegory” that he had permitted
himself was “to use the red, white and blue [of the United States flag] for
her garments.”118
What did others see? A local newspaper objected to the “barefooted
mulatto woman wearing bright-hued clothing.”119 The federal judge in
whose courtroom the mural was displayed called it a monstrosity, a “profanation of the otherwise perfection” of the courthouse, and wanted it
removed.120 The artist both protested and offered to repaint; he explained
that he was “anxious to obliterate this ‘blemish,’ because [he] had certainly
intended nothing of the sort.”121 A proposed compromise, to “lighten” Justice’s skin color, never took place because of the press coverage about what
had become a national controversy; the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People and artists objected to the condemnation
and to the alteration of the art. The denouement was to cover the mural
with a tan velvet curtain, seen at the edges of the photograph.
In 1938, a picture of a seemingly dark-skinned woman could not pass,
uncontested, into the deserving ranks of images that qualified to represent
“Justice.” The draped wall echoed the limited responses of law for, in that
era, people labeled “mulattos” also did not have much protection in courts.
Thus, even as the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1935 building advertised the words
“Equal Justice Under Law” above its front steps, the import that we take
from it today—our common heritage—comes from decades after, as the
Court insisted on equality in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education,122 in 1971
in Reed v. Reed,123 and in 2015 in Obergefell v. Hodges.124 In the wake of
these doctrinal commitments to equality for all persons, the phrase “Equal
Justice Under Law” has become one of the Court’s taglines. And, although
that exact phrase appears nowhere in the U.S. Constitution, since it
appeared on the courthouse, it has been quoted in hundreds of opinions.
Daniel Meltzer understood both the importance of such doctrine and its
dependence on what he termed the “machinery of jurisdiction and remedies that can transform rights proclaimed on paper into practical protec117 Letter from Stefan Hirsch to Forbes Watson, Advisor to the Section of Painting &
Sculpture of the Treasury Department (May 18, 1938) (on file with GSA Archives, Public
Building Services, Fine Arts Collection, 477, Stefan Hirsch).
118 Id.
119 See MARLENE PARK & GERALD E. MARKOWITZ, DEMOCRATIC VISTAS: POST OFFICES AND
PUBLIC ART IN THE NEW DEAL 61 (1984).
120 Matthew Brody, Controversy Shadows Mural, AUGUSTA CHRON. (Ga.) (Aug. 26, 2001),
http://chronicle.augusta.com/stories/2001/08/26/met_321475.shtml#.Vvcxc8ddJEc.
121 Letter from Stefan Hirsch to Edward B. Rowan, Superintendent of the Section of
Painting & Sculpture (Oct. 7, 1938) (on file with GSA Archives, Public Building Services,
Fine Arts Collection 477, Stefan Hirsch).
122 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
123 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
124 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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tions.”125 Indeed, in his view, the on-the-ground work of that machinery
was what posed the “central problems for constitutional law.”126
One piece of the fabrication—the filing of a lawsuit—is often taken for
granted. Given that the contemporary literature is awash with the rhetoric
of an overuse of courts (the litigation “explosion” and the “litigious” society127), it is useful to remember that the federal courts were once relatively
lonely venues, looking for cases.128 Moreover, in light of the intellectual
space that “the federal courts” have come to occupy, the numbers of filings
at the beginning of the twentieth century seem surprisingly small.
FIGURE 5: CIVIL
300,000
250,000

AND

CRIMINAL FILINGS IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURTS: 1901, 1950, 2001

Criminal
Civil

254,523

200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000

37,720

54,622

63,473

16,734 11,971

0
Total
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28,705

Total
1950:
92,342

Total
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317,996

125 Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, supra note 23, at 2537.
126 Id.
127 See generally Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil
Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1998); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Judicial Hellholes, Lawsuit Climates and Bad Social Science: Lessons from West Virginia, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1097 (2008).
128 For details of the small number of cases filed in the early years of the federal courts,
see THE ESSENTIAL FEDERAL COURTS HISTORY, supra note 3, at 13–105. Indeed, when a
district judge opened business in Richmond, Virginia in 1789, there was “no business” and
he closed the session. Id. at 61. In the years between 1817 and 1819, federal district courts
in New York and Pennsylvania had caseloads ranging from 21 to 134 pending cases a year.
Id. at 97.
The number of filings picked up after the Civil War; in Southern states, civil litigants
turned to federal court for debt relief, and the federal government filed criminal cases
seeking to get fees paid. Id. at 67. Thus, “white southerners gained the aid of the federal
courts” through the Bankruptcy Act of 1867. Id. at 176. Northern federal courts likewise
had a large increase in filings, with “a whopping 1229 cases” filed in Massachusetts in 1866.
Id.
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Figure 5, Civil and Criminal Filings in the United States District Courts: 1901,
1950, 2001, outlines the docket growth during that hundred-year span. At
the beginning of the twentieth century, fewer than 30,000 cases were filed
around the United States, and many more of them were criminal than civil.
By the end of the twentieth century, more than 300,000 cases were filed
annually, and many more were civil as compared to criminal.129
Of course, the number of cases is but one metric, and the mix and their
relative “weight” in terms of the amount of work entailed are important factors relating to the need for additional judges.130 Figure 6, Article III
FIGURE 6: ARTICLE III AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS: 1901, 1950, 2001
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129 Data for Figure 5 are derived from multiple sources. Data for 2001 are from ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2001 tbls.C & D
(2001). Data for 1950 are from David S. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical
Analysis of Federal District Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 126 tbl.14
(1981) (citing ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1950)). Data for 1901 are
from id. at 103 tbl.6 (citing 1 AM. LAW INST., A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS 107 (1934); 2 AM. LAW INST., A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 111
(1934)) and are estimated. Numbers do not include bankruptcy filings. During the 26
years from 1960 to 1986, civil filings “grew 398%.” Moore, The Federal Civil Caseload, supra
note 24, at 1178.
130 For example, Richard Posner disaggregated filings between 1981 and 1996 by the
kinds of cases. See RICHARD POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 60–61,
tbl.3.2 (1996) [hereinafter POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS 1996]. He attempted to identify
other measures of workload in the lower courts. Id. at 65–79. For arguments that, given
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Authorized Judgeships: 1901, 1950, 2001, details that the number of life-tenured
judgeships rose from about 100 in 1901 to more than 850 in 2001.131
A full account of appointments, including both the early and the more
recent history, is depicted in Authorized Life-Tenured Lower Court Federal Judgeships, 1789-2015.132 As Figure 7 details, between 1995 and 2015, new judgeships rose by 28, from 824 in 1995 to 852 in 2015.133
FIGURE 7: AUTHORIZED LIFE-TENURED LOWER COURT FEDERAL JUDGESHIPS:
1789–2015
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the addition of magistrate judge positions and greater reliance on senior status judges,
overall judicial workload has not increased, see Moore, The Federal Civil Caseload, supra note
24, at 1187, and infra text accompanying notes 160–80.
131 Data for Figure 6 are drawn from ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDGES AND
JUDGESHIPS: AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS (2012), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/docs/all-judgeships.pdf; see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/docs/history-district-judgeships.pdf.
132 Between 1950 and 2000, Congress added 578 life tenured judgeships, 46 of which
were temporary. Between 1986 and 2014, Congress added 17.2% of district court judgeships that exist today. See Moore, The Federal Civil Caseload, supra note 24, at 1187–88. The
authorized lower court life-tenured federal judgeships increased from 824 in 1995 to 852
in 2016. Congress authorized 37 new judgeships in total during this time: 31 permanent
district court judgeships and six temporary district court judgeships. But because nine
temporary judgeships lapsed or were made permanent during, the net total increase was
twenty-eight. There were no new courts of appeals judgeships (either permanent or temporary) during this time.
133 Data for Figure 7 are derived from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts’
“Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships” for the Courts of Appeals and the District
Courts. See Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships—Courts of Appeals, ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/authorizedjudgeships/chronological-history-authorized-judgeships-courts-appeals; Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships—District Courts, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (Feb. 23,
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Meltzer’s attention to the “machinery” included an appreciation of the
need for both public and private enforcement of rights.134 As noted, Congress repeatedly paved the way to the federal courts for an array of claimants.
Further, with the Certiorari Act of 1925, Congress turned control over the
docket to the Supreme Court by giving it discretion to pick its cases.135 The
Court has since cut its caseload dramatically. The Court is thus unique
among government institutions because it can regularly perform its own competency, by which I mean that it can take and decide whatever number of
cases it wants to, within a term, and publicly be seen as remarkably
efficacious.
Moreover, William Howard Taft’s commitment to the federal rules project, which came to fruition (as did the Supreme Court building) after his
death, linked federal judges across the country by giving them a structure for
daily practices via the shorthand of “the Rules.”136 The sociological import
of the Rules cannot be understated, as they shape (and have reshaped)
expectations of what constitutes “the judicial” role.137 Promulgating rules,
coupled with the chartering in 1939 of the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts and of the Federal Judicial Center in 1966, enabled the federal judiciary to gain autonomy from the Department of Justice, albeit not from the
General Services Administration (GSA), which, since 1949, is the landlord for
most federal buildings. Through the congressional license to have internal
administrators, the judiciary gained the capacity to function as a third

2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/authorized-judgeships/chronologicalhistory-authorized-judgeships-district-courts; see also Authorized Judgeships, ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, (Feb. 26, 2016) http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/authorizedjudgeships. During those years, Congress added thirty-seven new judgeships, all at the district court level; because a few slots were “temporary” and lapsed, the net increase was
twenty-eight.
134 Meltzer, Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors, supra note 102, at 1053 n.177.
135 See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After
the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1644 (2000).
136 A recent illustration comes from Chief Justice Roberts’s year-end State of the Judiciary report, which centered on rule changes on discovery and the loss of the forms. For
discussion of the rule revisions and objections to some, see Brooke D. Coleman, Abrogation
Magic: The Rules Enabling Act Process, Civil Rule 84, and the Forms, 15 NEV. L.J. 1093 (2015),
and Letter from Brooke D. Coleman to the Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the U.S. Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules (Feb. 7, 2014), http://
www.lfcj.com/uploads/3/8/0/5/38050985/frcp_seattle_university_school_of_law._brooke
_coleman_2.7.14.pdf. See also generally Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court
Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559 (2015) [hereinafter Burbank & Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking]; Letter from Stephen Burbank, David
Berger, Professor for the Admin. of Justice, Univ. of Pa. School of Law, to the Comm. on
Rules of Practice & Procedure (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.aceds.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/05/Stephen-Burbank-Comments-to-Committee-on-Rules-of-Practice-andProcedure.doc.
137 See Resnik, Privatization of Process, supra note 32.
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branch, collecting its own data, running education programs for judges,
budgeting, and making its annual case to Congress.138
We who sit in law schools are very much a part of the transformation of
the federal courts into a platform for public education. After 1938, law
school classes on Pleadings and Remedies were replaced by Civil Procedure
courses, centered on the Federal Rules. Under the tutelage of Harry Schulman, Wilbur Katz, Herbert Medina, Felix Frankfurter, Henry Hart, and Herbert Wechsler, the canon of “the federal courts” came into being, and
students were schooled in what the casebook authors insisted was not “simply” procedure but a new body of jurisprudence, called the law of federal
courts.139
Thereafter, both Congress and the civil rights social movement enlisted
federal judges in service of their equality efforts. The ascendency in the
1960s of the federal courts in popular imagination is easily reflected in the
phrase “don’t make a federal case out of it,” which gained currency in that
decade.140
138 See generally THE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS (Cathy A. McCarthy & Tara Treacy eds., 2000).
139 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV.
953, 961 n.37 (1994) (quoting Mary Brigid McManamon, Felix Frankfurter: The Architect of
“Our Federalism”, 27 GA. L. REV. 697, 779–70 (1993)); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story,
102 HARV. L. REV. 688 (1989) (reviewing Paul M. Bator, Daniel J. Meltzer, Paul J. Mishkin
& David L. Shapiro, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
(1988)); Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 671, 681–87 (1989).
140 See ERIC PARTRIDGE, A DICTIONARY OF CATCH PHRASES 52 (1977) (defining the
phrase to mean, colloquially, “Don’t exaggerate the importance of something! Don’t exaggerate the seriousness of my action—e.g., of a mistaken judgment: US: since c. 1950”); see
also HAROLD WENTWORTH & STUART BERG FLEXNER, DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN SLANG 179
(1975) (citing use in 1957 and similarly defining the phrase as “[t]o overemphasize the
importance of something”).
An account going back further is provided in the book Law Talk, co-authored by Fred
Shapiro, James E. Clapp, Elizabeth G. Thornburg, and Marc Galanter (2011). They identified a 1936 short story, printed in the Chicago Daily Tribune, in which a young “Colorado
cowboy” named Barton runs off to Chicago with the even younger daughter of a sheepherder. When the local sheriff uncovers the runaways’ whereabouts, he notifies the Chicago police and adds: “Please arrest and hold these parties, as the girl’s folks are about
crazy. If there is no law to hold Barton on we’ll make a federal case of it.” JAMES E. CLAPP,
ELIZABETH G. THORNBURG, MARC GALANTER & FRED SHAPIRO, LAW TALK 161 (2011) (citing
Police Break in on Romance of the Range, CHI. DAILY TRIB., May 22, 1936, at 1). Thereafter, the
comedian Jimmy Durante used the phrase in a radio comedy skit in 1944 and used it
thereafter. The researchers attribute the negative inferences to an exchange on Milton
Berle’s Texaco Star Theater in 1949. Id. at 163. Thanks are due to Yale Law Librarian
Fred Shapiro for this research.
In terms of use in law, a review of data-based decisions indicates that the phrase was
first used in opinions in the 1960s. For example, a Florida judge explained that a “person
who suffers a major upset over a minor grievance is admonished not to ‘make a federal
case out of it.’” Reynolds v. State, 224 So. 2d 769, 769 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (upholding a prisoner’s claim of access to Florida post-conviction remedies to review convictions
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Fast forward to the 1980s and the chief justiceship of William Rehnquist,
a person not always seen by Federal Courts scholars to be a cheerleader for
the federal courts. Yet, while he was guiding the Court toward a conservative
jurisprudence insistent on state authority, Chief Justice Rehnquist was also an
institution builder. Working with Ralph Meacham, the Director of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO), and judges from the Judicial
Conference whom Rehnquist selected for its Executive Committee, Rehnquist obtained new resources for the federal judiciary. In 1971, the federal
judiciary received $145 million; by 2005, its budget was $5.7 billion dollars,
rising from under one tenth to two tenths of one percent of the federal
budget; during that time period, staff positions rose from about 15,000 to
32,000.141
Buildings are again a way to make the results vivid. During the 1960s
and 1970s, federal judges had talked about their needs for space in terms of
“furnishings.”142 By the 1990s, judges aspired to retain serious architects to
design signature courthouse buildings. Intersecting with federal government
interest in “excellence in architecture,” the Rehnquist Administration
obtained what one newspaper called the “largest public-buildings construction campaign since the New Deal: a 10-year, $10 billion effort to build more
than 50 new Federal courthouses and significantly alter or add to more than
60 others.”143 The federal judiciary thereby had the “fastest growth in square
footage” of any sector under the aegis of the GSA, and between 1996 and
2006, the space dedicated to the federal courts also doubled.144
The “bailouts” and “stimulus” packages of the last decade may make
those numbers seem small, but the sums devoted specifically to federal courts
outstripped those provided to other federal agencies under the GSA. A summary is again provided by way of a photograph, a sampling of United States
Courthouse Buildings and Renovations, finished from 1998 to 2002. Shown
here are buildings (designed by architects such as Harry Cobb, Thom Mayne,
obtained allegedly in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright). Westlaw and Lexis databases of
cases from both before and after 1944 include 79 cases employing the phrase, 63 from the
federal courts and 16 from the state courts. See also Frederick Bernays Wienter, Wanna
Make a Federal Case Out of It?, 48 A.B.A. J. 59 (1962) (speculating on the origins of the
phrase).
141 Russell R. Wheeler, Chief Justice Rehnquist as Third Branch Leader, 89 JUDICATURE 116,
120 (2005).
142 See, e.g., AO ANN. REP. 113 (1975); see also JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT 65 (Sept.
1961) (detailing needs for “the cost of purchasing furniture and furnishings for judges’
chambers and courtrooms”); AO ANN. REP. 197 (1961) (noting needs for “items of furniture, carpeting, draperies, etc., out of the regular appropriation designated for this purpose” to upgrade when items “had become antiquated”).
143 Randy Gragg, Monuments to a Crime-Fearing Age, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 28, 1995, at
36.
144 The Future of the Federal Courthouse Construction Program: Results of a Gov’t Accountability
Office Study on the Judiciary’s Rental Obligations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Dev., Pub.
Bldgs. and Emergency Mgmt. of the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 109th Cong. 269
(2006) (statement of David L. Winstead, Comm’r Pub. Bldgs. Serv., U.S. Gen. Servs.
Admin.).
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and Richard Meier) in Boston, New York, Florida, Washington, D.C., Virginia, Nebraska, Texas, and Oregon.
FIGURE 8: UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION
SAMPLING, 1998–2002

AND

RENOVATION: A

Top (left to right): John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse (Boston, Massachusetts); Alfonse
D’Amato United States Courthouse (Central Islip, New York); United States Courthouse (Tallahassee, Florida). Middle: Wayne Lyman Morse United States Courthouse (Eugene, Oregon); William B.
Bryant United States Courthouse Annex (Washington, D.C.); Wilkie D. Ferguson Jr. United States
Courthouse (Miami, Florida). Bottom: United States Courthouse (Corpus Christi, Texas); Roman L.
Hruska United States Courthouse (Omaha, Nebraska); Spottswood W. Robinson III and Robert R.
Merhige Jr. Federal Courthouse (Richmond, Virginia). Photographers: Taylor Lednum, Thomas
Grooms, and Frank Ooms.
Images reproduced courtesy of the Design Excellence Program, General Services Administration, 2016.

What I have just painted is a picture of the federal courts as a growth
industry, with public and private funds coming into the federal judiciary,
which became popular icons of government as well as pillars of American
legal education. Hence, our “common intellectual heritage” for much of
the twentieth century was that federal courts were central public (and architecturally distinguished) institutions, to be supported even when intense
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disputes existed about their output. Calls for the impeachment of Earl
Warren145 and proposals to eviscerate federal court jurisdiction in cases
about school busing, abortion, or religion (prompted in the wake of court
rulings on these topics146) did not stop Congress from investing and reinvesting in the federal courts.
The important point for those of us who teach about “court stripping”
and interbranch conflicts is that doing so focuses on the exceptions. Our
examples run from Ex parte McCardle in the nineteenth century147 to the
efforts to limit the impact of federal judges’ anti-labor sentiments in the
early part of the twentieth century;148 as well as the Detainee Treatment
Act,149 the Military Commissions Act,150 and Boumediene151 in this century.152 Yet our common heritage has largely been produced by joint-venturing among the branches of the federal government, working together to
expand the girth and authority of the federal courts.153
145 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Judicial Activism or Judicial Necessity: The D.C. District
Court’s Criminal Justice Legacy, 90 GEO. L.J. 685, 693 (2002) (citing Kermit L. Hall, The Warren Court: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 28 IND. L. REV. 309, 326 (1995)).
146 Bills introduced to strip federal court jurisdiction over cases involving mandatory
busing of children in school desegregation cases included: S. 528, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981); S. 1005, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 1147, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 1647,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 1743, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 1760, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981); H.R. 311, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 340, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981);
H.R. 761, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 867, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 869,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 1074, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 1180, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 2047, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 3332, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981). For proposed legislation to strip jurisdiction over cases involving voluntary
school prayer, see S. 481, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 1742, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981);
H.R. 72, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 326, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 408, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 865, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 989, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981); H.R. 1335, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 2347, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981); H.R. 4756, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). For jurisdiction-stripping bills related to
abortion, see S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 583, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S.
1741, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 73, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 900, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). See generally Max Baucus & Kenneth R. Kay, The Court Stripping
Bills: Their Impact on the Constitution, the Courts, and Congress, 27 VILL. L. REV. 988, 992
(1982).
147 74 U.S. 506 (1868).
148 See THE ESSENTIAL FEDERAL COURTS HISTORY, supra note 3, at 220–22.
149 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739.
150 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
151 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
152 See Meltzer, Ex Parte McCardle, supra note 107, at 57; Fallon & Meltzer, Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction, supra note 105.
153 See generally Tara Leigh Grove, The Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 250 (2012); Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2011); Vicki C. Jackson, Introduction: Congressional Control of
Jurisdiction and the Future of the Federal Courts—Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 GEO.
L.J. 2445, 2446 (1998).
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The details I have provided on buildings and judgeships reflect that, in
the years between the 1960s and the 1990s, Congress dispatched the federal
courts hundreds of times, regularly creating new causes of action endowing
individuals with rights to go to the federal courts.154 Further, as Sean
Farhang has analyzed, Congress repeatedly used “incentives” such as treble
damages to encourage the filing of lawsuits by both public and private
actors. Congressional invitations to private parties to pursue their rights
bore fruit. Farhang found that, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the federal courts received about 20,000 employment discrimination
cases a year, ninety-eight percent of which were filed by private litigants.155
Moreover, between the 1940s and the 1960s, federal filings averaged about
three per 100,000 people; by 1996, that rate had increased to twenty-nine
per 100,000.156
In short, not only were rights expanding as a formal matter; more people also saw the courts as potentially responsive to their claims. The capacity to use the courts improved when, in 1974, Congress created the Legal
154 See AO Federal Jurisdiction Legislation, 1974–1998, supra note 4. One analysis of
statutory claims enacted between 1887 and 2004 concluded that Congress provided incentives for filing through “economic rewards for successful plaintiffs” who sought relief from
private sector actors in 84% of the enactments, in 9% against states, and in 17% against the
federal government. SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE UNITED STATES 55, 67 (2010) [hereinafter FARHANG, LITIGATION
STATE]. Private sector defendants ranged from corporations to labor unions, as both liberal and conservative congresses authorized lawsuits to enforce their own view of the public
good. Id. at 68. One variable (not discussed) affecting the distribution of incentives to
pursue particular defendants is the shifting doctrine on sovereign immunity, and the
Court’s conclusion in 1996 that Congress lacked Commerce Clause authority to authorize
actions by private parties seeking monetary relief against states. See Seminole Tribe of Fla.
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
Enhancements include attorney fees, or punitive damages, or other forms of multipliers. FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra at 62. These methods have a long history in U.S.
law, dating back to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Anti-trust Act of
1890. Id. at 63–66. Farhang chronicled that Congress provided 379 litigation incentives
between 1887 and 2004. Id. at 66. Farhang’s interest was in showing that while the scholarly literature hypothesized the enactment of such private rights provisions as predicated
on “rent-seeking” lawyers, interest group issue lobbying, party alignments, and budgetary
constraints, his view was that separation of powers was the more important variable, and
that congresses repeatedly preferred private enforcement to endowing the executive
branch with more authority. Id. at 68–84.
155 Id. at 3.
156 Id. at 12–13. Farhang sought to understand and to model why Congress relied on
private enforcement of statutory rights, in part as an alternative to endowing executive
branch actors with all the enforcement authority. Thus, rather than think about the
expansion of rights claims in general, Farhang wanted to understand congressional action
in mobilizing enforcement of state norms through private actors. In terms of rights-seeking more generally, Farhang noted that the rate of tort litigation in federal courts between
the 1970s and 2005 tapered off, but he did not explore how the rise of doctrines such as
Erie, federal preemption of state tort remedies, and limits on diversity affected that decline.
Id. at 14–15.
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Services Corporation157 and, in 1976, authorized fee shifting for prevailing
claimants in certain kinds of statutory cases.158 Further, private sector institutional litigation organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union
reshaped their own capacity (often with support from foundations), and
the number of specialized “Legal Defense and Education Funds”
increased.159
The volume of filings produced demand for more judges, and Congress
responded both by making small increases in life-tenured positions and by
fashioning new genres of non–Article III judges in Article III courts.160
The number of Article III district court judgeships increased eighteen percent between 1986 and 2013.161 Some sitting judges took “senior status,”
thereby opening up vacant slots while continuing to preside over a reduced
caseload.162
The more substantial response came at the behest of federal judges,
prompting Congress to enact statutes creating a new federal judicial position, a magistrate (renamed magistrate judge in the 1990s).163 That statutory provision for auxiliary judges was followed in the 1980s by legislation
157 Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–355, 88 Stat 378.
158 The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat.
2641.
159 During the first decades of the twentieth century, a wave of “liberal” groups, such as
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the National Bar Association (NBA) (a group
of African American lawyers), and the Legal Defense and Educational Fund (LDF) of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, came to the fore in search of
new understandings of rights. Parallel entities—such as the Mexican American Legal
Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education
Fund (PRLDEF, now called LatinoJustice/PRLDEF), the Asian American Legal Defense
and Education Fund (AALDEF), and the National Organization for Women’s Legal
Defense and Education Fund (NOW LDEF)—formed between the 1960s and the 1980s, as
did the Judicial Council within the NBA, to give voice to African American judges, and the
National Association of Women Judges (NAWJ), committed to women’s equality. See
Judith Resnik, Representing What? (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
160 See generally Judith Resnik, “Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice”: Inventing the Federal District Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607
(2002).
161 From 1986 to 2013, Congress created 116 district court judgeships, including temporary judgeships, and 11 appellate judgeships. See Figure 7, Authorized Life-Tenured Lower
Court Federal Judgeships: 1789–2015; Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships in the U.S.
District Courts, supra note 54.
162 Moore, The Federal Civil Caseload, supra note 24, at 1188, counted an increase of
122% in senior judgeships since 1986. Some judges, however, chose to leave the bench—
in part to pursue more lucrative work. See Stephen B. Burbank, S. Jay Plager & Gregory
Ablavsky, Leaving the Bench, 1970–2009: The Choices Federal Judges Make, What Influences Those
Choices, and Their Consequences, 161 U. PA L. REV. 1 (2012).
163 Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 631–69 (2012)). From 1986 to now, the number of full-time magistrates has
grown 90%. Moore, The Federal Civil Caseload, supra note 24, at 1188.
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creating bankruptcy judges.164 By 2015, in several districts, non–Article III
judges working inside the federal courts number as many or more than
Article III district court judges.165 That increase is part of the demand for
more courthouses, as each of these judicial officers has, until recently, been
thought to require a courtroom of his or her own. Although the current
Chief Justice has suggested the limits of delegation,166 the life-tenured judiciary has approved the transfer of substantial adjudicatory authority to
non–Article III judges, with and without litigants’ consent.167 As a result,
the combined federal judicial workforce (including senior judges) numbered, as of 2015, more than 2300.168
The reminder is that state judges, like state dockets, far outnumber the
federal judiciary. According to the National Center for State Courts, about
100 million cases (including all kinds of filings) are brought to the more
than 30,000 judges who preside in the state courts.169
164 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeships Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. (2012)).
165 As of 2015, twenty-four district courts had the same number of Article III district
court and magistrate judgeships; ten district courts had more magistrate judgeships than
Article III district court judgeships. When including bankruptcy judgeships, fifteen district
courts had the same number of Article III judgeships as non–Article III (magistrate and
bankruptcy) judgeships, and sixty-eight districts had more non–Article III judgeships than
Article III district court judgeships. See 28 U.S.C. § 152; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, MAGISTRATE JUDGE POSITIONS AUTHORIZED AS OF THE SEPTEMBER 2015 JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE (2015); Table N/A—U.S. District Courts–Combined Civil and Criminal Federal
Court Management Statistics (December 31, 2015), ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (2015),
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/na/federal-court-management-statistics/2015/
12/31-2.
166 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
167 See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1938–39 (2015); United
States v. Hollingsworth, 783 F.3d 556 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 535 (2015). On
Hollingsworth, see Stephen I. Vladeck, Petty Offenses and Article III, 19 GREEN BAG 2D 67,
69–74 (2015).
168 Julia A. Gibbons, Statement to the Committee on the Budget of the Judicial Conference of the United States, before the House Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. and General Government Comm. on Appropriations (Mar. 25, 2015); Julia A. Gibbons, Statement to
Committee on the Budget of the Judicial Conference of the United States, before the
Senate Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. and General Government Comm. on Appropriations
(Mar. 24, 2015) [hereinafter collectively Gibbons Judiciary’s Budget 2015] (describing
2353 judicial officers in the federal courts).
As Richard Posner noted in 1996, “Article III judges are a diminishing fraction of the
total employees of the federal court system.” POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS 1996, supra note
130, at 8. The number of Article III judges had, since 1960, almost tripled, and the number of judicial employees had increased “approximately fivefold.” Id.
169 Since the 105 million cases in 2008, filings in state courts have declined; as of 2013,
94.1 million cases were filed. See Richard Y. Schauffler, Robert C. LaFountain, Shauna M.
Strickland, Kathryn A. Holt & Kathryn J. Lewis, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING
THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW OF 2013 STATE COURT CASELOADS 2 (2015). As
of January 2015, 366 individuals sit on state courts of last resort, with an additional 1013
individuals on intermediate appellate courts, 10,736 in trial courts of general jurisdiction,
and 15,560 in trial courts of limited jurisdiction. S. Strickland, R. Schauffler, R. LaFoun-

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-5\NDL505.txt

1866

unknown

Seq: 36

16-SEP-16

notre dame law review

13:32

[vol. 91:5

The assumption for many decades was that the past was prologue, that
more people would turn to the federal courts; that Congress would be supportive; that federal judges would be welcoming, and that the legal profession, fueled by a growing number of law students at many universities,
would expand. Indeed, federal courthouse construction built in extra
spaces on the assumption that more judgeships and cases would be coming.
The vertical charts that I have shown mapping twentieth-century growth in
case filings and in judgeships capture some of the exuberance; the upward
lines appear to suggest a never-ending surge of cases, resulting in demands
for more lawyers, judges, and courthouses.
III. UNAVAILING COURTS: REVISITING PRESUMPTIONS ABOUT
JUDICIARY’S REMEDIAL AUTHORITY

THE

FEDERAL

A less inviting heritage has, however, emerged and, as Meltzer analyzed, the
interaction between the courts and Congress is pivotal. During the latter part
of the twentieth century, leaders of the judiciary looked at the pictures of
growth and, rather than celebrate, bemoaned the expansion. A language of
“crisis” became pervasive,170 as filings came to be seen as a problem to be
solved. Rather than pursue significant additional judgeships, prominent
members of the judiciary called for the need to “cap” growth in life-tenured
positions through a moratorium on new judgeships.171
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s era was not the first to seek to curb the federal
courts; progressive era reformers also aimed to bound the aegis of federal
judges, who were seen during the early part of the twentieth century as inhospitable to rights-claims by workers. Expanding administrative agency adjudication was one method of opening new fora for redress.
Dislike of the federal courts is not novel.172 Hostility by members of the
Supreme Court towards the diverse users of the federal courts is. Thus, and
in contrast to earlier campaigns to limit federal court use, the more recent
effort is embedded within the judiciary, as the Supreme Court aimed to make
structural and group-based redress less unavailable. The techniques ranged
from developing new doctrines, reinterpreting statutes, expanding federal
preemption, orienting incoming judges through educational programs,
tain & K. Holt, State Court Organization, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, tbls.II.20a & 35 (last
updated Jan. 9, 2015), www.ncsc.org/sco.
170 See, e.g., POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 1996, supra note 130.
171 See, e.g., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPOSING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER OF FEDERAL
JUDGES 13 (1993), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/impomora.pdf/$file/
impomora.pdf; see also FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE 8 (Apr. 2, 1990), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/repfcsc.pdf/
$file/repfcsc.pdf (describing how the federal judiciary would soon be at “the limits of [its]
natural growth” and noting that some commentators had called for a cap of 1000 as the
“practical ceiling” of life-tenured judges to ensure quality performances without “significant degradation of quality”).
172 See, e.g., WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND THE LABOR
UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890–1937 (1994).
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reshaping federal rules, issuing court strategic plans, and lobbying Congress
to cut back on its openness to creating new federal rights.173 These initiatives were, in turn, part of a larger effort to constrain government’s regulatory capacities and activities.174
A.

Curbing Rights and Remedies: Constricting Congressional Powers and
Immunizing the Government

Chief Justice William Rehnquist oversaw a growing bureaucracy able to gain
funds for new courthouses, more judges, and staff. Yet he was also deeply
skeptical of an expansive role for adjudication. Under his leadership and
then that of Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court has limited the ability to
bring lawsuits alleging illegal actions of state and federal governments as well
as of private actors.175 While guarding judicial prerogatives, the commentary
and jurisprudence create an intellectual gestalt skeptical of the role of courts
in generating remedies and in filling congressional gaps.
During his decades on the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist steered the
law towards ceding authority to state courts, thereby narrowing access to the
federal courts for various groups, such as civil rights plaintiffs and habeas
corpus petitioners. The doctrinal techniques varied. For example, in the
1970s in his decision (before becoming Chief Justice) in Wainwright v.
Sykes,176 Rehnquist began the line of cases finding that criminal defendants
had forfeited federal constitutional claims, sometimes through their lawyers
or their own inadvertence, and were therefore precluded from obtaining
post-conviction review of alleged federal constitutional error. Rehnquist-era
case law also began the decline in implying causes of action from statutes and
the Constitution.177
In addition, the Rehnquist Court imposed limits on congressional reliance on the Commerce Clause. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the five-person decision in United States v. Lopez, holding that Congress had exceeded its
authority by creating the federal crime of possession of guns within a certain
distance from schools.178 Rehnquist also wrote the five-person majority in
173 Analyses of revisions of the Federal Rules have concluded that committees
appointed by Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts have shaped increasingly “anti-private
enforcement,” and thus anti-plaintiff, rule proposals. See Burbank & Farhang, Federal Court
Rulemaking, supra note 136, at 1578–79. The impact of education programs and rule revisions has been described by one lower trial judge as teaching her to “duck, avoid, evade.”
See Nancy Gertner, Opinions I Should Have Written, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 423, 428 (2016).
174 See ROBERT A. KAGAN, AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM IN THE EARLY 21ST CENTURY:
AN AFTERWORD FOR THE 2D EDITION OF ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW
(forthcoming 2016).
175 See generally Burbank & Farhang, Litigation Reform, supra note 21.
176 433 U.S. 72 (1977); see also Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real
Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 7 (1997).
177 See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287 (2002); United States v. Stanley,
483 U.S. 669, 684 (1987); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983).
178 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
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United States v. Morrison, ruling that Congress lacked authority under either
the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the civil rights
remedy in the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), which had provided a
federal civil action for victims of violence if they could prove gender-based
animus.179 Likewise, Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the opinion for the
Court in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, which held that Congress could
not rely on the Commerce Clause to authorize Indian tribes to enforce obligations that states bargain with them in good faith about constructing casinos
on tribal lands.180
Moreover, the tone set by Chief Justice Rehnquist as lead spokesperson
for the federal courts fit his doctrinal approach. Rehnquist exercised his
authority as Chair of the Judicial Conference to shape Federal Rule revisions
through appointments to the committees that drafted them.181 He repeatedly used his annual “State of the Judiciary” addresses to counsel against
expansion of federal jurisdiction.182 Both before and after the enactment in
1994 of VAWA’s civil rights remedy, for example, the Chief Justice invoked
the statute as an example of the overuse of federal remedies.183
Further, during his tenure chairing the Judicial Conference, the Conference took formal policy positions pressing Congress to cut back on federal
jurisdiction. As part of a wave of millennium planning, the Conference
charged a specially constituted committee to write a “Long Range Plan,”
which in 1995 produced ninety-three recommendations adopted by the Judicial Conference.184 (This document has been replaced by a 2010 “Strategic
Plan” that was updated in 2015, but the newer plans caution against reading
179 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
180 517 U.S. at 47; see generally Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik, Sovereignties—Federal,
State and Tribal: The Story of Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES
329 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010).
181 Analyses of the composition of rule committees come from Burbank & Farhang,
Federal Court Rulemaking, supra note 136, from Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant Composition
of the Federal Rulemaking Committees, 83 U. CINN. L. REV. 1084 (2015), and from Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post: The Continuing Odyssey of Discovery “Reform”,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring/Summer 2001, at 197, 248–52; see also generally Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 429 (2002); Resnik, Constricting Remedies, supra note 21.
182 William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice’s 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary,
THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1992, at 2–4 (calling for limits on the growth in the number of federal
judges).
183 Id. at 1, 3 (“The Judicial Conference joins the Conference of Chief Justices (composed of the chief justices of the state courts) in opposing [these provisions] of the bill.”);
William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at Monday Afternoon Session, in AM. LAW INST., 75TH
ANNUAL MEETING: REMARKS AND ADDRESSES 13, 17–18 (May 11–14, 1998).
184 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS
(1995) [hereinafter 1995 LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS], http://
www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/publications/long-range-plan-federal-courts. The 1995
Long Range Plan is also reprinted in 166 F.R.D. 29 (1996). Subsequent references refer to
page numbers as printed in the original document.
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them as rescinding the individual recommendations of the 1995 Long Range
Plan.185)
The 1995 Plan worried about overuse of the federal courts, both by civil
litigants and because of the “federalization of criminal law,”186 and proposed
a variety of methods to limit access and refocus law enforcement. The Long
Range Plan urged Congress, when possible, to look to state courts and federal
agencies in lieu of the federal courts so as to shape “sensible limitations on
federal criminal and civil jurisdiction.”187 The proposed solutions included
increasing reliance on administrative agency adjudication when constitutionally permissible, as well as more judicial case management and alternative
dispute resolution.188 Further, the 1995 Long Range Plan recommended that
Congress “exercise restraint” by not creating new federal statutory rights or
new federal crimes unless Congress determined that doing so advanced
“clearly defined and justified federal interests” and “where federal interests
are paramount.”189
These recommendations were in service of avoiding what the Long Range
Plan called a “nightmarish” future, which assumed a growth rate at a pace
calculated “over the past 53 years,” producing a “bleak” picture about a wave
of filings. As the Long Range Plan explained, in 1995, civil filings numbered
about 240,000; the projection was that, by 2020, civil cases “could reach 1
million” and criminal filings could grow from 44,000 to 84,000.190 This rising tide would, the planners thought, undermine federal court governance
and the coherence of law. Moreover, users would be harmed because, as
resources became scarcer, the results would be “delay, congestion, cost, and
inefficiency.”191
These projections and the concerns that shaped them were part of a new
“common intellectual heritage” that federal litigation was a problem to be
solved by diverting cases and diffusing disputes. The doctrinal routes were,
as already noted, varied. Here, I focus on the interaction between new bod185 The 2010 “Strategic Plan,” a slim eighteen-page document, stated that it was not an
across-the-board “rescission of the individual policies articulated in the recommendations
and implementation strategies” of the 1995 plan. JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., STRATEGIC
PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 18 (2010). That 2010 plan was updated in 2015 and
explained that it should “not necessarily be interpreted as the “rescission of the individual
policies articulated in the recommendations and implementation strategies” of the 1995
plan. JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 19 (2015),
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/18424/download.
186 See also TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIM. LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW (1998).
187 1995 LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 184, at 22.
188 Id. at 34, 38, 35.
189 Id. at 28, 24.
190 Id. at 18.
191 Id. at 19. Under this scenario, the Long Range Plan predicted that “civil litigants
who can afford it will opt out of the court system entirely for private dispute resolution
providers.” Further, district trial judges were already spending “fewer of their working
hours in civil trials than ever before,” and “the future may make the civil jury trial—and
perhaps the civil bench trial as well—a creature of the past.” Id. at 19–20.
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ies of Supreme Court case law that expanded immunities, contracted rights,
and constricted remedies.
A first exemplar comes from the 1988 decision of Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., a lawsuit alleging that a member of the military had drowned,
trapped under water because the helicopter’s manufacturer, Sikorsky, had
allegedly designed a defective escape hatch.192 The family sued the company, but the Court (in a five-person majority opinion by Justice Scalia)
rejected the claim based on the Court’s creation of a then-new federal common law immunity for government contractors.193 The Court explained:
This case requires us to decide when a contractor providing military
equipment to the Federal Government can be held liable under state tort
law for injury caused by a design defect.
....
Petitioner’s . . . contention is that, in the absence of legislation specifically immunizing Government contractors from liability for design defects,
there is no basis for judicial recognition of such a defense. We disagree. In
most fields of activity, to be sure, this Court has refused to find federal preemption of state law in the absence of either a clear statutory prescription,
or a direct conflict between federal and state law. But . . . [in] a few areas,
involving “uniquely federal interests,” . . . state law is pre-empted and
replaced, where necessary, by . . . so-called “federal common law.”194

The dispute involved private parties, but the Court identified a “uniquely
federal” interest in the government’s procurement policies, to be protected
to ensure no “second-guessing” through state tort-based claims.195 Although
bills had been proposed in Congress but not enacted, the Court put into
place a common law rule that no liability for product defects could be
imposed if a defendant established that “(1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in
the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the
United States.”196 To justify that holding, the Court noted the risk of passing
on costs to the government;197 aside from creating a government contractor
immunity, the Court did not explore techniques (such as price caps) to avoid
the potential for added costs.
192 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
193 A defendant asserting such an immunity would have to show that “(1) the United
States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those
specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use
of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States.” Id. at 512.
194 Id. at 502, 504 (citations omitted).
195 Id. at 504, 511.
196 Id. at 512.
197 Id. at 511–12 (“The financial burden of judgments against the contractors would
ultimately be passed through, substantially if not totally, to the United States itself, since
defense contractors will predictably raise their prices to cover, or to insure against, contingent liability for the Government-ordered designs.”).
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Justice Brennan’s dissent raised an objection that can be understood in
Meltzer’s terms, that “large public bureaucracies” have the capacity to
threaten “a greatly expanded list of individual rights” through actions that
were not directed at “identifiable individuals but at the public at large.”198
Justice Brennan explained that, under the majority’s approach, low-level federal government personnel gained the power to insulate private actors from
liability through decisions approving (“rubberstamping”) producer-supplied
product specifications: “a federal procurement officer . . . might or might not
have noticed” a potential defect.199 In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens
added that Congress, not the courts, ought to assess what he termed “the
novel question of policy” entailed in “balancing” the costs of government
programs and the safety of individuals.200
A parallel to Boyle comes from a more recent decision by the Seventh
Circuit, sitting en banc in 2012 in Vance v. Rumsfeld.201 This case (like Boyle)
involved government contractors and judicial lawmaking. In Vance, however,
the private contractors, Donald Vance and Nathan Ertel, were the plaintiffs,
alleging that when they had worked in Iraq in 2006, they had been tortured
by federal military interrogators.202 Vance and Ertel claimed that, after they
warned the government about possible arms-running, military personnel
accused them of wrongdoing, put them into solitary confinement, held them
for months “incommunicado,” and subjected them to violence, sleep deprivation, and extremes of light, sound, and temperatures.203 A government-convened “Detainee Status Board” eventually determined that Vance and Ertel
were “innocent” of the claims made against them and ordered their
release.204
The question in Vance was whether the Constitution, statutes, or the
common law gave these men access to the federal courts to seek redress.
Unlike Boyle, Congress had legislated a form of immunity by providing in the
Defense Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 protection for members of the military from liability if they “did not know that the practices were unlawful.”205
That phrasing could be read to imply that liability was possible, if plaintiffs
198 Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations, supra note 74, at 328.
199 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun). Justice Brennan also noted the many bills that had been introduced in Congress
but not enacted. Id. at 515 n.1.
200 Id. at 532 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
202 Id. at 195–96.
203 Id. at 196; see also Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 961 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (noting
plaintiffs’ allegations that during their detention, they were subjected to “threats of violence and actual violence, sleep deprivation and alteration, extremes of temperature,
extremes of sound, light manipulation, threats of indefinite detention, denial of food,
denial of water, denial of needed medical care, yelling, prolonged solitary confinement,
incommunicado detention, falsified allegations and other psychologically-disruptive and
injurious techniques”).
204 Vance, 701 F.3d at 196.
205 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd-1(a) (2012) (quoted in Vance, 701 F. 3d at 201).
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could prove that persons ought to have known of the unlawfulness. Further,
as the dissent by Judge Hamilton detailed, Congress had also provided a
cause of action in 1991 in the Torture Victim Protection Act for relief for
victims, if alleged torturers could be found in the United States.206
Thus, judges could have used these two congressional directives, coupled with the Court’s 1991 decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,207 to permit the case to proceed beyond the
motion to dismiss. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s case law declining to
imply constitutional causes of action against the military, including famously
when military personnel were given LSD,208 related to individuals in the military and hence to activities that could fall under the umbrella of injuries
“incident to service,” rather than those relating to private parties such as
Vance and Ertel.
But the Seventh Circuit majority declined to recognize either a Bivens or
an implied statutory cause of action, rejected what it termed an “extra-statutory” cause of action, and replaced the narrower immunities of the Supreme
Court’s law with a broader set of protections absent new congressional
action.209
When considering whether to create an extra-statutory right of action
for damages against military personnel who mistreat detainees, we assume
that at least some of the conditions to which plaintiffs were subjected violated their rights. . . . The conduct alleged in the complaint appears to violate the Detainee Treatment Act . . . .
. . . [T]he choice of remedies for military misconduct belongs to Congress and the President rather than the judicial branch.210

Vance and Boyle share an eerie symmetry. In both cases, judges filled the
gaps. Meltzer’s analysis of the judiciary’s role in protecting individuals from
bureaucratic government action (be it the potential for under-supervision of
contract specifications in Boyle or for licensing of torture in Vance) would
have predicted that judges would be “hospitable” to shaping paths, even if
narrow, for relief if predicated upon sufficient evidentiary bases. But instead,
Boyle immunized private actors contracting with the military, and Vance
immunized the military from private actors claiming torture. These two decisions, like the Long Range Plan, new habeas corpus, sovereign immunity, and
Commerce Clause doctrine, craft a presumption of unavailing courts that
leave government bureaucracies free from judicial oversight.

206 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (cited in Vance, 701 F.3d at 211 (Hamilton, J., dissenting,
joined by Rovner and Williams)).
207 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
208 United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
209 As discussed below, the argument is made also that courts ought to reject statutory
causes of action, if judges determine that plaintiff’s harm is not the kind of “real” harm or
“injury” required by Article III. See infra Section III.D.
210 Vance, 701 F.3d at 198, 203.
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Narrowing the Judiciary’s Equitable Powers: Grupo Mexicano and GreatWest Life & Annuity Company

Another technique for limiting the judicial role comes through the Court’s
approach to equitable powers under federal statutes, interacting with the
familiar phrase in the U.S. Constitution that the “judicial Power shall extend
to all Cases, in Law and Equity.”211 Two examples, Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.212 and Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance
Co. v. Knudson,213 decided in 1999 and 2002 respectively, involved creditor
and debtor disputes. In both cases, Justice Scalia wrote a five-person majority
opinion, and Justice Ginsburg authored a four-person dissent.
At issue in these cases was the authority of federal judges to provide remedies. Neither case involved structural injunctions nor monetary relief
involving public actors, and thus neither drew sustained attention from constitutional scholars.214 Yet Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo and Great-West Life &
Annuity work in tandem with the more familiar cases to reiterate the leitmotif
of unavailing courts. Under these doctrinal developments, federal judges do
not have the power to shape ordinary remedies that give relief in various
kinds of commercial transactions.
A few details of each case are in order. In Grupo Mexicano, the creditor,
Alliance Bond Fund, requested what is known as a “stop-injunction” to prevent the dissipation of assets while it pursued contractual rights for money
damages.215 Federal District Judge John Martin concluded, after two hear211 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. A rich interpretation of the breadth of this grant—
through admiralty and maritime jurisdictional powers as well as through law and equity—is
in James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, The Adverse-Party Requirement,
and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346 (2015).
212 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
213 534 U.S. 204 (2002). Both Meltzer and I wrote about Great-West. See Meltzer, The
Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, supra note 86, at 346–52; Resnik, Constricting Remedies,supra
note 21; see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations on Federal Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291 (2000); John H.
Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in Russell,
Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2003).
214 Renewed attention to this body of law comes from Samuel Bray, in a prize-winning
federal courts essay. See Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L.
REV. 997 (2015). Bray argued that the Court’s doctrine is, despite the merger of law and
equity in the 1930s, drawing and enforcing lines between legal and equitable remedies.
Unlike Meltzer and myself, Bray is more admiring of the new jurisprudence of the Court,
which he describes as seeking to keep equity distinctive even when courts of equity no
longer exist. See id. at 1053–54.
In 2016, the pattern continued, as the Court returned to ERISA and interpreted the
statutory authorization for plan fiduciaries “to obtain . . . equitable relief” to preclude suits
to attach a participant’s general assets. See Montanile v. Bd. of Trs. of Nat’l Elevator Indus.
Health Benefit Plan, 136 S. Ct. 651 (2016). Justice Ginsburg again dissented, albeit this
time alone, and cited the criticism of the Court’s understanding of equity leveled in
Langbein, supra note 213. Montanile, 136 S. Ct. at 662 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
215 Alliance had invested in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo (GMD), a holding company
involved in building roads in Mexico. Unable to meet its obligations, GMD restructured its
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ings, that Alliance would “almost certainly” prevail on the merits but that, by
then, the defendants’ assets would likely be insufficient to pay the judgment.216 To protect the utility of its final judgment, the court enjoined the
defendant from transferring assets but specifically did not preclude Grupo
Mexicano from declaring insolvency.217 The Second Circuit agreed; the
appellate court invoked federal procedural rules authorizing the use of state
remedies “for the purpose of securing satisfaction” of judgments as well as for
preliminary injunctive relief.218
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion reversed.
Because such a remedy was historically unavailable from a court of
equity, we hold that the District Court had no authority to issue a preliminary injunction preventing petitioners from disposing of their assets pending adjudication of respondents’ contract claim for money damages.219

Rejecting the view of four dissenters that the constitutionally endowed
“judicial power” over “all Cases, in Law and Equity” entailed authority to
respond to the “grand aims of equity” by fashioning appropriate remedies,220
debts by assigning priority in specific notes to the Mexican government and other creditors. After not being paid, Alliance invoked the diversity jurisdiction of the federal district
court to bring a damages action for breach of contract. As an interim measure, Alliance
requested a preliminary injunction to freeze GMD’s assets. The defendant conceded in
affidavits that by assigning assets to competing creditors, it had less than $6 million remaining to satisfy $75 million of debt owed to Alliance. See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo,
S.A., 527 U.S. at 310–12; Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A.,
143 F.3d 688, 691–92 (2d Cir. 1998).
216 See Petition for Certiorari at App. 26a, Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 527 U.S.
308 (No. 98-231) (including the order dated December 23, 1997, from the Southern District of New York that had granted the preliminary injunction based on a finding that “the
probability that Plaintiffs will succeed on the merits of their underlying claim for breach of
contract is almost certain”); Brief for Respondent at Joint App. 79aa, Grupo Mexicano de
Desarrollo, S.A., 527 U.S. 308 (No. 98-231) (including the transcript of the district court
proceedings).
217 Brief for Respondent at Joint App. 79aa, Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 527 U.S.
308 (No. 98-231) (including the transcript of the district court proceedings).
218 The relevant rules are FED. R. CIV. P. 64 (providing that, after an action is commenced, “all remedies . . . for seizure of person or property for the purpose of securing
satisfaction of the judgment ultimately to be entered in the action are available under the
circumstances and in the manner provided by the law of the State”), and Fed. R. CIV. P. 65
(providing for preliminary and permanent injunctions). The Second Circuit saw the two
as “complementary,” and while all agreed that New York law did not provide for a freeze
order, the Second Circuit determined that federal “general equitable power” supported
the remedy once the exacting requirements for preliminary injunctive relief were met. See
Alliance Bond Fund, 143 F.3d at 692, 695.
219 Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A., 527 U.S. at 333. Justice Scalia wrote for himself,
the Chief Justice, and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justice Ginsburg issued
the dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer. The decision was unanimous in
one respect, that the issuance of a permanent injunction had not rendered the controversy
moot because, if as claimed, the issuance of the preliminary injunction was wrongful, GMD
would be able to recover on the bond. Id. at 315, 335 n.2.
220 Id. at 342 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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the majority held that, absent congressional direction, federal judges lacked
the authority to create this form of interim relief.
When doing so, the majority read the 1789 congressional grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts over “all suits . . . in equity” to permit only those
remedies available during the founding era or provided by other statutory
authority or justified by special public interests. Ironically, given Justice
Scalia’s prior creation of a common law immunity for government contractors and his subsequent expansive reading of the Federal Arbitration Act,
Justice Scalia explained his interpretation as consistent with democratic obligations that judges be restrained. He invoked Justice Story’s concerns about
English equity as “the most formidable instrument of arbitrary power, that
could well be devised.”221
Central to the paradigm is a reading of the Article III grant of “judicial
Power” to “all Cases, in Law and Equity.” My puzzle is about why those words
should not be seen to incorporate then-common (the word used purposively)
practices of state and federal judges.222 Starting with the textual reference in
Article III to “courts,” we know that, unlike some of the other institutions
created by the Constitution, courts were familiar to the Framers, who knew
well the justice systems in England, the colonies, and the states. Further, the
Framers borrowed methods of protecting judges (tenure during good behavior, guaranteed salaries, and competency over certain subject matters) from
state constitutions and from England.223 The concept of judicial indepen-

221 Id. at 332 (majority opinion) (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE § 19 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1886)) (also describing equity as placing
“the whole rights and property of the community under the arbitrary will of the Judge”).
Justice Scalia also repeated a commentator’s characterization of a freeze-asset injunction as
a “nuclear weapon.” Id. at 329, 332 (quoting RICHARD N. OUGH & WILLIAM FLENLEY, THE
MAREVA INJUNCTION AND ANTON PILLER ORDER: PRACTICE AND PRECEDENTS xi (2d ed.
1993)); see also Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, address given at
Princeton University (Mar. 8–9, 1995), in THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 1995
at 86, http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/lecture-library.php.
222 An expansive literature, much of it focused on judges’ role in statutory interpretation, addresses the topic. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990
(2001); John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911 (2015); William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509 (1998) (reviewing
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997)). Another facet is courts’ inherent
or supervisory powers. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal
Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1433 (1984).
223 See THE ESSENTIAL FEDERAL COURTS HISTORY, supra note 3, at 13–14; Wythe Holt,
“Federal Courts as the Asylum to Federal Interests”: Randolph’s Report, the Benson Amendment, and
the “Original Understanding” of the Federal Judiciary, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 341 (1987); Wythe Holt,
“To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts,
1989 DUKE L.J. 1421.
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dence had its roots in the English Act of Settlement and in several of the state
constitutions.224
Early federal courts were tied to state courts in other ways. In 1789, Congress required lower federal courts to align themselves in various ways with
state courts’ practices, for several decades in a static fashion and subsequently
in a dynamic manner.225 When law and practices came to be coded as “state”
or “federal” or “English” or “American” is a subject of dispute, but some
aspect of the “common law” was a law in common.226 Moreover, English
equity law was, in the early period, a source of authority for the federal judiciary, as some state courts lacked equity powers or had hybrid systems.227
Further, despite the Grupo Mexicano majority holding abjuring federal
common law making, federal courts’ jurisprudence is filled with it. The areas
are so wide-ranging that debate is had about whether to think about a line of
cases related to common law as a delineated genre or as a series of unrelated
examples, ranging from the “act of state doctrine” in foreign affairs and commercial transactions with the United States to labor law, admiralty, and statutes of limitations,228 as well as the already-detailed federal defense of
224 See supra note 223.
225 See Conformity Act of 1872, Ch. 255, 17 Stat. 196. The complexities are analyzed in
Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and Judge-Made Law
in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249, 259–65 (2010) [hereinafter Collins, Article III, Equity,
and Judge-Made Law], in Kristin A. Collins, Article III, Social Movements, and the Making of the
Modern Federal Courts (2016 manuscript on file with the author), and in Stephen N. Subrin,
How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 930–31 (1987).
226 See William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984).
227 See generally Collins, Article III, Equity, and Judge-Made Law, supra note 225.
228 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); United States v.
Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.
363 (1943); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811, 820 (2001); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.
261 (1985); Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975). Scholarly comment
abounds. Of course, many—Daniel Meltzer included—have written about the question in
the context of federal common law. See, e.g., Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal
Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967); Daniel J. Meltzer, Customary International Law, Foreign Affairs, and Federal Common Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 513 (2002);
Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975) [hereinafter Monaghan, Foreword].
The Erie-based argument that federal courts lack common law powers has sometimes
been read contextually to mean that federal courts cannot make common law only in those
cases that arise under state law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Proponents of this position, such as Professor Martha Field, also detail the many instances of
federal common lawmaking to undercut the argument that federal courts are incompetent
to develop law. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARV. L. REV. 881 (1986). Another understanding of the constitutional flaw, to the extent
one existed in Erie, is that the courts ought not to make common law in an area where
Congress could but has not done so. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of Erie: How
Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, Politics, and Social Change Reshape the Law, in CIVIL PROCEDURE
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immunity for government contractors. And unlike the Court’s cutting off of
equitable developments absent congressional permission, the other doctrines
were shaped without such permission and sometimes in the face of congressional inaction on bills, such as proposals seeking to create government contractors’ immunity as a defense to liability.229
In 2002, the Grupo Mexicano majority returned to the question of equitable relief and again read out a role for judicial responsiveness to the
problems presented. The case related to the Employment Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), and the issue was whether reimbursement by a
recipient of medical expenses paid by a plan was due because she had
received funds in a settlement against a car’s manufacturer. As Meltzer
explained, Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance v. Knudson raised the legal
question whether Congress, which had in ERISA authorized “equitable” remedies for violations,230 had left “a health insurance plan without any federal
remedy for breach of a subrogation obligation” even when state remedies
were possibly preempted.231
Meltzer thought that the Court ought to have read the statute to enable
it to permit relief. Instead, the majority ruled out repayments of funds as
permissible in equity.
[Section] 502(a)(3) [of ERISA], by its terms, only allows for equitable relief.
We will not attempt to adjust the “carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme” embodied in the text that Congress has adopted. Because
petitioners are seeking legal relief—the imposition of personal liability on
respondents for a contractual obligation to pay money—§ 502(a)(3) does
not authorize this action.232

John Langbein has argued that this interpretation is a misunderstanding of
the historical powers of equity, which did provide for compensatory damages;
an “award of money damages” was “a classic form of equitable relief”233 as
well as a remedy at law. When I wrote about this case in 2003, I worried
about the impact of Great-West on a myriad of statutes that referenced equitable relief,234 as well as its implications for structural remedies in injunction
STORIES 21 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008). Moreover, given the murky bases of the
decision in Erie itself (which lacks specificity on what exactly was unconstitutional), I read it
as an example of federal common lawmaking. Given that one can read Article III’s jurisdictional bases, including diversity, to support authority for judge-made law, Erie represents
a decision to decline to do so based on principles of comity, such as deference to state or
legislative lawmaking. See generally John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 693 (1974); Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 427
(1958); Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1785 (1997).
229 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
230 Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 502(a)(3) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012)).
231 Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, supra note 86, at 383–84.
232 Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 221 (2002).
233 Langbein, supra note 213, at 1351–52.
234 Resnik, Constricting Remedies, supra note 21, at 265–67.
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actions. Meltzer focused on the decision’s burdens on Congress; he criticized the Court for unfairly expecting legislators “to anticipate all of the
uncertainties,” let alone be able to respond through provisions in statutes.235
As noted earlier, Meltzer saw the incompleteness of legislation as an
appropriate facet of congressional processes.236 He thought that the Court
undervalued congressional challenges in forecasting all the work that federal
statutes would need to do, and undercut its own useful role in filling gaps.
Thus, the Court had made it more difficult “for Congress to legislative effectively”237 by insisting on the judicial “powerlessness to fashion” rules of decision for remedies.238 But instead of this generative interdependency, Grupo
Mexicano and Great-West Life & Annunity Insurance contribute to a new “common intellectual heritage” that renders the federal courts unable to be
responsive when faced with ordinary claims made by individuals and commercial entities.
C.

Precluding State and Federal Adjudication as Old Statutes Gain New
Purposes: From AT&T to DIRECTV

If Grupo Mexicano and Great-West insist on waiting for Congress before offering remedies, the Court has taken a different tack through untethering itself
from texts and imposing its own reading on specific statutory grants to close
off litigation. A major example (discussed by Meltzer in his 2013 article on
textualism and preemption239) is the Court’s expansion of what is now called
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), enacted in 1925. In recent decades, the
Supreme Court has enabled defendants to use the FAA as a form of immunity. The Court has required state and federal courts to enforce both obligations to arbitrate and bans on class actions, even when such provisions are
placed by potential defendants into form job applications or shrink-wrapped
product service documents.
To clarify the Court’s imprint on the FAA requires a thumbnail account
of the 1925 statute and of the Court’s readings of the statue.240 In the 1920s,
235 Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, supra note 86, at 387–88. While I share
his view of missteps by the Court in this line of cases, I want to register a concern about the
term he chose—“passivity.” Like the term “activism,” the nomenclature of “passivity” is illadvised. Judges always have to decide something, and appellations of decisions evidencing
activism or passivity obscures that they are making decisions that ought to be analyzed as
confirming or departing from precedents and as either wise or unwise judgments.
236 Meltzer applauded Jonathan Siegel’s formulation that in “the name of preserving
legislative power, the textualists actually reduce it, by compelling Congress to meet an
impossible standard of drafting perfection before its instructions can be carried out properly.” Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, supra note 86, at 388 (quoting Jonathan
R. Siegel, What Statutory Drafting Errors Teach Us About Statutory Interpretation, 69 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 309, 325 (2001)).
237 Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, supra note 86, at 345.
238 Id. at 370–71. As I read Meltzer, positing the courts as junior partners does not fully
capture his analyses of the two branches working interactively.
239 Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, supra note 110, at 12–14, 31–32.
240 See also Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 32.
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the American Bar Association and the Chamber of Commerce worked to
enact legislation to make agreements to arbitrate enforceable in federal
courts. Their efforts, focused on commercial actors seeking to use arbitration in lieu of litigation, produced the 1925 statute authorizing the federal
courts to enforce agreements, if “written . . . in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce,” by concluding that
such agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Further, the 1925 Act expressly exempted the only workers that Congress clearly
had the power to regulate under the Commerce Clause as it was then read:
“seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”241
From 1925 to 1985, interpretations of the FAA were true to this model,
predicated on bargains struck after negotiations between relatively equal
partners to contracts. One example comes from the 1953 decision in Wilko v.
Swan,242 in which a brokerage customer objected to being forced, at the
behest of the broker, to use arbitration, which had been included as an obligation in a form contract. The U.S. Supreme Court sided with the customer
and explained that, even if some buyers and sellers “deal[t] at arm’s length
on equal terms,” the federal securities laws were “drafted with an eye to the
disadvantages under which buyers labor.”243 Further, arbitrators’ “award[s]
may be made without explanation of their reasons and without a complete
record of their proceedings,” and hence, one could not examine “arbitrators’
conception of the legal meaning of such statutory requirements as ‘burden
of proof,’ ‘reasonable care’ or ‘material fact.’”244
As the brief quotes from the opinion illustrate, the Court’s decision was
based on two distinct rationales. A first problem centered on the formation
of the contract. Structurally unequal bargaining positions suggested the
absence of real negotiations, making it unwise to enforce a provision against
a party who might not have been able to negotiate. A second problem
focused on the arbitration itself, which the Court described as too informal
and flexible to enforce federal statutory rights reliably. In contrast, when
judges made rulings, they were subjected to regulatory oversight. Their adjudication had to be based on rules of evidence; the obligations to keep
records enabled appellate review.245 In short, the Court read the FAA as
appropriate only for volunteers, choosing to strike bargains within its ambit.
Starting in the mid-1980s, the Court revised its approach and reread the
1925 Act as applicable to employees and consumers who could not negotiate
terms on job applications and form contracts. When doing so, the Court
adverted to parties’ consent but focused on another justification: that arbitra241 Pub. L. No. 48-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925).
242 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
243 Id. at 435.
244 Id. at 435–36.
245 Id. at 436–37.
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tion could provide as effective a means of vindication of rights as did
adjudication.246
The Court first used the phrase “effective vindication of rights” in its
purposive interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act247 in 1985 in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., which was also the first case in
which the Court applied the FAA to preclude litigation of a federal statutory
right.248 A car dealer in Puerto Rico, Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, alleged that
the two other parties (a Japanese automobile manufacturer and the Chrysler
Corporation) had violated federal antitrust laws because they were part of an
“international cartel that has restrained competition in the American market
. . . [and] allegedly prevented the dealer from transshipping some 966 surplus vehicles from Puerto Rico” to other U.S. dealers.249
In addition to the FAA, the Court relied on the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (which the United
States had joined fifteen years earlier), when holding that arbitration was
mandated.250 The Mitsubishi ruling could easily have been cabined: the
three parties were businesses (albeit with different resources), and consent to
the contract was not much in question.251 Moreover, given the Court’s discussion of the need for “comity” in international cases, one could read the
decision to apply only to transnational transactions.252 The Court explained
it was confident that international arbitrators would be loyal to national legal
norms; the opinion added that “so long as the prospective litigant effectively
may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute
will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”253
The Court’s next steps in the relocation of statutory claims to arbitration
could also have been limited ones, dependent on supervision of arbitrations
by federal agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
For example, in 1987, in Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, Justice
O’Connor wrote for the Court to enforce a pre-dispute arbitration clause
“between brokerage firms and their customers.”254 She explained that since
246 I parse the case law developments in Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 32, at
2874–920.
247 Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, supra note 110, at 13–14; see generally Resnik,
Diffusing Disputes, supra note 32.
248 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
249 Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
251 The dissent argued that there had been “no genuine bargaining” about the arbitration terms. 473 U.S. at 666 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
252 “[E]ven assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context,” the Court emphasized the importance of “international comity, respect for the
capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes.” Id. at 629
(majority opinion).
253 Id. at 637.
254 482 U.S. 220, 222 (1987).
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the 1950s era of Wilko v. Swan, the SEC has gained statutory authority to
ensure that arbitration was “adequate to vindicate Exchange Act rights,” and
therefore that enforcing that obligation would not result in “a waiver of ‘compliance with any provision’ of the Exchange Act.”255
“Effective vindication” became the mantra thereafter, but the Court has
since deemed that test to be satisfied without individually negotiated contracts, international transactions, or federal administrative oversight. Indeed,
the Court has imputed effective vindication in a host of settings and has
declined to scrutinize the arbitration systems that consumers and employees
are now required to use.
Given that common heritages are built on artifacts as well as texts, the
two pages of an “Application for Employment” (Figure 9) is an important
emblem, to be produced and reproduced to illustrate the activities putting
Daniel Meltzer’s understanding of the judicial role at risk.
The two-page form comes from the record in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2002.256 Waffle House provided this
job application to Eric Baker, who signed the documents in South Carolina
in 1994. The illegibility may annoy readers but it is relevant. Reading the
actual words had little utility, for those seeking employment did not have the
option of negotiating the terms.
What did the form require? It warned against taking food or equipment
and imposed a requirement that employees agree to polygraph tests and to
pay the costs of items lost while under their superintendence.257 The application further required that all disputes go to arbitration, and that the parties
had to split the costs. Specifically:
The parties agree that any dispute or claim concerning Applicant’s employment with Waffle House, Inc., or any subsidiary or Franchisee of Waffle
House, Inc., or the terms, conditions or benefits of such employment,
including whether such dispute or claim is arbitrable, will be settled by binding arbitration. The arbitration proceedings shall be conducted under the
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association in
effect at the time a demand for arbitration is made. A decision and award of
the arbitrator made under the said rules shall be exclusive, final and binding
on both parties, their heirs, executors, administrators, successors and
255 Id. at 238; see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991);
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
256 EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
257 In the words of the form:
I agree that Waffle House, Inc. may deduct from any monies due me, an amount
to cover any shortages which may occur and will indemnify Waffle House, Inc.
against any legal liability for withholding said shortages from monies due me as a
result of my employment with Waffle House. If there are any shortages or losses
in money, food, or equipment which is assigned to me or to which I have access, I
agree to submit to a polygraph or other scientific evaluation test conducted in
compliance with applicable law . . . .
Joint App. at 61a, EEOC v. Waffle House, No. 99-1823, 2001 WL 34093975 (May 25, 2011).
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assigns. The costs and expenses of the arbitration shall be borne evenly by
the parties.258

FIGURE 9: WAFFLE HOUSE EMPLOYMENT APPLICATION

Joint Appendix at 59, 61, EEOC v. Waffle House, No. 99-1823 (May 25, 2001).

258

Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 2, Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (No. 99-1823).
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Joint Appendix at 59, 61, EEOC v. Waffle House, No. 99-1823 (May 25, 2001).

Eric Baker signed the application at one venue, but was hired at another
Waffle House, miles away. Baker had a seizure soon after he started work,
and he was fired.259 Baker went to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), which filed an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

259 EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., No. Civ.A. 3:96-2739-O, 1998 WL 35168489, at *1
(D.S.C. Mar. 23, 1998).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-5\NDL505.txt

1884

unknown

Seq: 54

notre dame law review

16-SEP-16

13:32

[vol. 91:5

lawsuit, alleging discrimination because of the seizure.260 In defending the
federal case, Waffle House argued that the EEOC could not bring the lawsuit
because Eric Baker had signed the job application committing him exclusively to arbitration.261
The lower court judge rejected Waffle House’s views, and concluded
that because Baker signed the form in one place and was hired after a discussion in another, the form did not constitute a contract.262 The Court of
Appeals reversed in part; it held that, while the EEOC could pursue injunctive relief, it could not seek back pay for Baker.263
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed; although Eric Baker was precluded,
the EEOC was not, as it had a statutory mandate to bring claims, including
remedies for employees like Baker.264 The Court’s decision is a vital source
of precedent for the public enforcement of employment discrimination laws,
as other defendants have sought unsuccessfully to stop state agencies from
pursuing remedies.265 But the ruling also exemplifies that the Court now
applies the 1925 FAA to employees, even if arbitration mandates are found in
form job applications.266 Another step in the expansion of arbitration can
be seen by looking at a document that came with my cell phone. Again,
reading it is difficult, and again, the image is expressive of the point that
being able to read it is irrelevant. It is not negotiable.

260 Id. at *1.
261 Id.
262 Id. at *2.
263 EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 813 (4th Cir. 2002). The court distinguished between the EEOC’s pursuit of “the public interest in a discrimination-free workplace” and hence that seeking an injunction was permissible and the EEOC’s effort to
protect Baker’s “individual rights,” which the Fourth Circuit said the EEOC could not do.
Id. at 812–13. In dissent, Judge King argued instead that under “fundamental principles of
contract law,” Mr. Baker had not entered into a written employment agreement, and
hence, that the court ought not reach the issue of the EEOC’s case, as Baker himself was
not precluded from using the courts. Id. at 813–17 (King, J., dissenting).
264 EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
265 See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 843 N.W.2d 727 (Iowa
2014); Joulé, Inc. v. Simmons, 944 N.E.2d 143 (Mass. 2011); People v. Coventry First LLC,
915 N.E.2d 616 (N.Y. 2009).
266 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
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CELLULAR

This form stipulates that if disputes arise, I must use arbitration or small
claims court. Neither I nor the provider can be a part of a class action. (This
symmetry, while ironic, has legal utility as some courts have required symmetrical constraints to make such documents enforceable.267) As is now famil267 See, e.g., Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159 (5th Cir.
2004) (holding that state law may find unconscionable an agreement requiring consumers
to arbitrate their claims while allowing the provider to choose arbitration or litigation). A
more recent decision questioned but did not decide whether symmetrical constraints were
required. See THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., LLC, v. Patton, 741 F.3d 1162, 1170 (10th Cir.
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iar, many judges thought this form unenforceable because the provider
could exempt itself from liability. In California, for example, both a statute
and a decision by the Supreme Court of California took that view under the
state law of unconscionability.268 As is also familiar, the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed the California decision in AT&T v. Concepcion, decided five to four
in 2011.269 The Court read the Federal Arbitration Act as preempting state
bans on class action waivers.
Recall the 1950s Court in Wilko v. Swan had two criticisms of mandated
arbitration. One was the inability to bargain. That problem is all the more
acute today. The documents that bind parties to arbitrate do not merit the
term “contract.” Not only is bargaining unavailable (even for clients with
resources) but also the terms provided by some, such as those of wireless
providers like AT&T, make plain that categorizing the interaction as a contract is a mistake; providers assert their right unilaterally to “change any
terms, conditions, rates, fees, expenses, or charges regarding your Services at
any time.”270
The Wilko Court’s other problem was about the lack of public regulatory
function because arbitrators’ decisions were unsupervised. I have a third criticism to offer, which is that obligations to arbitrate individually can stymie the
pursuit of claims rather than be a route to their vindication. The evidence
for this proposition comes from delving into the data on the use of arbitration, available from a small number of sources including research by legal
scholars,271 the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB),272 and by
way of analyses of web-based information.
2014); see also Alltel Corp v. Rosenow, 2014 Ark. 375, at *8–9 (2014) (holding unenforceable an arbitration agreement lacking mutuality and explaining “there is no mutuality of
obligation where one party uses an arbitration agreement to shield itself from litigation,
while reserving to itself the ability to pursue relief through the court system” (quoting
Independence Cty. v. City of Clarksville, 386 S.W.3d 395, 399 (Ark. 2012))).
268 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1751 (West 2015) (“Any waiver by a consumer of the provisions of
this title is contrary to public policy and shall be unenforceable and void.”); Discover Bank
v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (2005).
269 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
270 Wireless Customer Agreement § 1.3, AT&T, http://www.att.com/legal/terms.wireless
CustomerAgreement.html (last visited May 20, 2016).
271 See, e.g., David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An
Empirical Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 87–115 (2015); Alexander J.S. Colvin & Mark Gough, Individual Employment Rights Arbitration in the United States: Actors and
Outcomes, 68 ILR REV. 1019, 1026–35 (2015); Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz,
An Empirical Study of AAA Consumer Arbitrations, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 843, 843–44
(2010); Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence,
41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813, 813–16 (2008).
272 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a) (2015) [hereinafter 2015 CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY], http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/
201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/P5B9-JPSZ].
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A few jurisdictions, of which California is one, require providers of consumer arbitrations to publish data about their services.273 As of 2011, a Hastings Law School study tallied twenty-six arbitration providers in California
and identified eleven providers following these requirements.274 The American Arbitration Association (AAA) is one of those that does comply and,
moreover, provides significant amounts of information.275 Assisted by several thoughtful law students, I mined the AAA database to learn about individual use of arbitration. Because of AT&T’s leadership in insisting on
arbitration and on class arbitration bans, we focused on claims brought
against AT&T.
The California statute requires five years of information; each quarter, as
data come up, the AAA takes down the oldest quarter. We analyzed filings
from 2009 to 2014. What we learned was that between 2009 and 2014, AT&T
had, each year, some 85 million to 120 million customers. But, what the
posted logs from the AAA taught us was that, as detailed in Figure 11, Consumer Arbitrations Filed with the American Arbitration Association: 2009–2014, during those five years, 134 people, or fewer than 30 a year, brought individual
arbitrations against AT&T.
FIGURE 11: CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS FILED WITH THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION: 2009–2014
Sources

Types

AAA Data, Provider
Organization Report

AAA-defined consumer
claims

June 2009–
July 2014

AAA claims involving
AT&T

Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau,
2015 Arbitration Study
January
2010–December 2012

AAA claims in credit
card, prepaid card,
checking account,
payday, private student,
and auto market loans

Average per Year

Total
1,460

7,303

85–120 million users

27

134*

80 million credit card
consumers

616**

1,847

* All 134 of the consumer claims involving AT&T were filed by consumers.
** Of the 616 consumer arbitrations a year, approximately two-thirds were filed by consumers.

What might be the explanation for this low rate of claims? One could
hypothesize a lack of a need to do so, either because AT&T was compliant
273 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West 2015) (originally enacted in 2002, effective in 2003, and amended in 2014).
274 DAVID J. JUNG, JAMIE HOROWITZ, JOSE HERRERA & LEE ROSENBERG, PUB. L. RES. INST.,
REPORTING CONSUMER ARBITRATION DATA IN CALIFORNIA: AN ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE WITH
CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.96, at 9, 51 (2013), http://gov.uchastings.
edu/docs/arbitration-report/2014-arbitration-update.
275 AAA’s Vice President for Statistics and In-House Research provided guidance on
analysis of the materials posted. See Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 32, at 2812 n.25.
Data for Figure 11 are drawn from AAA Data, July 2009–-June 2014, Provider Organization
Report, and 2015 CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 272.
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with legal obligations or responsive to consumer complaints. But evidence of
misbehavior during this time period comes from the federal government
which, joined by state attorneys general, filed lawsuits against several wireless
providers and alleged violations of federal laws through, for example,
imposing extra charges.276 Soon after filing, these cases were settled with
funds set up for consumer reimbursement as well as penalties paid to the
state and federal governments.277 This form of collective action pursued by
governments is further evidence of the importance of collectivity and of the
consequences of the Court’s sanctioning of class action bans. Few individuals
can afford to pursue small value claims; mandating single-file arbitration
serves as a means of erasing rights, rather than enabling their “effective
vindication.”278
As Figure 11 also reflects, the data that we developed were paralleled by
findings of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which issued
a report in the spring of 2015 about arbitration in five credit card markets
that involved hundreds of millions of consumers.279 CFPB researchers
identified 616 individual arbitrations during a three-year period, of which a
third were brought by companies against the individuals.280
The judicial insistence on an expansive interpretation of the FAA
continued in the 2015–2016 Supreme Court term. In DIRECTV, Inc. v.
Imburgia,281 the Court reached out to review a decision by an intermediate
appellate court in California. At issue was a “contract” providing that “if the
law of your state” made a waiver of class arbitration unenforceable, the
obligation to arbitrate was likewise unenforceable.282 The litigation was filed
in 2008 against DIRECTV; the claim was that the company had violated state
law through imposing early termination fees. At that time, the law of

276 See, e.g., FTC v. T-Mobile USA, No. 2:14-ev-00967 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 19, 2014); FTC
v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-3227 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2014).
277 See, e.g., Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 16,
31, FTC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-3227-HLM (N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2014) http://
www.ftc.gov/es/system/files/documents/cases/141008attstip2.pdf (requiring that AT&T
report to the FTC on its compliance with the settlement order for at least six years);
Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment at 10, FTC v. TMobile USA, Inc., No. 2:14-ev-00967 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 19, 2014); Diane Bartz, Update 1U.S. Settles Lawsuit over T-Mobile US’s Unauthorized Charges, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2014), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/19/t-mobile-us-usa-settlement-idUSL1N0U31F1201412
19; see also Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 32, at 2878–79 (discussing different
measures of “effective vindication” and their difficulties).
278 I elaborate this argument and explain why one could read the Court’s case law as
imposing a deprivation of property without due process in Diffusing Disputes. See Resnik,
Diffusing Disputes, supra note 32, at 2818–24.
279 2015 CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 272.
280 Id. §§ 1, 5.
281 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).
282 Id. at 466.
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California (as described above) rendered the class-action waiver
unenforceable.283
A few years later, the California appellate court held that, given the
specific terms in the form agreement that called for the application of
California law, the obligation to arbitrate was not enforceable.284 In 2015,
the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Over Justice Ginsburg’s dissent (joined by
Justice Sotomayor) that courts were to “give the customer, not the drafter,
the benefit of the doubt” and hence provide “effective access to justice,”285
the majority decision by Justice Breyer insisted that under the Court’s
approach, arbitration was obligatory.286
The oddities of this decision merit comment. Unlike the class action
waiver at issue in AT&T v. Concepcion that affected millions of people and the
provisions in hundreds of documents related to consumer goods and
employment, the DIRECTV dispute related only to older claims under clauses
that lawyers, drafting for those imposing arbitration, should no longer use.
The particular provision obliging that either arbitrations proceed
individually or that no one arbitrate at all is itself evidence that those
imposing arbitration do so to preclude public collective actions, rather than
because they are wedded to arbitration per se.
Further, as Justice Ginsburg explained in dissent, FAA preemption had,
before this case, been unusual in that the federal statute could itself be
“preempted” (if you will) by parties’ intent, when set forth in contracts.287
Indeed, the Court had in its 2008 decision in Hall Street Associates288 noted
that parties could “choose” the governing law to apply. Yet the DIRECTV
majority rejected what the contract drafters had specified, which was using
California state law as it then was.
From Grupo Mexicano to Great-West Life and AT&T v. Concepcion and
DIRECTV, the Court has been, as Meltzer argued, purposivist in its
283 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2015); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100
(Cal. 2005).
284 Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 225 Cal. App. 4th. 338 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), rev’d
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).
285 DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 471 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas dissented
separately that the FAA did not, in his view, apply in state court. Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
286 Id. at 471 (majority opinion). In light of the holding in DIRECTV, the Court in
Schumacher Homes of Circleville, Inc., v. Spencer summarily vacated and remanded a case
decided by the West Virginia Supreme Court. See Schumacher Homes of Circleville, Inc. v.
Spencer, 136 S. Ct. 1157 (2016), granting cert., vacating, and remanding Schumacher Homes
of Circleville, Inc., v. Spencer, 774 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 2015).
287 DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 473 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
288 See id. at 473–74 (citing Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586
(2008)). Justice Ginsburg quoted Hall Street when, in her dissent in DIRECTV, she
discussed the ability under the FAA for parties to “tailor some, even many, features of
arbitration by contract, including . . . procedure and choice of . . . law,” and noting that
parties could even “choose to have portions of their contract governed by the law of Tibet,
the law of pre-revolutionary Russia.” See id. at 468.
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interpretation of statutes.289 But the majority’s purposiveness has been in
service of rendering courts unresponsive. The Court has come to attribute to
Congress a disinterest in enabling access to the federal courts and in judicial
gap-filling remedies.
In shaping this sequence of remedial constraints, majorities often invoke
the Court’s obligation to defer to congressional mandates. Yet, the Court’s
approach has been, as Justice O’Connor put it in a case on the FAA, to build
“an edifice of its own creation.”290 Her objection (echoed by Justice Thomas
most recently in DIRECTV291) was that Congress had designed the FAA as a
procedural forum-allocation rule for the federal courts and not as a
substantive obligation that applied in state courts.292 But the majority
rejected that reading. The result is that a presumption of preclusion has
come to lace the law.
D.

Statutory Rights and Specified Damages: Spokeo’s Injuries in Law, in Fact,
and in Cases in the Federal Courts

The Court’s interpretation of the FAA limits the remedies for claimants,
whether asserting federal or state rights. Another effort aims to cut off private plaintiffs altogether from being able to bring claims under certain kinds
of federal consumer protection statutes.293 A developing line of argument
insists that even when Congress has created private causes of action for failures to comply with statutory duties, and a specific individual can assert a
particular violation of that statute (an “injury in law”), that breach does not
necessarily create the kind of “injury” that constitutes a “case” for purposes of
Article III. Thus, litigants have asked the Court to assert its power to override
congressional decisions making certain forms of behavior actionable wrongs.
The defense bar’s promotion of drawing such distinctions between
something styled an “injury in law” and an “injury in fact” gained momentum
in the last two decades as part of the quest to curtail class actions. When
Congress couples a statutory right with a statutory remedy (the payment of
$100, for example, in lieu of a requirement to put on proof of economic
injury), and plaintiffs proceed as a class, a finding of liability can impose
289 Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, supra note 110, at 56.
290 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring). And, as Meltzer explained, in preemption, there has been a “dominance in
this area of a nontextualist approach to interpretation.” Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism,
supra note 110, at 56.
291 Justice Thomas “remain[s] of the view that the [FAA] does not apply to proceedings
in state courts.” DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 471 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
292 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 21 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
293 The Court has taken other liberties with federal statutes creating rights. I have
already noted the Court’s 2000 override of the civil rights remedy in the Violence Against
Women Act. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); supra note 179 and
accompanying text.
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significant costs. In response, the potential defendants have spawned a
debate under the moniker of a “no-injury claim.”294
A case on the docket in 2012 ended without reaching the “no-injury”
question,295 and the issue was posed again in the 2015–2016 term in Spokeo
Inc. v. Robins,296 which resulted in an ambiguous holding remanding the
issue to the Ninth Circuit. Thomas Robins filed a proposed class action
alleging that Spokeo Inc., which runs a website, had violated the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA) by inaccurately describing his education and financial
status as well as failing to follow the required procedures for posting information.297 The FCRA, dating from 1970,298 protects consumers by authorizing
federal agencies and state attorneys general to bring cases299 if credit agen294 Some commentators trace this idea of “no-injury” to the current Chief Justice who,
when at the Solicitor General’s Office in the early 1990s, represented Secretary of the
Interior Manuel Lujan before the Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555 (1992). Roberts had previously argued on Lujan’s behalf in Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). In 1993, while in private practice, he wrote an essay
defending the Court’s decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. See John G. Roberts, Jr.,
Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219 (1993). Yet that essay is more
focused on the Lujan scenario of generalized injury; the other examples of legislative overreach he used did not address the specific statutory claims now in focus.
295 See, e.g., First Am. v. Edwards, 132 S. Ct. 2536 (2012), cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted. At issue was whether a conflict of interest as defined by the Real Estate Settlement
Provider Act gave rise to redress, despite the lack of economic injury. In oral argument,
Chief Justice Roberts asked questions about the distinction between injury in fact and
injury in law, as he challenged the argument that “violation of a statute is injury-in-fact”
rather than “injury-in-law” and noted that “what is required [for standing] is injury-in-fact.”
Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Edwards, 132 S. Ct. 2536 (No. 10-708).
296 See Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (Mem.) (2015), granting cert. to Robins v.
Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014). The Court’s decision by Justice Alito, 136 S.Ct.
1540 (2016), is discussed below. See infra notes 336–41.
297 See Complaint at 8, Robins v. Spokeo, No. CV10-05306-ODW-AGRx, 2010 WL
11240827 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 20, 2010).
298 See Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970) (codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–81x (2012)).
299 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681s(a)–(c) (providing for enforcement of the FCRA by the FTC,
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and state attorneys general).
State attorneys general can rely on the statute as well as on state analogues. See Brief
of Amici Curiae States of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, Oregon,
and Washington in Support of Respondent at 1, Spokeo, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (No. 13-1339). The
statue expressly preempted certain state claims, including state defamation, invasions of
privacy, and negligence, unless based on “false information furnished with malice.” See 15
U.S.C. § 1681h(e).
As of 2011, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau had dealt with more than
“43,000 complaints about inaccuracies on credit reports.” See Brief for Experian Information Solutions, Inc., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 24, Spokeo, 135 S. Ct. 1892
(No. 13-1339). As of February 25, 2016, the CFPB had received 84,443 credit-reporting
complaints. See Beta Consumer Complaints Visualization, Number of Complaints by Product, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://data.consumerfinance.gov/view/wkue-ycpk (last visited
May 20, 2016).
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cies reported inaccurate or misleading information,300 and by creating private rights of action.
In 1996 amendments, Congress added that, for “willful” violations,
courts could award damages in private actions specified by statute as an alternative to sums established through evidentiary hearings.301 Specifically, the
FCRA instructs courts either to award damages as proven or to rely on
“damages of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000.”302 As argued to
the Supreme Court, permitting FCRA statutory damages reflects the “difficulty of documenting that injury, given the structural characteristics of the
offending conduct.”303 Identifying what false information passed from one
database to another, and then reached which entities to result in lost opportunities (for jobs, or credit, and the like) entails costly, if not insurmountable,
problems of proof. Specifying damages is one way to lower the transaction
costs of litigants and save the time of federal judges.
Spokeo, joined by many amici, objected to Robins’s claim on several
grounds. One was that the alleged errors, describing him as “wealthier” and
better educated than he was, did not constitute a “harm.”304 But the larger
objection was to the proposed class action, and hence that the $100–$1000 of
specified damages could be multiplied many times over. As the case proceeded through the courts, Spokeo’s amici argued that a lawsuit like Robins’s
“threatens to greatly expand . . . [the] intended scope of consumer protection” and would expose “credit bureaus . . . to potentially massive class action
cases brought by or on behalf of persons without any real-world harm.”305
300 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (describing the purpose of the act as “requir[ing] that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner
which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy,
relevancy, and proper utilization of such information”).
301 See Pub. L. No. 104-208, tit. II, subtitle D, § 2412, 110 Stat. at 3009–446 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A)) (“Any person who willfully fails to comply with any
requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any consumer is liable to that
consumer . . . .”). For negligent violations of the act, a consumer may obtain only “actual
damages.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a).
302 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A).
303 Brief of Amici Curiae Information Privacy Law Scholars in Support of Respondent
at 12, Spokeo, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (No. 13-1339).
304 See, e.g., Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3–4, Spokeo, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (No. 13-1339).
305 Brief of Trans Union LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1–2, Spokeo,
135 S. Ct. 1892 (No. 13-1339). As explained by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, collective
relief with statutorily specified damages could impose large economic penalties when the
class members have not suffered real economic losses. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce
of the United States of America, The American Hotel & Lodging Association, The American Tort Reform Association, The International Association of Defense Counsel, The
National Association of Manufacturers, and The National Federation of Independent Business as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 12–26, Spokeo, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (No. 131339). See also Brief of the Coalition for Sensible Public Records Access; American Escrow
Association; American Land Title Association; Consumer Mortgage Coalition; National
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A district judge concluded that Mr. Robins’s allegations that the misinformation hurt his employment prospects were too speculative to constitute
the harm required by Article III. The lower court dismissed the lawsuit by
drawing the distinction between the allegations of statutory violations (taken
to be true at that stage) and the “actual” harm required by the Court’s Article
III jurisprudence.306 The Ninth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court
granted review.307 Before discussing its ruling, the arguments presented to
the Court merit analysis.
Spokeo is, of course, not the first case in which judges have examined the
nature and quality of an individual’s injury, and the general doctrinal rubric
has been “standing.” During the last few decades, the Court’s jurisprudence
has focused on the concreteness and specificity of injuries, as well as on
whether individuals fall within the “zone” of interests that a statute addresses.
A major exemplar in the 1990s was Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, involving the
Endangered Species Act (ESA), which obliged environmental impact statements for federally funded projects and authorizing “any person” (including
organizations) to “commence a civil suit on his own behalf” for failures to do
so.308 One question was whether that obligation applied off-shore, and the
federal government’s answers varied depending on who was the U.S. President. When alterations of the Aswan Dam were contemplated, environmentalists argued that that the government had to comply with the ESA. In a
plurality opinion, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs, living in the
United States far from the area, could not show a specific particularized
injury (“injury in fact”), nor the requisite nexus and relationship between the
alleged harm (a loss of animal habitat and maybe of the animals themselves),
the alleged violation (procedural failures), and the relief requested (stopping the funding).309
Association of Realtors; and Real Estate Services Providers Council, Inc. (RESPRO) as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6, Spokeo, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (No. 13-1339) (arguing
that meritless settlements will result out of fear of “overwhelming liability”); Brief for Amici
Curiae Time Inc. and Seven Media Organizations in Support of Petitioner at 4, Spokeo, 135
S. Ct. 1892 (No. 13-1339) (warning of the “chilling effects of unbridled class actions
brought—or even threatened—by uninjured plaintiffs”). The question of the propriety of
class actions in this context was also in focus in the Supreme Court argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, No. 13-1339 (2015).
306 Robins v. Spokeo, No. CV10-05306-ODW-AGRx, 2011 WL 1793334, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
May 11, 2011).
307 Spokeo, 135 S. Ct. 1892, granting cert. to Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir.
2014).
308 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); see also Endangered Species Act of
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44
(2012)).
309 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–62 (plurality opinion). Justice Stevens would have ruled
that the plaintiffs had standing but lost on the merits, see id. at 581–82 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment), and Justices Souter and Kennedy noted that while Congress could
create new rights and remedies, Congress needed to provide more specificity about who
could enforce them, see id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
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But Spokeo offered a different paradigm than Lujan, in that Mr. Robins
presented the very kind of particularized harm (the circulation of false information about him) that the FCRA protects and for which it specified remedies. Moreover, given that the Federal Trade Commission had sued and
settled with the defendant Spokeo for other violations of the FCRA,310 Mr.
Robins’s complaint passed the “plausibility” test that the Supreme Court has
imposed on pleadings.311
The briefing before the Supreme Court in Spokeo clarified the kinds of
decisions the Justices could have made. A first question was about statutory
interpretation, as some of Mr. Robins’s critics argued that the statute, which
discussed the “adverse effect” of credit information on a specific plaintiff,
required proof of actual harm.312 A sub-issue was whether inaccurate personal information that seems positive could impose adverse effects, as Mr.
Robins alleged, and whether making such misinformation about a person’s
education and wealth available electronically imposed “real” injuries that
Congress can protect through new statutes.313 Related to the statutory interpretation question was the allocation of authority between private and public
actors. Spokeo’s amici argued that enforcement of these rights by federal
and state agencies sufficed, and they urged the Court to limit private enforcejudgment). The Court has many standing decisions, and a recent example is Arizona State
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2015).
310 Complaint for Civil Penalties, Injunction and Other Relief, United States v. Spokeo,
Inc., No. 2:12-cv-05001 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 7, 2012) (alleging that Spokeo violated the FCRA by
selling detailed information profiles of consumers to companies in the human resources,
background screening, and recruiting industries without complying with several FCRA
requirements). Spokeo paid $800,000 to the FTC to settle the charges. See Consent
Decree and Order for Civil Penalties, Injunction, and Other Relief at 4, United States v.
Spokeo, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-05001 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 7, 2012).
311 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007); see also Brief for Center for Democracy & Technology, Electronic Frontier
Foundation, New America’s Open Technology Institute and World Privacy Forum as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondent, at 14–17, Spokeo, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (No. 13-1339) (arguing
that “self-regulation” within the credit reporting industry does not “eliminate the need for
a private right of action in the Fair Credit Reporting Act”).
312 See Brief for Experian Information Solutions, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 17–18, Spokeo, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (No. 13-1339).
313 See Amicus Curiae Brief of Center for Digital Democracy in Support of Respondent
at 2–3, Spokeo, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (No. 13-1339). Some of the amici in support of Mr. Robins
argued the importance of private enforcement in particular, as public agencies had limited
resources and often settled actions. Thus, violation of the statute alone without a showing
of additional injuries ought to suffice. See, e.g., Brief for Center for Democracy & Technology et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 311, at 3–5.
Mr. Robins’s proponents pointed to various kinds of injuries from inaccuracies, such
as being excluded from job searches, losing out on insurance, and being assumed to be
untrustworthy. Id. at 12–13. They also argued that inflated credentials, such as those
alleged by Mr. Robins, could cause candidates to be excluded as overqualified for some
jobs. Id. at 13.
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ment.314 Robins’s defenders insisted that public and private incentives
diverged, and cited the settlements of such public actions as evidence of the
need for private enforcement.315
A second line of argument was about whether the FCRA is innovative or
better understood as a statutory analogue to injuries long recognized by constitutional and common law. Some of Robins’s amici argued that the FCRA
protected “reputation and property” as had the common law, which also provided remedies (for example, based on publication if a person was libeled)
that do not turn on “proof of further harm” beyond the violation itself.316
Thus, examples such as trespass or the violation of a right to vote were cited
for the proposition that law did not require all injuries to be cashed out in
economic loss.317 Remedies scholars offered a related analysis, that the “law
of restitution and unjust enrichment creates remedies and causes of action
based on gain to defendant rather than loss to plaintiff,” and that at the
founding, plaintiffs could recover “statutory damages or penalties in an
action of debt” without proof of specific damages to themselves.318
A third tack was to defend the power of Congress to identify and to
“define new legal rights” and authorize their vindication.319 Rather than
314 See Brief for the Coalition for Sensible Public Records Access, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 25–31, Spokeo, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (No. 13-1339) (arguing that public
enforcement, via state agencies and Congress, was sufficient); see also Brief for Ebay Inc.,
Facebook, Inc., Google Inc., and Yahoo! Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4–6,
19–20, Spokeo, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (No. 13-1339).
315 See Brief for Center for Democracy & Technology et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, supra note 311, at 16–17.
316 See Brief of Amici Curiae State of Massachusetts et al., supra note 299, at 3, 23–24
(pointing to publication of false information and to trespass, as well as infringement
actions); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Public Citizen, Inc. et al., in Support of Respondent
at 7, 18, Spokeo, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (No. 13-1339) (“[A]s a man is said to have a right to his
property, he may equally be said to have a property in his rights” (quoting James Madison,
Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 27 1792, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266)).
This brief also gave examples of deprivations of legal rights from English common law,
including the loss of the right to vote and the diversion of water. Id. at 8–9. It also cited
harm to reputation, privacy, and defamation as harms that did not require proof of injury
other than the action itself in both English and U.S. common law. Id. at 18–21.
317 See Brief for Public Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at
19–20, Spokeo, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (No. 13-1339); Brief of Restitution and Remedies Scholars as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2, Spokeo, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (No. 13-1339).
318 Brief of Restitution and Remedies Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2, Spokeo, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (No. 13-1339) (emphasis added).
319 See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States 529 U.S. 765, 773 (2000); see also Lujan v.
Defs. Of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Congress has the
power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or
controversy where none existed before . . . . [H]owever, Congress must at the very least
identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled
to bring suit.”). An oft-cited example is the mechanism that Congress crafted to enforce
the Fair Housing Act of 1968. The statute makes unlawful the denial of housing based on
race; the Court recognized the ability of a black woman who planned to rent an apartment
but was denied information to bring a lawsuit for the violation of the Fair Housing Act.
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being moored in analogies to the common law, the claim was that invention
is more than appropriate when technologies change. In the Spokeo litigation,
the examples proffered included environmental and aesthetic injuries, with
citations to many cases in which Justices such as Anthony Kennedy have specifically recognized the legislature’s power to identify new rights and
remedies.320
The one vector on which the disputants agreed was that the stakes were
about separation of powers. While Robins’s supporters insisted on locating
rights-creation in Congress by warning the judiciary not to intrude into the
legislature’s province, Spokeo’s proponents posited either that Congress was
trenching on the Court’s role in bounding Article III321 or that Article II’s
Take Care Clause permitted enforcement of the statute only by the executive,
unless individuals have “actual injuries.”322
The Constitution does not use the word “injury” (concrete, particularized, or speculative), nor does it offer the phrases “causes of action,” “claim
for relief,” or terms such as “nexus” and “redressability.” But the idea that
not all experiences of harm produce legally cognizable “cases” is commonplace. The concept of a cause of action is slippery precisely because of a
space between what people experience as harm (the withdrawal of an invitation to dinner, rejection from being admitted to universities, loss of recreational opportunities, sexual harassment, breaches of promises to marry,
household violence) and what law recognizes as actionable. As the examples
just proffered make plain, what kind of injuries law redresses changes over
time through constitutional and common law and by virtue of new legislation. Further, as the many cases turning on the idea of “standing” make
plain, debates can readily be had about the requisite kinds of relationships
between potential defendants and plaintiffs.
What is new is the effort to persuade judges that although Congress has
regulatory authority under its Commerce Clause powers to prohibit specified
actions, impose duties on how to treat individuals, and authorize private
enforcement if specified breaches occur, judges should use their own metrics
to decide that the harms Congress has recognized do not suffice to constitute
“cases” as required by Article III.
The novelty of this argument can be seen in the array of phrases
deployed to try to escape the majoritarian presumption that Congress can
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982). In Spokeo, the Privacy Scholars
argue that Congress ought also be able to recognize that technology can impose new forms
of injury. Brief of Amici Curiae Information Privacy Law Scholars in Support of Respondent at 17–27, Spokeo, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (No. 13-1339); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Public
Citizen, Inc. et al., supra note 316, at 6.
320 See Lujan, 504 U.S. 555 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 734 (1972).
321 See Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 8–23, Spokeo, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (No. 13-1339).
322 Brief of the American Bankers Association, the Consumer Bankers Association, the
Mortgage Bankers Association, the Clearing House, and the Financial Services Roundtable
as Amici Curiae at 3, Spokeo, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (No. 13-1339).
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make such judgments and expand the common law rights-to-remedies traditions. Hence, both the briefing in Spokeo and the literature more generally
grope for language to license the judicial trump. Proffered were “injury in
law,” “injury in fact,”323 a “bare violation of statutory duties,”324 an “uninjured plaintiff,”325 “wholly uninjured persons,”326 no “real-world sense” of
injury or no “real” injury,327 “no-harm class actions,”328 a “technical violation,”329 a “statutory injury,”330 “statutory injury-in-law,”331 the absence of
“actual harm,” an “empty suit,”332 and “negligible or infinitesimal” economic
loss.333
These terms have attracted a good deal of scholarly attention. Professor
Patricia Moore has analyzed the deployment of these phrases, the history of
the word “injury” in Black’s Law Dictionary, and the absence of case law recognizing “injury-in-law” as a viable concept.334 The work of her’s and others
makes plain that the many briefs aimed to reopen debate about the wisdom
of the enactment of the FCRA and of other statutes that, coupled with class
actions, could impose significant penalties on defendants. Thus, as Henry
323 Sometimes these arguments invoke the Chief Justice’s article on standing. See, e.g.,
Brief of the American Bankers Association et al. as Amici Curiae at 9, Spokeo, 135 S. Ct.
1892 (No. 13-1339) (citing Roberts, supra note 294).
324 Brief of Amici Curiae New England Legal Foundation and Associated Industries of
Massachusetts in Support of Petitioner at 5, Spokeo, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (No. 13-1339).
325 Id. at 15.
326 Brief of Trans Union LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note
305, at 24.
327 Id. at 3.
328 Id. at 7.
329 Brief of Public Justice, P.C., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 18,
Spokeo, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (No. 13-1339).
330 Brief of Amicus Curiae Consumer Data Industry Association in Support of Petitioner at 14, Spokeo, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (No. 13-1339).
331 Brief of the Chamber of Commerce et al., supra note 305, at 9.
332 Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, The Rise of “Empty Suit” Litigation: Where Should
Tort Law Draw the Line?, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 599 (2015).
333 This phrase comes from a report seeking to identify what it describes as an empirical search for such cases; researchers classified cases by determining that plaintiffs had not
suffered “actual or imminent concrete harm,” the “only harm was a technical statutory
violation,” economic loss was “negligible or infinitesimal,” and the recover was “unrelated
to compensating” plaintiffs’ losses. See Joanna Shepherd, An Empirical Survey of No-Injury
Class Actions 9–10 (Feb. 1, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2726905. Thus, the researchers supplied their own view of harm and then identified “432 no-injury cases” in state and federal courts resolved between 2005 and 2015. Id.
at 1. The exemplary federal statutes included the FCRA, as well as the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, and the Electronic Funds Transfer
Act. More than 97% were resolved without trial, and the research summary appears to
want to conclude—albeit without data on claiming rates for the class actions studied—that
individuals recouped little benefit and administrative expenses (including lawyers’ fees)
take the bulk of monetary awards. Id. at 4–5, 23–24.
334 See Patricia W. Hatamyer Moore, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins: The Illusory “No-Injury
Class” Reaches the Supreme Court, 2 ST. THOMAS J. COMPLEX LITIG. 1 (2016).
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Monaghan underscored in this symposium, the debate reflected that “injury
‘in fact’ has a strongly normative component.”335
In May of 2016, Justice Alito provided a response for the Court, which
sent the case back to the Ninth Circuit for analysis of the distinction that he
drew between “concreteness and particularization,” each of which, the Court
directed, required independent evaluation.336 In terms of guidance on the
delineation (which appears to be elusive), Justice Alito said that “intangible
injuries” could be “concrete”; when determining “whether an intangible
harm constitutes injury in fact, both history and the judgment of Congress
play important roles.”337 Those statements could be read as agreeing with
the briefs arguing on behalf of Robins and evoking both the precedents
about remedies and deference to Congress. Yet the majority also noted that
Robins could not “satisfy the demands of Article III by alleging a bare procedural violation” unless he had also plausibly claimed that harms flowed.338
Justice Thomas offered a concurrence that delineated common law private rights from public rights; the latter were what he deemed to be interests
more appropriately protected by the Executive.339 For Justice Thomas, Mr.
Robins had “no standing to sue Spokeo, in his own name, for violations of
the duties that Spokeo owes to the public collectively.”340 Justice Ginsburg,
joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented. Reading the majority as concluding
that Robins met the “particularity requirement,” the dissent argued that he
had also met the showing of a particularized “concrete” injury; Robins complained of “misinformation about his education, family situation, and economic status.”341
These disagreements among the jurists raise questions about what norms
supply answers about the role to be played by federal judges. The posture of
the Court that Meltzer advanced as either an “agent” or a “junior partner” to
Congress342 and the approach embraced by proponents of a textualist
approach would seem to require deference to congressional directives.
Indeed, in 2014, in a unanimous decision authored by Justice Scalia, the
Court concluded that it was neither supposed to “apply its independent policy judgment to recognize a cause of action that Congress has denied,” nor
“limit a cause of action that Congress has created merely because ‘prudence’
dictates.”343
But even if judges were to shift away from deference or the interdependency remedial gap-filling (that I read Meltzer to have commended) and
335 Monaghan, An Essay in Honor of Daniel Meltzer, supra note 108, at 1818.
336 Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. at 1540, 1548.
337 Id. at 1549.
338 Id. at 1550 (using a statement of an erroneous zip code as an example of a dissemination that would not constitute harm).
339 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (Thomas, J., concurring).
340 Id. at 1553.
341 Id. at 1554, 1556 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Sotomayor, J.).
342 Fallon, On Viewing the Courts as Junior Partners, supra note 108.
343 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1388 (2014).
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become overseers, the question returns: What norms supply answers for how
such an overseer ought to behave? Two competing common heritages can
now be drawn upon, one counseling hospitality and the other committed to
limiting both judicial and congressional authority to provide remedies in
courts.
As the majority and concurring opinions in Spokeo illustrate, which
approach seems more “plausible”344 has changed. In earlier decades, I
watched students in my Federal Courts classes react with distress when confronted with victims (such as the member of the armed services who drowned
in Boyle, or the unwitting subjects of LSD experiments345 as well as those
alleging torture as in Vance) who lost the chance to prove their claims of
rights. They were in the generations schooled under the heritage presuming
federal courts to be hospitable. In these last few years, however, I have
encountered much less outrage. Instead, I have found students in search of
the “logic” behind the dizzying array of doctrines resulting in remedial preclusion. (“999 ways to kick a case out of federal court,” as Meltzer put it.)
Students increasingly take at face value arguments that judges ought to create immunities, even when Congress has not expressly done so. The illogic
of refusing to imply causes of action but implying limits on liability is subsumed by a larger narrative that courts ought to be unavailing.
These students have thus incorporated the attitude that courts (and new
lawyers) should be suspicious of plaintiffs seeking redress, whether they be
members of “the public at large” (per Meltzer) or specific victims, and
whether the harms sound in tort, torture, misinformation on the web, or the
environment. Many of these rulings are not harking to a conservative (lowercase c) approach to judicial interpretation but rather calling for expansive
exercises of judicial authority. In lieu of the common law development of
constitutional remedies that Meltzer (as well as Richard Fallon and Henry
Monaghan346) has commended, the Court has developed diverse methods of
preclusion rendering courts unavailable in the face of an array of alleged
wrongdoings by both private and public actors.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL LOYALTY

TO THE

FEDERAL COURTS

At the outset, I joined Daniel Meltzer in seeing the federal courts as the
font of the “common intellectual heritage.” Yet I also resisted too heavy a
reliance on the federal judiciary by arguing the centrality of Congress in
bringing the courts into play. And, indeed, even as the Supreme Court during the last four decades has tutored us on the propriety of barriers to the
federal courts, Congress continued, by and large, to provide ways for more
people to use them.
344 “Plausibility” is the test the Court has required for the adequacy of federal complaints. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).
345 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 502 (1988); United States v. Stanley,
483 U.S. 669, 671–72 (1987).
346 Fallon & Meltzer, New Law, supra note 90; Monaghan, Foreword, supra note 228.
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Of course, an account of the decades has complexity, as Congress has
sometimes limited access, just as the Supreme Court has sometimes opened
the doors, either by refusing the congressional constraints or by recognizing
new rights, such as Second Amendment gun claims. Thus, in the mid-1990s,
what for Federal Courts scholars had been hypotheticals about “jurisdiction
stripping” turned into reality, as Congress imposed specific limits on access to
federal courts for certain kinds of litigants. In a trio of enactments (the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),347 the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),348 and the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)),349 Congress targeted
prisoners, migrants, and welfare recipients and curtailed their ability to make
use of courts. And in 2006, in the Military Commissions Act (MCA),350 Congress did the same for those in detention at Guantánamo Bay.
Further, Congress has responded to criticisms of securities litigation and
class actions by imposing new requirements for the filing of such cases. The
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) created a series of
pre-conditions to filing securities class actions, structured the requirements
for attorneys to collect fees, and changed some of the requirements for
pleading claims, potentially making it more difficult to bring cases.351 In
contrast, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) opened new doors to
federal courts by relaxing diversity requirements so that defendants in singlestate class actions involving large numbers of people could remove such cases
to the federal courts.352 Interest in such removal stemmed, at least from
those pressing for CAFA’s enactment, on the assumption that federal judges
would be less hospitable to class actions than many state court judges.
347 Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012)). The impact of the PLRA is analyzed in Margo
Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
153 (2015).
348 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
349 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18
U.S.C. (2012)).
350 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2631 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a et seq. (2012)).
351 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, §§ 101, 109
Stat. 737, 737–49 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4 (2012)). The impact of the statute
has been debated. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, The Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 35 (2009);
Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year’s Experience: A Statistical and Legal Analysis of Class Action Securities Fraud Litigation Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ., Working
Paper No. 140, 1997).
352 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (2012)); see generally Symposium, Fairness to Whom? Perspectives on
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (2008).
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In a few contexts, the Court has, in turn, rebuffed some jurisdictional
incursions while tolerating others. As is familiar, in Boumediene v. Bush,
decided in 2008, a five-person majority held the MCA unconstitutional in its
limiting habeas corpus petitions by individuals detained pre-trial by the federal government at Guantánamo Bay.353 Further, the Court’s inventive interpretations of IIRIRA left windows open for migrants to obtain judicial review
of certain decisions by the executive.354 And, while the Court has largely
deferred on the PLRA and on AEDPA, it has done so in part when these
statutes converge with the Court’s own decisions constraining court access
for prisoners and criminal defendants.355 On the other hand, the Court has
also authorized judicial review of claims brought by some prisoners, such as
those in California’s prisons who were so densely incarcerated as to be
unsafe,356 and by an occasional habeas petitioner such as the one whose lawyer left the firm without safeguarding his client’s access rights.357
More generally, the examples of congressional jurisdiction-stripping in
the 1990s remain aberrational. Thus, even as the Court limited its authority
to create new rights, Congress continued to respond to diverse problems
(sometimes related to Supreme Court decisions) by deploying the federal
courts. Below, I offer a sampling of the groups that have succeeded during
the past twenty years in mobilizing congressional support for new rights,
implemented in part through federal litigation. I then sketch the federal
judiciary’s success (aside from judges’ salaries) in securing funding and consider the ways in which the political economy reflected in these congressional
acts underscores the function of the federal courts and of private rights as
part of the American political identity. Thus, even as members of Congress
sometimes assail judges as “activists,” the Congress as a body has remained a
judiciary loyalist, prompted by an array of incentives to keep endowing the
federal courts in a variety of ways.358
Some of the new rights of the recent decades are well known, such as the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, which authorized “any person
alleging discrimination on the basis of disability” in violation of the Act to file
a complaint in federal court.359 The Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of
1993 both gave employees unpaid leave for care-giving and the authority to
enforce those rights if employers, including state governments, violated the
353 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); see generally Stephen Vladeck, The PassiveAggressive Virtues, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 122 (2011).
354 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 1051 (1996).
355 See Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1
(1997).
356 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
357 See, e.g., Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012).
358 See, e.g., FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 154, at 19–24.
359 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 107, 104 Stat. 327,
336 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2012)).
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FMLA.360 The 1994 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) authorized damage actions for victims of gender-based violence (later rejected by the U.S.
Supreme Court),361 as well as new federal criminal penalties.362 In 1996, as
discussed, Congress amended the Fair Credit Reporting Act to provide for
civil liability for a consumer reporting agency’s “willful noncompliance” with
the Act.363
Other statutes have a lower profile. In 1997, Congress added enforcement authority against violations of the Atlantic Striped Bass Conservation
Act,364 and created a new federal crime of “electronic theft.”365 And as concerns mounted about whether computers would crash as the century turned,
Congress contemplated a path to federal courts that, as it turned out, was not
needed.366
Since 2000, Congress has continued to enlist the federal judiciary in protecting rights ranging from remedies for victims of global trafficking to interference with public wilderness lands in New Mexico. In 2003, for example,
Congress created a new “private right of action” for victims of forced labor,
human trafficking, and child sex trafficking, all of whom were authorized to
360 Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 107, 107 Stat. 6, 15
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 2617 (2012)). The Court upheld some applications of
the FMLA against states, but ruled out obtaining damages from states for violations of
other provisions. Compare Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (holding that state employees may recover money damages in federal court for state failures to
comply with the family-care provision of the FMLA), with Coleman v. Court of Appeals of
Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012) (holding that Congress could not abrogate states’ sovereign
immunity for damages under FMLA’s self-care provision).
361 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1796,
1941 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13981). As is also familiar, the Court later limited both of these statutes; in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the Court held
the civil rights remedy of the 1994 VAWA unconstitutional
362 Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 904, 127
Stat. 54, 120–23.
363 Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2412 (1996) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (2012)). The authority to do so for claims not asserting actual damages is now pending before the court. See Spokeo, Inc., v. Robins, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (2015)
(granting petition for writ of certiorari).
364 The Atlantic Striped Bass Conservation Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105146, § 5, 111 Stat. 2672, 2674 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 5154(c), (d) (2012)).
365 No Electronic Theft Act, Public L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 and 18 U.S.C. (2012)).
366 Drafts of some of the bills proposed federal jurisdiction, including class actions,
S. 96, 106th Cong. §§ 401–03 (1999), alternatives introduced federal defenses, see H.R.
775, 106th Cong. (1999). The Y2K Act provided jurisdiction, and potential defenses, to
actions stemming from disputes relating to computer failures at the year 2000. Pub. L. No.
106-37, 113 Stat. 185 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601–17). The Judicial Conference
opposed the expansion of its jurisdiction. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
ADDENDUM TO THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL-STATE JURISDICTION 17 (Mar.
1999).
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sue the perpetrators.367 In 2004, responding to exploitation of student athletes, Congress authorized states to bring federal cases on behalf of their resident student athletes who entered into contracts based on misleading
information.368 In 2005, the Ojito Wilderness Act designated some new recreational areas in New Mexico through using federal lands in trust for the Zia
Pueblo and created private enforcement rights to ensure public access to the
newly designated wilderness land.369 In 2012, after the Supreme Court had
ruled that the First Amendment protected anti-gay protestors at the funeral
of a U.S. soldier,370 Congress crafted a civil remedy for those alleging that
individuals had disrupted the funeral of a member of the armed services.371
In 2015, Congress created federal oversight of insurance brokers through a
367 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193,
§ 1595, 117 Stat. 2875, 2878 (creating rights for any victim to bring a damage action “in an
appropriate district court of the United States” against “the perpetrator”). Under the Act,
successful plaintiffs can recover “reasonable attorneys fees,” and judges were required to
stay civil cases “during the pendency of any criminal action arising out of the same occurrence.” Id. §§ 1595(a)–(b). In 2008, the statute was amended to authorize lawsuits against
“whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in
violation of this chapter.” See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 221(2), 122 Stat. 5044, 5067 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a)).
368 Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act, Pub. L. No. 108-304, § 5, 118 Stat. 1125,
1127–28 (2004) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7804) (authorizing filings on behalf of students
harmed by misleading or false statements to induce the athlete “to enter into an agency
contract” or the provision of gifts to do so). States can seek equitable relief, damages,
restitution, or “other compensation,” but can only file if the state’s attorney general has
“reason to believe that an interest of the residents of that State has been or is threatened.”
Id. § 5(a)(1).
369 Ojito Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-94, §§ 3–4, 119 Stat. 2106, 2108–10 (2005)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1132 note) (designating lands in New Mexico as “wilderness”
within the scope of the National Wilderness Preservation System and providing a continuing public right of access to the land for enumerated uses, to be enforced by “any person”
through a civil action for declaratory or injunctive relief in the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico). Included in the new wilderness land was federal land that
the Secretary of the Interior would “take into trust, on behalf of the Pueblo of Zia.” See S.
REP. NO. 109-13, at 5–6 (2005).
370 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011). When a member of the U.S. armed services who died “in the line of duty” in Iraq was buried in Kansas, members of the Westboro
Baptist Church picketed near his funeral and held signs, with slogans such as “Thank God
for Dead Soldiers” and “Don’t Pray for the USA.” Id. at 447–48. A jury awarded millions of
dollars in damages to the soldier’s father, but the Court held that the First Amendment
protected the protestors’ speech, given the distance of the picketers from the funeral.
371 Honoring America’s Veterans and Caring for Camp Lejeune Families Act of 2012,
Pub. L. No. 112-154, § 601, 126 Stat. 1165, 1195 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1388). This
amendment, which aimed to survive challenges under Snyder, authorized the Attorney
General and immediate family of members of the Armed Forces to sue individuals if alleging that they were subjected, within two hours before or after a funeral, to protests within
300 feet of the funeral that disturbed “the peace or good order” of such funeral. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 1388(c)(1)–(3) (2012). The statute provides for “statutory damages” of “not less
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National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers and authorized “[a]ny
person aggrieved by a decision or action” of that association, after exhausting
administrative remedies, to sue that association.372
Analysts have sought to account for the political economy that prompts
Congress repeatedly to create new rights by arguing that they reflect commitments to decentralized, private enforcement.373 From the vantage point of
the “common intellectual heritage,” these many enactments shape a national
political identity commending, rather than criticizing, “litigiousness.” The
authority to bring cases could be conceptualized as turning individuals into
“private attorneys general” representing the public good (in a manner to
which Justice Thomas objected in Spokeo). But private enforcement can also
meld the public and the private, as individuals function not as representatives
of others but as themselves, personally entitled to the status of worthy claimant in public courts.374 Moreover, this status is generative for the government, as individuals, constitutionally entitled to “petition for redress” (to
borrow from the First Amendment), forge a relationship with the state and
expect the state to be responsive to them.
In addition to continuing to confer rights of access to federal courts,
Congress has remained steadfast in funding the federal courts, whose budget
lines are small when compared to other federal programs but ample when
compared to state judiciaries. Despite the Great Recession and contraction
in the last decade, the federal judiciary has been successful in garnering significant dollars both directly and through some of the targeted anti-recession

than $25,000 or more than $50,000 per violation” as well as for “actual damages” and also
creates a presumption of willfulness to disturb the funeral. Id. §§ 1388(d), (e).
372 See National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers Reform Act of 2015, Pub.
L. No. 114-1, § 332, 129 Stat. 3, 26 (codified at 15 U.S.C § 6762(a)). The purpose of the
statute was to create methods, through “licensing, continuing education” and other multistate methods to improve governance of insurance brokers, including through criminal
background checks. Id. § 322.
373 See, e.g., FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 154, at 5. Possible explanations
include anxiety about central control as well as competition for power between Congress
and the Executive, which may be dominated by different parties. Under this approach, the
U.S. is a “weak” state in that, unlike some European countries, the preference is not to use
organs of the state for enforcement. Id. at 6; see also Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang &
Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637 (2013). They noted
that private enforcement can both shift costs to private actors and rely on knowledge gathered outside government, as well as insure against administrative failures to implement
legislative rights and enhance participatory democracy. Burbank, Farhang & Kritzer,
supra, at 662–66. Farhang also found that many individuals, rather than politically organized plaintiffs, filed suit. See FARHANG, LITIGATION STATE, supra note 154, at 11. In his
sample, interest group litigation constituted 2–5% of published federal appellate decisions
between 1960 and 2004.
374 See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L.
REV. 28 (1976).
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federally funded building programs.375 (The exception is the federal judiciary’s inability to obtain increases in salaries, which is an ongoing source of
concern.376)
In some respects, the judiciary has been pressed into “cost containment,” including shrinking the judiciary’s “footprint.” In a 2013 report,
“space reduction” was “priority Number One for the Space and Facilities
Committee,” which aimed to reduce working spaces by three percent within
five years.377 A “no net new” policy was put into place, requiring that any
circuit seeking additional space had to identify reductions through tradeoffs,378 such as “courtroom sharing” and cutting back on projections for
space for new judgeships.379
Nonetheless, the 2016 budget allocations included funds to support construction of new courthouses in Tennessee, Ohio, North Carolina, Iowa,
South Carolina, Alabama, Georgia, and Texas, as well as buildings earmarked
for Mississippi and Vermont. In all, a billion dollars was provided that could
be used for buildings. More generally, as the federal judge chairing the Judicial Conference’s Committee on the Budget explained to Congress when testifying in March of 2015, the judiciary had received “a 2.8 percent overall
375 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-307, RECOVERY ACT: GSA’S COURTHOUSE
PROJECTS ILLUSTRATE OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND ANALYZE
ENVIRONMENTAL OUTCOMES (2015).
376 See, e.g., CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, 2006 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 1 (Jan. 2007), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2006yearendreport.pdf. The Chief Justice stated that the failure to raise judicial pay had “reached
the level of a constitutional crisis that threatens to undermine the strength and independence of the federal judiciary.” Id.; see also CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, 2005 YEAR-END
REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3–4 (Jan. 2006), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2005year-endreport.pdf; AM. BAR ASS’N & FED. BAR ASS’N, FEDERAL JUDICIAL PAY EROSION: A REPORT ON THE NEED FOR REFORM (2001), http://www.fedbar.org/
PDFs/Government-Relations/Federal-Judicial-Pay-Erosion-A-Report-on-the-Need-forReform.aspx?FT=.pdf. Cost-of-living increases have come after judges have filed classaction lawsuits arguing that failing to do so violates Article III’s promise that judicial salaries not be diminished. See Beer v. United States, 696 F.3d 1174 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1997 (2013).
377 31 Court Facilities to be Downsized in First Year of Cost-Cutting Project, ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2013/10/15/31-courtfacilities-be-downsized-first-year-cost-cutting-project.
378 Two years later, the judiciary’s budget chair testified that the 2013 goals of “3 percent space reduction target” would generally be met by 2018. Gibbons Judiciary’s Budget
2015, supra note 168, at 3–4 (detailing a 12% reduction, or 242,402 square feet, from the
“courts’ rent bill,” largely through cutting spaces for probation and other court
employees).
379 James C. Duff, Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, before the
Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government of the Committee on
Appropriations of the U.S. Senate, March 24, 2015, at 2. Duff, appreciative of support,
mixed details of cost containment with need, when asking for a 3.8% increase for the AO,
aiming for 3.8% above 2015.
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increase in discretionary appropriations above fiscal year 2014.”380 In addition, and based on concerns about “longer-term funding prospects,”381 the
courts requested $7 billion in discretionary appropriations for 2016, a 3.9%
increase over 2015.382
The Senate Committee announced in turn that it was aiming for “$6.9
billion for the federal courts, an increase of $163 million above the FY2015
enacted level. This will provide sufficient funding for all federal court activities, including timely and efficient processing of federal cases, court security,
and supervision of offenders and defendants.”383 And in December of 2015,
the Administrative Office confirmed that the Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 2016 contained $6.78 billion in discretionary funding, providing a
1.2% increase “from the previous year and essentially equal to the Judiciary’s
final budget request.”384 In short, as the Judiciary’s budget chair put it, this
was “the third consecutive year that the Judiciary has received essentially full
funding of its appropriations requirements,” and it was clear that Congress
“treated the Judiciary as a top funding priority.”385

380 Gibbons Judiciary’s Budget 2015, supra note 168. That support built on the “5.1
percent appropriations increase Congress provided the Judiciary for fiscal year 2014” and
therefore, together, matched what the judiciary thought it needed to recoup from “2013
sequestration cuts.” Id. at 1. Those 2015 operations funded support for 2352 judicial
officers (including both Article III and non–Article III magistrate and bankruptcy judges)
and some 28,500 court employees. See also James C. Duff, Director of the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts, before the Senate Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. and General Government Comm. on Appropriations at 6 (Mar. 24, 2015). Duff made virtually the same statement to the house subcommittee on March 25, 2015, including his discussion of efforts to
“increase diversity in the federal courts.” James C. Duff, Director of the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts, before the House Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. and General Government Comm. on Appropriations at 5 (Mar. 25, 2015).
381 Gibbons Judiciary’s Budget 2015, supra note 168, at 2. Judge Gibbons reported
that, while the revenue enabled the courts to fill vacancies in the offices of court clerks,
public defenders, and probation, the judiciary worried that the spending cap growth of
2.4% through 2021 would mean that the courts could not meet the anticipated needs.
382 Id. at 2. The statement included hopes for three new magistrate judge positions, id.
at 8, and more compensation for court-appointed counsel and security funding and
increased daily fees for juries from $40 to $50, id. at 11.
383 Press Release, Sen. John Boozman, Senate Comm. Agrees to Boozman’s FY2016
Financial Services Appropriations Bill (July 23, 2015), https://www.boozman.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=3C202CBF-B0B3-4274-8AF2-63E2CA714F94.
384 FY 2016 Funding Meets Judiciary Needs, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (Dec. 21,
2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2015/12/21/fy-2016-funding-meets-judiciaryneeds.
385 Id.
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The Federal Docket in Decline

The heritage that Daniel Meltzer celebrated, with federal courts as central
expositors of American law, continues to be invoked. Indeed, limiting access
to the federal courts has been justified as conserving the federal courts’
capacity to do so.386 As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained when introducing
the 1995 Long Range Plan, it aimed to preserve the “core values of the rule of
law,” “equal justice, judicial independence, national courts of limited jurisdiction, excellence, and accountability,” at risk because of the “limited financial
resources of the federal government.”387
Seeking to keep the number of life-tenured judgeships small,388 the
Judicial Conference argued that limiting workload would make the federal
courts “more accessible”389 by avoiding the “nightmarish” scenario of too
many cases. Otherwise, “civil litigants who can afford it will opt out of the
court system entirely for private dispute resolution providers.”390 Further,
district trial judges were already spending “fewer of their working hours in
civil trials than ever before,” and “the future may make the civil jury trial—
and perhaps the civil bench trial as well—a creature of the past.”391 The
projected denouement was that the “federal district courts, rather than being
forums where the weak and the few have recognized rights that the strong
and the many must regard, could become an arena for second-class justice.”392 In this future, the “federal courts have by and large become criminal courts and forums for those who cannot afford private justice.”393
Two decades have passed since these concerns were put forth, and as I
detail below, the goals of reducing case filings have been met; indeed, filings
were leveling off in the decade before the Long Range Plan was issued and
have been flat since. Yet the population of people unrepresented by lawyers
has grown in the appellate courts, and the capacity of “the weak” to call for
accountings from “the strong” has been constrained by limits on class
actions, preclusion of claims through FAA preemption, and growth in immunity doctrines. The identification of the federal courts with oppressive sentencing laws makes vivid their role as “criminal courts,” and the number of
trials has continued to decline, as have the hours judges spend on the bench.
386 Chief Justice Rehnquist introduced the Judicial Conference’s 1995 Long Range Plan,
replete with recommendations on retrenchment that were explained as in service of “conservation.” See 1995 LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 184, at vii.
387 Id. at vii.
388 Id. at viii.
389 Id. at 5.
390 Id. at 18–19.
391 Id. at 19–20.
392 Id. at 20.
393 Id.
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Given that much of the activities within courts take place in chambers
and often off-the-record, a different “nightmarish” scenario has emerged.
Absent a willingness to rejuvenate its public practices, reorient its concerns,
and coordinate more with state courts, the federal judiciary will have a diminishing capacity to contribute to a “common intellectual heritage.”
1.

Flattening and Clumped Filings

When worrying about the growth in federal filings, the 1995 Long Range
Plan projected that, absent substantial changes, in 2010, more than 610,000
cases would be filed in the federal courts. As Figure 12, 1995 Projections of,
and the Federal District Court Caseloads in, 2010, shows, hindsight enables us to
know that rather than that number, some 360,000 cases were begun, a number close to the 324,000 cases filed in 2000. Not included in either estimate
were bankruptcy filings.394
FIGURE 12: 1995 PROJECTIONS OF, AND THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
CASELOADS IN, 2010
700,000
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610,800
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500,000
Actual filings
2010
359,594
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300,000
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100,000
77,287

62,000
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394 Data for Figure 12 are drawn from multiple sources. Projected filings data are from
the JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS 15, tbl. 3 (1995), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/publications/longrange-plan-federal-courts. Actual filings data are from ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS, 2010, tbls. C, and D Cases (Mar. 31, 2010),
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2010. I discuss bankruptcy trends in Resnik, Privatization of Process, supra note 32, at 1830, fig.13 and
accompanying text.
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A broader picture comes from Figure 13, Growth Rate of Federal District
Court Filings: 1905–2015, which provides an overview of civil and criminal filings from 1905 to 2015.395 As the charts detail, federal filings are flattening.396 While some districts remain busy, filings in other districts were, as of
2015, down to about 160 per judge.397 If the trend line holds stable, both the
395 Data for Figure 13 about the years 1905–1998 are from William F. Shughart &
Gökhan R. Karahan, Determinants of Case Growth in Federal District Courts in the United States,
1904–2002 (ICPSR 3987), INTER-Univ. CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL & SOC. RESEARCH (Jan.
4, 2016), http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/3987. For data for years
1999–2012, see FED. JUDICIAL CTR., HISTORICAL CASELOADS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (Jan. 4,
2016), http://www.fjc.gov/history/caseload.nsf/page/caseloads_main_page. Data for
2000 until 2015 were also adapted from tables C & D of the respective yearly reports accessible at ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (Jan. 4,
2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/federal-judicial-caseload
-statistics. The effective annual growth rate reflects growth that would have occurred if
filings had increased at a constant rate during the prior five years. This rate, based on
actual growth in each of the five years, has been smoothed out. Five-year growth rates for
1905–1908 are based in part upon estimated filings during 1900–1903, projected backwards from years with reported numbers. Data do not include bankruptcy filings.
Note that Professor Moore, who also has analyzed caseload data for the last decades,
refined her analysis to exclude some filings based on her view that the AO double counted.
See Moore, The Federal Civil Caseload, supra note 24, at 1187. Depending on which cases are
included, the growth since 1986 is 9% (her figure) or 12% or 32%. Id.
396 Professor Moore termed the trend “stagnant.” See id. at 1177. Disaggregating by
categories, some areas have been growth areas, prompting discussions for example of a
contemporary “crisis” in patent cases, which grew from about 2500 in 2000 to 5000 in 2014.
But a longer-term analysis argued that the critical surge in filings came in the nineteenth
century. Christopher Beauchamp, The First Patent Litigation Explosion, 125 YALE L.J. 848,
852 (2016).
397 Federal Court Management Statistics from the end of 2015 detail 158 civil filings
per judge in the D.C. District Court, and 180 including criminal filings that were then
described as 205 weighted filings. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE N/A—U.S.
DISTRICT COURTS–COMBINED CIVIL AND CRIMINAL FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS
2 (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/na/federal-court-management-statistics/2015/12/31-2. In contrast, the District of Idaho judges handled about 308 civil and
504 including criminal cases, with weighted filings at 494. Id. at 71.
The AO described weighted filings to account for the different amounts of time district judges require to resolve various types of civil and criminal actions. The Federal Judiciary has employed techniques for assigning weights to cases since 1946. In 2004, the
Judicial Resources Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States approved a
civil and criminal case weighting system proposed by the Federal Judicial Center. On a
national basis, weighted filings did not change significantly after the implementation of the
new case weights. More than two thirds of all district courts saw their weighted filings
change by 10% or less. Average civil cases or criminal defendants each receive a weight of
approximately 1.0; for more time-consuming cases, higher weights are assessed (e.g., a
death-penalty habeas corpus case is assigned a weight of 12.89); and cases demanding relatively little time from judges receive lower weights (e.g., an overpayment and recovery cost
case involving a defaulted student loan is assigned a weight of 0.10). See Explanation of
Selected Terms, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/file/19823/download (last visited
July 12, 2016). Nationally, according to the highlights from the 2015 AOUSC Judicial Business update, civil case filings fell 6% to 279,036. Judicial Business 2015, ADMIN. OFFICE OF
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rate of civil filings and, over time, the number of cases will, as the Long
Range planners had hoped, decline.398
The composition of the caseload has also changed. When Marc
Galanter mapped the kinds of cases that predominated in the 1980s, he identified the “big six” to be contract (19%), tort (17%), recovery (such as on
student loans, 16%), prisoner (12%), civil rights (8%), and social security
(6%).399 By 2013, when Patricia Moore studied the caseload, tort filings
topped the list at almost a quarter of the docket, followed by filings involving
prisoner (up to 20%); civil rights (up to 12%); contract (down to 9%); social
security (relatively stable at 7%) and labor (at 6%).400
U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2015 (last
visited May 20, 2016).
398 The flattening of filings was apparent in the mid-1990s, as Posner analyzed. See
POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS 1996, supra note 130, at 63–64. Moreover, as he noted, the mix
had changed, and civil cases declined and the caseload composition shifted to criminal
cases. Id. at 64. Further, the docket of the appellate courts suggested that their work had
also become increasingly focused on criminal and prisoner cases. Id.; see also Moore, The
Federal Civil Caseload, supra note 24, at 1191.
399 Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six, supra note 18. The title related to an essay
by Justice Scalia, who had remembered the federal courts from his law school days as dealing with great, as contrasted with “mundane,” cases. Antonin Scalia, Remarks Before the
Fellows of the American Bar Foundation and the National Council of Bar Presidents, New
Orleans, La. (Feb. 15, 1987). Professor Galanter’s data showed that, while law students in
the 1960s saw the vivid examples of civil rights litigation, the docket of the federal courts in
the 1960s, like in the 1980s, was full of ordinary diversity cases. Galanter, Life and Times of
the Big Six, supra note 18, at 925.
400 Moore, The Federal Civil Caseload, supra note 24, at 1210.
THE

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-5\NDL505.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 81

16-SEP-16

revising “our common intellectual heritage”

13:32

1911

Within categories, other shifts had taken place. While the 1980s tort
litigation was a mix of malpractice and motor vehicles, the 2013 federal court
tort filings were largely product liability cases, gathered under the multi-district litigation statute and dealing with issues such as asbestos, medical
devices, and diet drugs.401
A more dramatic picture of the current caseload emerges by looking at
what happens after cases are filed. In the fall of 2015, almost forty percent of
the pending cases were consolidated pre-trial under the 1968 “multi-district
litigation” statute (MDL).402 By way of contrast, in 1986, fewer than 1400
cases were part of MDL proceedings; in 2013, almost 90,000 cases, about
thirty-two percent of the caseload, were in MDL proceedings.403 Returning
to 2015, of 341,813 federal civil cases pending,404 132,529 were concentrated
in 271 proceedings aggregated before a single judge, based on a decision by
a panel of judges that the statutory criteria for aggregation (“civil actions
involving one or more common question of fact . . . pending in different
districts”) had been met.405
2.

Poor Litigants

The clumping of cases is one way to augment resources of individuals;
MDLs, as many commentators recount, become de facto class actions in
which repeat-player lawyers dominate the landscape of plaintiff steering committees.406 But for other private litigants with limited funds, lawyers are
scarce. For those without contingency fee options and seeking assistance
from public resources, the options are few. In 1980, Congress appropriated
$300 million to the Legal Services Corporation (LSC); had that level of fund401 Id. at 1212–13. She also noted that the number of individual filings put under the
MDL rubric in 1986 numbered 1367, and in 2012, those filings were 22,391. Id. at 1215.
The concentration of MDLs with certain judges and lawyers is detailed in Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2017),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2768171.
In terms of individual litigants, Farhang tallied that between 1994 and 2004, an average of 165,000 private civil litigants filed cases to enforce federal statutory rights. FARHANG,
LITIGATION STATE, supra note 154, at 10. That rate represented a per capita increase, from
3 per 100,000 population in 1967 to 29 per 100,000 in 1996 (a growth of 1000% between
1960s and 1990s). Id. at 12–13.
402 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012); see generally Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation”, 54
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1991).
403 Moore, The Federal Civil Caseload, supra note 24, at 1214.
404 See TABLE C-1. U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL CASES COMMENCED, TERMINATED, AND
PENDING DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2015, ADMIN OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/19511/download. The pending cases use the end date of September 30, while the MDL reports on the fifteenth of each
month.
405 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a); MDL STATISTICS REPORT—DISTRIBUTION OF PENDING MDL
DOCKETS BY DISTRICT, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG. (Oct. 15, 2015), http://
www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending_MDL_Dockets_By_District-October-152014.pdf.
406 See, e.g., Burch, supra note 401.
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ing remained steady, Congress would have, in 2013 dollars, appropriated
about $848 million rather than the $365 million it did.407
Moreover, in the 1990s, Congress prohibited LSC lawyers from bringing
class actions,408 thus precluding aggregation as a means of providing economies of scale. Indeed, in 2014, the LSC estimated that more than sixty-three
million Americans were eligible for its services (keyed to federal poverty
guidelines and permitting aid to families of four that earn $30,000 or
less409), but that LSC lawyers could help only one in five of those eligible.410
And for those hoping that their cases will attract lawyers because of the
potential to recoup fees from opponents, the Court’s narrowing interpretations of when success permits fee-shifting makes that route riskier for
lawyers.411
Federal courts are thus increasingly filled either with well-to-do litigants;
with litigants who via MDLs have attenuated relationships with the lawyers
representing those aggregates; or with litigants who have no lawyers at all.
The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts has tracked the percentage of
cases filed pro se in the appellate courts since the mid-1990s, and collected
parallel data at the trial level in the last decade. As Figure 14, Pro Se Civil
Filings in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: 1995–2014, details, the percentage of selfrepresented litigants rose at the appellate level from about forty percent in
1995 to more than fifty percent since 2012.412 In 2014, more than 28,000
407 2013 LSC by the Numbers, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. (July 2014), lsc.gov/media-center/pub
lications/2013-lsc-numbers.
408 See Class Actions, 45 C.F.R. § 1617.3 (2016).
409 LEGAL SERVS. CORP., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT (2015), http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default
/files/LSC/pdfs/LSC2014AnnualReport.pdf.
410 FY 2016 Budget Request, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. (2016), http://www.lsc.gov/media-cen
ter/publications/fy-2016-budget-request#bfrtoc-afy-2016-budget-requesta.
411 See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001); see also Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 600–04 (2010) (Sotomayor,
J., concurring) (discussing the adverse consequences of the Court’s holding on attorneys
who are unable to obtain fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act due to a Government
offset to satisfy the prevailing litigant’s pre-existing debt). Fee shifting statutes may have
distinctive tests for when litigants can recoup. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health &
Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014) (clarifying the “exceptional” case standard for
fee-shifting in patent cases under 35 U.S.C. § 285); Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.
Co., 560 U.S. 242, 245 (2010) (holding that a litigant must obtain “some degree of success
on the merits” in order for the litigant’s attorney to recover fees under 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(g)(1), the fee-shifting provision for most ERISA actions (quoting Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983))).
412 Data in Figure 14, Pro Se Filings in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: 1995–2014, for years
1996 through 2014 come from Pro Se Cases Commenced, by Source—in the Administrative Office of the U.S. Court’s Judicial Reports (1996 - 2014), available at Judicial Business,
tbls. B-19, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/report-names/
judicial-business?tn=B-19&pt=All&t=37&m%5Bvalue%5D%5Bmonth%5D=Cy%5Bvalue
%5D%5Byear%5D=.
Data for 1995 are from Table 2.4—U.S. Courts of Appeals-Pro Se Cases Filed, available
at U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES, tbl. 2.4, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/24/judicial-facts-and-figures/2014/09/
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appeals were lawyer-less on at least one side, and about 12,000 of those appellants were not prisoners.413
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The number of pro se filings in the district courts has been tracked since
2004. As Figure 15, Pro Se Civil Filings in the U.S. District Courts: 2004–2014,
details, the rate remains constant, at just under thirty percent or about
75,000 civil cases per year.414 In response, federal courts have developed
staff positions dedicated to pro se filings and, if critics are correct, delegated
much of the decisionmaking to such staff.415
30. The categories provided by the Administrative Office are: “Criminal,” “Prisoner Petitions,” “U.S. Civil,” “Private Civil,” “Bankruptcy Appeals,” “Administrative Agency Appeals,”
and “Original Proceedings and Miscellaneous Applications.”
413 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE B-19—U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS JUDICIAL
BUSINESS (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/b-19/judicial-business/2014/
09/30.
414 Data for Figure 15, Pro Se Civil Filings in the U.S. District Courts: 2004–2014, come
from Table C-13 the Administrative Office of the U.S. Court’s Judicial Reports for each
year from 2004 until 2014. See Judicial Business, tbl.C-13, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/report-names/judicial-business?tn=C-13&pt=all&t=all&
m%5Bvalue%5D%5Bmonth%5D=C-y%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D (last visited May 20,
2016).
415 See Katherine A. Macfarlane, Shadow Judges: Staff Attorney Adjudication of Prisoner Claims (Feb. 8, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2722106.
Macfarlane reviewed court rules as well as websites to clarify the charter to such staff in
many circuits and districts and explored the constitutional problems with delegating so
much decisionmaking to non–Article III actors.
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Thus, while the aspirations of the 1995 Judicial Conference that filing
rates be slowed have come to fruition, that slowdown has not achieved the
planners’ goals that a lively mix of users remain in the federal courts.
Instead, the federal courts have become venues dominated by bankrupt petitioners, joining a stream of criminal defendants, self-represented civil plaintiffs, and product liability or other MDL claimants linked together in
proceedings before individual judges.
Another goal of the 1995 planners was to protect trials. Data on the
growing infrequency of trials comes from the American Bar Association,
which sponsored a research project on what has come to be known as the
“vanishing trial.”416 In the 1960s, trials took place in about ten percent of
the civil cases brought to federal courts.417 By 2014, trials began in about 1
out of 100 civil cases closed that year.418 In absolute numbers and with trials
broadly defined to include evidentiary hearings, the federal courts com-

416 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004) (supported by the American
Bar Association Section on Litigation).
417 See POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS 1996, supra note 130, at 68–69 tbl.3.4. In 1995, Posner
identified 3.4% of civil cases as “reaching trial.” Id. at 68.
418 See Table C-4—U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action
Taken, During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2014, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-4/statistical-tables-federal-judi
ciary/2014/12/31.
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pleted fewer than 5000 civil trials419 and about 7400 criminal trials in
2014.420
Judges do a good deal of adjudication without trials, as they decide
motions and manage cases. Thus, another measurement is what some
researchers call “bench presence,” the hours that judges spend in court.
After reviewing statistics gathered by the Administrative Office (AO),
researchers reported a “steady year-over-year decline in total courtroom
hours” from 2008 to 2012 that continued into 2013. Federal judges spent less
than two hours a day on average in the courtroom, or about “423 hours of
open court proceedings per active district judge.”421
Of course, judges do more than sit in court; a needed, but absent, data
point is the number of opinions that judges write.422 The Supreme Court’s
charter to federal trial judges to scrutinize pleadings for their “plausibility”
and the welcoming posture towards summary judgment have produced
volumes of decisions, referenced in various empirical studies,423 albeit not
(yet) tracked in the AO tables on the “judicial business.”
The Long Range Plan and the 2010 and 2015 Strategic Plans that followed
worried about judicial overload. Thus a question often asked is whether federal judges have more to do now than in past decades. Assessing whether
and how the workload and activities of federal judges have changed, let alone
419 In the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2014, civil bench trials numbered
2848, and civil jury trials completed numbered 1922; 3533 civil bench trials and 2980 civil
jury trials were held during the same period in 2001. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, TBL. T-1: U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS COMPLETED, BY DISTRICT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2014 (2014), http://
www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/t-1/judicial-business/2014/09/30 [hereinafter U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS COMPLETED 2013–14]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, TBL. T-1: U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS COMPLETED, BY
DISTRICT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2001, http://www.us
courts.gov/statistics/table/t-1/judicial-business/2001/09/30.
The AO’s definition of “trial” is broad, as the table “includes land condemnation trials, hearings on temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, hearings on
contested motions, miscellaneous civil cases, and other contested proceedings in which
evidence is introduced.” Id. But the data do not include civil trials by magistrate judges by
consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Id. (noting that AO data include “trials conducted by
district and appellate judges only; all trials conducted by magistrate judges are excluded”).
420 Bench trials numbered 5196 and jury trials numbered 2200. See U.S. DISTRICT
COURTS—CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS COMPLETED 2013–14, supra note 419.
421 Jordan M. Singer & Hon. William G. Young, Bench Presence 2014: An Updated Look at
Federal District Court Productivity, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 565, 565–66 (2014).
422 Former federal district court judge Nancy Gertner has been concerned that this
important facet of trial judges’ work has been given second seat to management of cases.
See Gertner, supra note 173, at 428.
423 Ray H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in Employment
and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235 (2012); Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the
Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE
L.J. 2270 (2012); Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact
on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 603 (2012); Alex Reinert, The Impact of Ashcroft v.
Iqbal on Pleading, 43 URB. LAW. 559 (2011).
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deciding on what timeframe to use as a benchmark, is difficult. Variables
that could be taken into account include the relationship of filings and adjudication to the country’s population; the changing costs of litigation; the creation or attrition of federal rights; the development of new categories of
judges (such as magistrate and bankruptcy judges); increased reliance on
senior judges; outsourcing to other courts and administrative agencies; mandating arbitration; and rule revisions such as refocusing judges on pre-trial
work as “case managers.”424
Rather than despair at problems of comparability, both the federal judiciary’s administration and scholars have been eager to find measures of federal court responsiveness; they have turned to numbers such as cases per
judge and the time to disposition. For example, factoring in the increased
number of judicial workers and the changing case mix, Patricia Moore concluded that, on average, a federal district court judge had the same number
of weighted filings in 2013 as judges had in 1986.425 (During that interval,
she noted, the U.S. population grew thirty-two percent.426) In addition, the
time to disposition was relatively stable. Civil cases that concluded without
“any court action” in 1986 took four months; in 2013, they took five months.
Cases with “court action” were disposed of in seven months in 1986, and in
8.5 months in 2013.427
To translate these shifts into litigants’ experiences and into opportunities for the public to observe the exchanges between litigants and judges, I
rely on a description by an esteemed federal district court judge asking the
question about how to depict judges in civil cases dealing with the “business
of the district courts.”
So how might reality television portray a federal “trial” judge . . . ? In an
office setting without the robe, using a computer and court administrative
staff to monitor the entire caseload and individual case progress . . . . For
federal civil cases, the black-robed figure up on the bench, presiding publicly over trials and instructing juries, has become an endangered species,
replaced by a person in business attire at an office desk surrounded by electronic assistants.428
424 Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982); Resnik, Trial as Error,
supra note 19; see also CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY, supra note 38, at 197–237. Crowe
identified the decade before World War II as when the federal judiciary bureaucratized, id.
at 197–238, and this period as one of specialization, id. at 21–24, 238–69. My view is that
while Congress authorized the Administrative Office between the world wars, the judiciary
did not shift toward a more bureaucratic form until the 1960s, with the advent of magistrate judges, the expansion of judgeships, and the enlargement of the functions of the
central staff.
425 Moore, The Federal Civil Caseload, supra note 24, at 1187 & n.39 (citing census data).
426 Id.
427 Id. at 1199 figs.6 & 7, 1200–01. If the case went to trial, time to disposition went
from 19 months to 24.1 months, id. at 1201, but only 1% of cases went to trial, id. at 1202.
428 D. Brock Hornby, The Business of the U.S. District Courts, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 453, 462
(2007).
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Vulnerable Heritages: The Post Offices and the Courts

In writing in 1996 about the federal courts, Richard Posner concluded his
book by describing how the work of an appellate judge in decisionmaking
was “collective in a profound sense”: each judge was “a member of a community of judges composed of the predecessors of the current judges as well as
the current judges themselves.”429 Like the heritage at the center of Daniel
Meltzer’s work, Posner’s intergenerational enterprise relies on public judicial
decisionmaking. Yet the declining number of trials, of hours on the bench in
public, and of filings, coupled with the privatization of process through pretrial management and alternative dispute resolution, limits the public dimensions of the federal courts. Moreover, appeals focused on whether grants of
motions to dismiss or of summary judgment were ill-founded tilt discussion
towards procedural rules rather than the shape of rights and their remedies.
Nonetheless, the older common heritage of responsive, hospitable
courts producing an expanding jurisprudence continues to dominate discussions of the federal courts. That impression is understandable, given the
importance of the public space (literal and metaphorical) that federal courts
occupy. Yet, as I noted at the outset, the federal courts were once linked to
another prominent federal government service, what was called the U.S. Postal Office. Both institutions shared facilities and political commitments to
nation-building through redistributive egalitarianism. Given the difficulties
of imagining the federal courts in decline, a brief reflection on what some
call the “death spiral”430 of what is now called the U.S. Postal Service is in
order.
As discussed at the outset, post offices and courthouses were two constitutionally chartered methods of shaping a national political identity through
the provision of services in localities around the country. By the twentieth
century, federal support for these services was significant. One commentator
reported in 1900 that the “average cost of sending” letters to Alaska was
“$450, in return for which the Post-office Department received only the price
of a two-cent stamp, the same amount that carriers a letter” from one part of
New York City to another.431 In that year, this government statistician
explained that the “tax that a large proportion of Americans paid every time
they sent a letter” had the “‘unanimous approval’ of the people,” as it was
understood to “be necessary to ensure” access to “intelligence” that was
“cheap and convenient in localities in which remunerative rates were prohibitively high.”432
429 POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS 1996, supra note 130, at 382.
430 NYE STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31069, POSTAL SERVICE FINANCIAL PROBLEMS
AND STAKEHOLDER PROPOSALS 11 (2002).
431 H.T. NEWCOMB, THE POSTAL DEFICIT: AN EXAMINATION OF SOME OF THE LEGISLATION
AND ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS OF A GREAT STATE INDUSTRY 9–10 (1900).
432 JOHN, NETWORK NATION, supra note 44, at 20 (quoting NEWCOMB, supra note 431, at
9). Newcomb found no evidence that “New Yorkers objected to the transfer of postage . . .
to cover the cost of mail delivery in Texas and Alaska.” See id. (citing NEWCOMB, supra note
431, at 9). This ‘post office principle,’ explained political economist Henry C. Adams in
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Universal service, rural free delivery, and air transportation altered the
possibilities of contact for people around the country and changed interpersonal and economic relationships. The U.S. Post Office turned the federal
government into a daily presence and, unlike police officers knocking at
one’s doors, government-dispatched mail services delivered holiday cards
and packages. Moreover, post offices were egalitarian on many metrics,
including that women gained jobs as “postal mistresses” long before women
joined the federal bench.
During the second half of the twentieth century, the leadership of both
the courts and the post office looked to private businesses as models for their
work. In 1970, Congress converted the U.S. Post Office, which had been a
department of government, into the U.S. Postal Service (USPS), which
became a semi-independent agency. However, Congress did not give this
new entity an unfettered competitive position. Rather, it operates under congressional mandates on what it must provide (such as universal service and
first class mail) and about what it cannot do, with limits imposed on the kinds
of auxiliary services the Postal Service can offer.433
In 2007, Congress mandated that the Postal Service have fully funded
(or what is called pre-funded) pensions;434 those economic challenges
(resulting in missed payments and multi-billion dollar financial deficits) have

1918, “subsidized different sections and classes to provide every citizen with access to mail
‘on equal terms.’” Id. at 20 (quoting HENRY C. ADAMS, DESCRIPTION OF INDUSTRY: AN
INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMICS 258 (1918)). But he also noted Congress had launched an
investigation into “excessive prices . . . paid to the railroad companies” for mail transportation and commended a focus on methods to reduce the postal deficit. NEWCOMB, supra
note 431, at 91. Newcomb encouraged “friends of the postal establishment” to consider
whether modifications “without public detriment” would “insure a more generally satisfactory relation between its income and its expenditures.” Id. at 12. Newcomb also noted
that the “rapidly declining” deficit (of $5,385,688 as of June 30, 1900) was not too large
and better than “a surplus, which would constitute an actual tax upon those who use the
mails.” Id. at 155. But he also argued that economies were likely needed, including more
efficient organization. Id. at 156.
433 For example, the Postal Service requested that it be permitted to cut back to five-day
a week delivery. See USPS, DELIVERING THE FUTURE: A BALANCED APPROACH, FIVE-DAY DELIVERY IS PART OF THE SOLUTION (2010), https://about.usps.com/news/electronic-press-kits/
five-day-delivery/plan/5day-plan-delivery.pdf; U.S. Postal Service in Crisis: Proposal to Prevent a
Postal Shutdown: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Gov’t Affairs, 112th
Cong. (2011) (statement of Postmaster General/CEO Patrick R. Donahoe). The Postal
Service also sought to offer new services, such as transporting beer and wine. See Ron
Nixon, Trying to Stem Losses, Post Office Seeks to End Saturday Letter Delivery, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/us/postal-service-plans-to-end-saturdaydelivery.html; see also Ron Nixon, Postal Service Reports Loss of $15 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
15, 2012) [hereinafter Nixon, Postal Service Reports Loss of $15 Billion], http://www.ny
times.com/2012/11/16/us/politics/postal-service-reports-a-nearly-16-billion-loss.html.
434 See KEVIN R. KOSAR & KATELIN P. ISAACS, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, R43349, U.S.
POSTAL SERVICE RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS AND PENSION FUNDING ISSUES, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE (2015).
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raised questions about the USPS’s economic viability.435 The mix of new
electronic mail technologies and congressional mandates and constraints, in
contrast to the unrestrained operations of private providers, has made major
inroads into the vitality of the USPS.436 Yet more people continue to have
access to snail mail than email; about half the population did not, as of 2014,
pay bills online, and 3-D printers have yet to replace mail-orders of packaged
goods.
But signs of the shrinkage of this federal service can be found around
the country. In 2009, 13,000 fewer post offices existed than had in 1951, with
more cutbacks underway.437 (How to count has become complex, as the
USPS differentiated among five kinds of “postal facilities,” including “contract postal units” in stores.438) In 2013, the New York Times ran a story about
the declining fortunes of the Postal Service; featured were four historic post
office buildings, in Annapolis, Washington, D.C., West Chester, Pennsylvania,
and Norwich, Connecticut, all up for sale.439 One of those four buildings is
depicted below.

435 Id. at 2; see Nixon, Postal Service Reports Loss of $15 Billion, supra note 433. Included
in that loss was the expense of more than $11 billion to be paid into the Postal Services’
“future retiree health benefits fund.” Id. Further, at that point, the volume of mail
declined by 5%, down from 168.3 billion pieces to 159.9 billion pieces, and operating
revenues likewise declined slightly, down from $65.7 billion to $65.2 billion. Id.
436 See DANIEL J. RICHARDSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43162, THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE’S FINANCIAL CONDITION: A PRIMER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Dec. 30, 2014).
437 Restoring the Financial Stability of the U.S. Postal Service: What Needs to Be Done?: Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. on Fed. Workforce, Postal Service, and the District of Columbia, 111th Cong.
108 (2009) (testimony of Dale Goff, Pres., Nat’l Ass’n of Postmasters of the U.S.), http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg50649/html/CHRG-111hhrg50649.htm.
438 See KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, R41950, THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE:
COMMON QUESTIONS ABOUT POST OFFICE CLOSURES (May 29, 2013); see generally KEVIN R.
KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, R42590, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE: BACKGROUND ANALYSIS OF
H.R. 2309 AND S. 1789 IN THE 112TH CONG. (July 9, 2012) [hereinafter KOSAR 2012].
439 Robin Pogrebin, Post Office Buildings with Character, and Maybe a Sale Price, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/arts/design/preservationists-fightpostal-service-over-sales.html; Postal Service Looks to Sell Historic Buildings, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/03/07/arts/design/postal-servicelooks-to-sell-historic-buildings.html.
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U.S. Post Office, 340 Main Street, Norwich, Connecticut. Photographer: Fred R. Conrad. The photograph accompanied the story, Postal Service Looks to Sell Historic Buildings, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2013).
Copyright The New York Times/Redux.

In contrast to the sampling of nine federal courthouses renovated or
built in the early twenty-first century provided in Figure 8, evocative federal
post office buildings like the one in Norwich, Connecticut were among those
on route to being de-accessioned through a campaign to relocate “post
offices” by opening up stalls selling stamps inside malls and other commercial enterprises.440 As the distinctive community post office buildings are
440 KOSAR 2012, supra note 438, at 4; Pogrebin, supra note 439. As of 2015, the United
States Postal Service has sold two of the four buildings featured in the news story. The
building at 1215 31st Street in Washington, D.C., was sold to developers in 2013. The State
of Maryland purchased the Annapolis building and planned to use the building for state
offices. Pamela Wood, Sale of Downtown Annapolis Post Office Building Will End Era . . . Eventually, BALT. SUN (May 16, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-05-16/news/bsmd-ar-post-office-20130516_1_post-office-academic-classicism-freda-sauter; Daniel J.
Sernovitz, A Look at Anthony Lanier’s Vision for the Georgetown Post Office, WASH. BUS. J. (Oct.
31, 2013), http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/breaking_ground/2013/10/east
bancs-take-on-the-old-georgetown.html?ana=E_wash_rdup&s=newsletter&ed=2013-10.
After the story was written, USPS decided not to sell the Norwich building. Adam
Benson, It’s Official: Downtown Norwich Will Keep Its Post Office, BULLETIN (Norwich, Ct.) (Jan.
21, 2014), http://www.norwichbulletin.com/article/20140121/News/140129906. The
post office in West Chester, Pennsylvania, was, as of 2014, on the market. Jeremy Gerrard,
Post Office Wants to Sell West Chester Building, DAILY LOCAL NEWS (West Chester, Pa.) (Feb.
21, 2014), http://www.dailylocal.com/article/DL/20140221/NEWS/140229966; see generally Historic Post Offices Sold or for Sale 2009–2014, SAVETHEPOSTOFFICE.COM, https://
www.google.com/fusiontables/DataSource?docid=1CQ5K6SyhDBz2RnxB2qtAQ-w3iilItEx_
qktAV60#rows:id=1002E (last visited July 12, 2016).
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spun off, the connections thin between the experience of the federal government as a direct service provider and what is now called the U.S. Postal Service, whose abbreviation (USPS) blurs with that of the private carrier (UPS).
Moreover, the name of another private service, Federal Express, which uses
red, white, and blue for its documents, conveys an impression that it could be
a national project. Further, all the private services free-ride the federal government investments in mail delivery, which helped to produce numbered
street addresses and created the “zip code” in the 1960s.441
More confusion comes from how electronic users find the USPS, which
once used “USPS.gov” and thus shared the “.gov” reserved for other government service providers, including federal judges. But even as the Postal Service has been held by the Supreme Court to be inseparable from the United
States for purposes of antitrust laws,442 the USPS switched to become
“USPS.com,” embracing the “.com” nomenclature of the private business
sector.
The criticisms leveled against post offices were that they were inefficient
and that the private sector with more modern technology could do better.
Parallel criticisms are leveled against courts, as exemplified by my discussion
about the degree to which private arbitration is lauded. Yet the private
providers of postal services or of adjudication have no enduring commitments to egalitarian redistribution. These alternative private services offer
little by way of subsidies or public access to their processes and outcomes.
What the contemporary assault on public postal subsidies ought to make
plain is that impressive stone buildings dotting communities around the
country are no guarantee of the longevity of the services provided in their
halls.
C.

Comity: Creating a Collective Culture of Court Services

What Daniel Meltzer taught us was to focus on how common cultures are
shaped and nurtured. Given the tensions between the cultures of hospitable
and of unavailing courts, and given the challenges that both federal and state
courts face, my hope is that “we” who have cultural and legal capital can
expand lawyers’ “common intellectual heritage” by situating the federal
courts in a larger landscape. Even if some of the rulings constricting access
render courts unavailing prove (given the narrow margins and changing
composition of the Supreme Court) to be what Meltzer termed “quixotic,”443
more than either hospitable or unavailable federal courts are needed. Our
common heritage requires acknowledging the degree to which the federal
and state courts systems are deeply interdependent and reassessing how,
441 See JOHN T. TIERNEY, THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE: STATUS AND PROSPECTS OF A PUBLIC
ENTERPRISE 78–90 (1988) (detailing the history of the “zone improvement plan”—zip—
code).
442 U.S. Postal Serv. v. Flamingo Indus. (USA), Ltd., 540 U.S. 736, 746 (2004).
443 Meltzer, The Seminole Decision, supra note 98, at 61.
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given the constitutionally stipulated judicial services, both can be enabling
for their users.
Doing so entails first, reorienting the federal judiciary to reject the rhetoric of an institution beleaguered by its users; and second, bucking the trend
of becoming a luxury good available only to those with great resources or
with no alternatives. Given the success of the federal judiciary in Congress, it
remains the best-endowed court system in the country. Federal judges need
not only reprise their partnership and joint work with Congress but should
also ally their work with that of state courts and help those courts obtain
congressional support. The academy, in turn, needs to identify state courts
as central intellectual sources for modern lawyers in working with federal
judges to craft an interdependent system of what I term “enabling courts.”
In some respects, this effort can be nested in doctrines of federalism that
are central to federal courts jurisprudence, which has long invoked ideas of
comity, explained as respectful of state courts. But the focus needs to expand
beyond deference and questions of preemption to how the federal judiciary
is both dependent on and could be helpful to the state courts as they shape
and then implement federal constitutional precepts—parts of the “machinery” that Meltzer described as giving life to constitutional precepts.
One final image is therefore in order, a bar chart, Comparing the Volume
of Filings in State and Federal Courts, 2010. As Figure 17 depicts, the federal
courts in that year received about 360,000 civil and criminal filings, along
with more than a million bankruptcy petitions. Those numbers are small
when contrasted with the volume of state court annual filings, which total
more than 47 million, if juvenile and traffic filings are excluded, and some
100 million when these additional cases are included.444
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This chart is in one respect a measure of the intellectual advantage of the
federal courts, made accessible through the small number of filings, the circumscribed body of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the limited sets of federal
procedural rules, the two research agencies (the AO and the FJC), supported
by more than $100 million annually,445 and through national law school
curricula.
In contrast to the substantial economic support of the federal judiciary,
the federal government provided about $14 million in grants to the National
Center for State Courts (NCSC). That organization which was founded in
1971 as a non-profit organization in part to support state court advocacy
444 Data for Figure 17 are drawn from the ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
Caseload Statistics, 2010, tbls C-1, D-1 and F, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/
FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics2010.aspx. Data on
state filings are from the National Center for State Courts, Court Statistics Project, National
Civil and Criminal Caseloads (2010), http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/
StateCourtCaseloadStatistics.aspx. The number of state filings is an estimate, as states do
not uniformly report data; this number does not include juvenile or traffic cases. See
ROBERT LAFOUNTAIN, SHAUNA STRICKLAND, RICHARD SCHAUFFLER, KATHYRN HOLT &
KATHYRN LEWIS, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN
OVERVIEW OF 2013 STATE COURT CASELOADS 6 (2015).
445 Appropriations for the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts in 2016 were $87.6
million (a 3.8% increase over 2015) and for the Federal Judicial Center $27.7 million (a
2.7% increase over 2015). See MATTHEW E. GLASSMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44078 JUDICIARY APPROPRIATIONS FY 2016, at 8 (2015).
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before the U.S. Supreme Court and which has developed into a research and
education support organization for the Conference of State Court Chief Justices and state courts more generally.446 The federal government gave
another $5 million in 2015 to the State Justice Institute (SJI),447 an entity
that Congress created in 1984 to provide grants “to improve the quality of
justice in state courts” by understanding innovative methods of responding to
“common issues.”448 The low budgets of both the NCSC and the SJI are
reflected in their relative invisibility to the legal academy.
The 2010 chart in Figure 17 is also a measure of the challenges that state
courts face when gathering data, given varying definitions of case filings, a
myriad of levels of courts and collection methods, and a wealth of doctrine.
Yet models of thinking across court systems to conceptualize shared questions of structure, method, and substantive rules come from the work of comparative constitutional law scholars,449 identifying categories that permit
analysis across jurisdictional systems. If state courts are brought into this
shared metanarrative, those courts are not only in focus when doctrine and
statutes delineate the boundaries of federal law (such as the habeas corpus
jurisprudence, the Anti-Injunction Act, and Younger abstention) but also as
centrally animating and contributing to a federal-state courts canon.
The outlines of the intellectual-heritage-in-the-making come into view by
looking at the vastness of the courts, and by appreciating that expansion as
the success of nineteenth-century promises of “open courts” and “rights to
remedies” that turned, through twentieth-century social movements, into
entitlements for all persons. Courts have become a central government service. By embracing federal and state courts as both the results and the
sources of practices and ideas foundational to those heritages, the contemporary challenges of running these services and the unfairness that continues to
reside within them become vivid.
Thus, a first element of this common heritage is the acknowledgement
that hundreds of millions of people see courts as potentially responsive institution. Just as it is hard to grasp that federal courts may be in decline, it is
difficult to imagine the world of the 1930s, when the depiction of Justice as
446 See NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. COURTS, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS ANNUAL
REPORT 2015 (2015), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Annual%20Reports/
2015-Annual-Report.ashx.
447 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, UNAUTHORIZED APPROPRIATIONS AND EXPIRING AUTHORIZATIONS 20 (2016) (citing State Justice Institute Reauthorization Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108372, 118 Stat. 1754). The 2008 authorized appropriations were $7 million. For fiscal year
2016, Congress authorized $5,121,000 for the State Justice Institute. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, H.R. 2029 div. B, tit. IV, 114th Cong. (2015) (enacted as Pub. L. No.
114-113).
448 About SJI, STATE JUSTICE INST., http:www.sji.gov/about-sji (last visited May 20, 2016).
The National Center for State Courts does not appear to have direct funding but, in its
reporting in 2013, detailed the receipt of about $14 million federal in funds. See IRS Form
990, National Center for State Courts, 2013, at 9.
449 Vicki C. Jackson, Honoring Dan Meltzer—Congressional Standing and the Institutional
Framework of Article III: A Comparative Perspective, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1783 (2016).
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Protector and Avenger (Figure 4) was draped because the image of that Virtue
was perceived to be of a “mulatto.” Promises that “all courts shall be open”
seem now naturally to invite all persons in as users. This remarkable achievement stems from rule-of-law values interacting with egalitarian democratic
movements that oblige courts to be venues respectful of all users.
Second, once state courts are part of the exposition of state and of federal law, the accounts of the development of bodies of law change. The current litigation about same-sex marriage has helped to underscore the
centrality of states in developing constitutional doctrine.450 Integrating the
role of states into analyses of other major decisions is a means of refocusing
the heritage on the interdependencies of state and federal systems and the
degree of dependence of federal law on state developments.
One example comes from the landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright,
decided in 1963 by the U.S. Supreme Court.451 By then, the United States
Supreme Court had held that federal criminal defendants had the right to
appointed counsel452 but that rule did not apply to states. Yet, between the
1940s and the 1960s, dozens of states came to provide free legal assistance to
indigent felons and then advocated to the Supreme Court that it should read
the Federal Constitution as obliging them to do so. Specifically, twenty-two
states sided with Mr. Gideon;453 only Florida, joined by Alabama and North
Carolina, argued that the Sixth Amendment did not mandate a blanket right
to counsel but that judges could appoint a lawyer based on “the totality of
facts in a given case.”454 In addition to being relevant sources for developing
federal constitutional doctrine, the Court’s ruling supported extant state
defenders. As Sara Mayeux has detailed, the Massachusetts public defender
system gained stature, even as indigent defense continued to suffer from a
lack of funding and overworked lawyers.455
Fifty years later, questions of supporting litigants, including those facing
imprisonment, remain central. State courts have again laid the groundwork,
albeit not in a way that prompted the U.S. Supreme Court to insist on more
rights to counsel. The difficulty (in light of the surge in prosecutions since
the 1980s) of implementing Gideon was proffered as a reason not to require
lawyers for other impoverished litigants. Thus, in 2011, the U.S. Supreme
Court refused to require counsel when a civil contemnor was faced with
450 See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub.
Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003); Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
451 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
452 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
453 Brief for the State Government Amici Curiae, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (No. 155), 1962
WL 75209; see generally William M. Beaney, The Right to Counsel: Past, Present, and Future, 49
VA. L. REV. 1150 (1963).
454 Amicus Curiae Brief for the State of Alabama, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (No. 155), 1962
WL 115123, at *8.
455 Sara Mayeux, What Gideon Did, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 15 (2016).
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twelve months in jail for failing to pay child support to the mother of his
child.456
Yet many states justices are advocates for the right to counsel for poor
claimants dealing with fundamental needs, such as shelter and family relations, as well as more help for criminal defendants.457 As Jonathan Lippman,
the former Chief Judge of New York explained, the “very reason [that courts]
exist” is to provide equal justice to all, and that mandate entails providing
representation to the “poor and the indigent.”458 He succeeded in prompting the New York state legislature to adopt a joint resolution that the “fair
administration of justice requires that every person who must use the courts
have access to adequate legal representation,”459 and in 2015, $85 million
had been budgeted for civil legal assistance.460
These initiatives reflect that, although the language about a “crisis” of
the federal courts has subsided as filings have flattened,461 that term remains
apt for courts in the United States and elsewhere.462 State budgetary
difficulties have resulted in the literal shutting down of courts, closed to business despite pressing needs such as domestic violence protection orders and
childcare subsidies.463 Procedure circles are preoccupied with what scholars
456 Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011).
457 In 2011, Chief Justice Ronald M. George and California’s Judicial Council
prompted California to enact the Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act—for pilot projects
based in selected courts to provide appointed counsel for “low-income parties in civil matters involving critical issues affecting basic human needs.” CAL. GOV. CODE § 68651(b)(5)
(West 2011); Cal. Assemb. Bill No. 590, 2009–2010 Sen., Reg. Sess., at 1–3, 13 (Cal. 2009),
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_0551-0600/
ab_590_bill_20091011_chaptered.pdf; see also Lippman, New York’s Template, supra note 28.
458 JONATHAN LIPPMAN, THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 2011: PURSUING JUSTICE 5 (2011),
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/admin/stateofjudiciary/SOJ-2011.pdf; see also AM. BAR
ASSOC., GIDEON: BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 7–8
(2004).
459 Assemb. Res. 1621, 2010 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2010); Lippman, New York’s Template, supra note 28, at 4.
460 PERMANENT COMM’N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK 2 (2015), http://nylawyer.nylj.com/adgifs/decisions15/
122915report.pdf.
461 In the preface to the second edition of Federal Courts, published in 1996, Posner
explained that “the recession of caseload in all but the courts of appeals” prompted him to
revise the title to The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform. See POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS
1996, supra note 130, at xiii.
462 John Thomas, The Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, Lord Chief Justice of England and
Wales, Address to the Organization Justice: Reshaping Justice (Mar. 3, 2014), https://
www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Speeches/lcj-speechreshaping-justice.pdf.
463 See PETER T. GROSSI, JR., JON L. MILLS & KONSTANTINA VAGENAS, NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE CTS., FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 2012: CRISIS IN THE COURTS: RECONNAISSANCE
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2012), http://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/futuretrends-2012/home/Better-Courts/~/media/Microsites/Files/Future%20Trends%20
2012/PDFs/Crisis_Grossi.ashx.
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term the “Age of Austerity,” as commentators address how courts can function given the volume of filings and the economic constraints.464
In the introduction to a 2016 volume entitled Beyond Elite Law: Access to
Civil Justice in America,465 Martha Minow termed the American “failure to
ensure access” to courts “shameful.”466 The argument from many of the contributors was that a major shift was required; as the former Chief Justice of
Texas, Wallace Jefferson, put it, a “culture of service” needed to be
created.467
In response, court-based litigant services are becoming regular features
of courthouses. Court employees’ ranks have not only been augmented by
architects, engineers, and court information officers, but also by “court assistance officers” (CAOs), sometimes also known as “pro se” clerks.468 From
kiosks and self-help forms on the web to staff, courts are trying to assist people entering their legal systems. Further, national institutions of state court
judges (the Conference of Chief Justices of State Courts, the National Center
for State Courts, the National Association of Women Judges) have, during
recent decades, put themselves at the helm of reforms through a focus on
sentencing, juvenile justice, and task forces on gender, race, and ethnic bias
in the courts.
The need for state subsidies brings a third facet of our developing
twenty-first-century heritage to the fore, that discussions of courts necessarily
require a focus on the poor people using them, whether they are filing cases
or hailed in as defendants. When poverty in courts becomes central to the
“federal courts canon,” the image of state and local courts is not only the
leadership that state justices have taken in the Civil Gideon movement but
also a darker role, the exploitation of poor people entering their halls.
“Ferguson” is a shorthand, as that city in Missouri used its police and
court systems to exploit residents through imposing fines and fees under
racially discriminatory policies. After the tragic death of Michael Brown
spurred inquiry into policing and the town’s use of its courts, the Supreme
Court of Missouri put the Ferguson Municipal Court under what was in
essence a receivership.469 The Department of Justice launched an investiga464 See, e.g., XANDRA KRAMER & SHUSUKE KAKIUCHI, GENERAL REPORT OF THE XV WORLD
CONGRESS OF PROCEDURAL LAW: RELIEF IN SMALL AND SIMPLE MATTERS IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY (2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2610773.
465 See BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA (Sam Estreicher & Joy
Radice eds., 2016).
466 Wallace Jefferson, Foreword, in BEYOND ELITE LAW, supra note 465.
467 Id. at xxiv.
468 For example, the Idaho court system authorizes Court Assistance Officers to provide
those without legal representation “with educational materials, court approved forms, limited assistance in completing court forms, and information about court procedures.” Idaho
Court Administrative Rule 53: Court Assistance Services, STATE OF IDAHO JUDICIAL BRANCH
(amended Aug. 4, 2005), https://www.isc.idaho.gov/icar53.
469 Order Transferring the Honorable Roy L. Richter, Eastern District, Missouri Court
of Appeals, to the 21st Judicial Circuit (St. Louis Cty.) (Mo. Mar. 9, 2015) (en banc) (citing
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tion470 that, in the winter of 2016, resulted in a federal lawsuit against Ferguson. The government alleged that police had engaged in a “pattern or
practice of stopping, searching, citing, and arresting individuals without legal
justifications,”471 and in prosecuting and imposing resolutions of “municipal
charges in a manner that violates the due process and equal protection rights
of defendants.”472 A settlement, with detailed plans to revise practices, followed in the spring of 2016.473
Ferguson is, unfortunately, not aberrational. A series of lawsuits, many
in state courts (in part because of Younger abstention), have challenged comparable practices in other localities. Remedial efforts come from state as well
as federal interventions. For example, the Ohio Supreme Court has issued a
“bench card” directing judges about how to avoid intimidating impoverished
individuals unable to pay fines and fees.474 In the spring of 2016, the Department of Justice sent a letter to the chief justices of all the state courts, asking
them to direct lower court judges “not [to] incarcerate a person for nonpayment of fines or fees without first conducting an indigency determination
and establishing that the failure to pay was willful,” exploring alternatives to
jail for those unable to pay; not conditioning “access to a judicial hearing on
the prepayment of fines or fees,” and not using warrants or driver license
suspensions as means of “coercing the payment of court debt.”475
Thus far, federal courts have not been in focus as a source of unduly
high fees, in part because of the system of “in forma pauperis” waivers, provided by statute and required for at least some litigants by constitutional
law.476 But the federal judiciary has raised the prices of filing fees for a variety of kinds of cases, and hence imposed more expenses on those who are
marginal but not indigent. Specifically, the costs of filing a civil complaint
have risen from $250 in 2005 to the current $350; the cost of docketing an
appeal is $500.477
the court’s authority under the Missouri Constitution to order temporary transfers “as the
administration of justice requires”).
470 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (Mar. 4,
2015), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/
03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf.
471 Complaint at 10, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-00180 (E.D. Mo. Feb.
10, 2016), http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/823486/download.
472 Complaint at 14, 20, 23, Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-00180.
473 Consent Decree, Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-00180 (Mar. 17, 2016).
474 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, OFFICE OF JUDICIAL SERVS., COLLECTION OF FINES AND
COURT COSTS IN ADULT TRIAL COURTS (Sept. 2015), http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/
publications/jcs/finescourtcosts.pdf.
475 See Letter from Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Rights Division, and Lisa Foster, Dir., Office for Access to Justice (Mar. 14, 2016), https://
www.justice.gov/crt/file/832461/download.
476 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2012); see generally Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
477 See Revised Court of Appeals Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/revised-courtappeals-miscellaneous-fee-schedule.
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Bankruptcy fees were likewise up in 2014,478 as administrative fees for
filing petitions under Chapters 7, 12, and 13 increased by $29 to $75 (raising
the total cost of filing a petition under Chapter 7 to $335, under Chapter 12
to $275, and under Chapter 13 to $310).479 Given that more than a million
bankruptcy petitions are filed annually, filing fees from bankruptcy come in
at about three times the rate of civil filings. In a 2014 article, I estimated that
as of 2014, bankruptcy petitioners filing under Chapter 7 provided some
$250 million in revenue, while civil filing fees garnered the federal courts
about $100 million that year.480
The fourth, and related, facet of this developing common heritage is the
decline of adjudication and the question about its potential for revitalization.
In a 2015 monograph, The Landscape of Civil Litigation in State Courts, the
National Center for State Courts analyzed almost a million cases disposed of
in 2012–2013 in ten urban counties.481 Like the federal courts, the caseload
mix had changed. In contrast to data in a 1992 survey, in which about half
the claims involved tort cases,482 the 2012–2013 data found that two thirds of
the filings were contract claims, and more than half of those involved debt
collection and landlord-tenant disputes. In more than three quarters of the
cases, “at least one party was self-represented, usually the defendant.”483
Three quarters of the judgments were below $5200; four percent were disposed of through adjudication.484 In short, most cases ended within about
478 See Bankruptcy Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS
(Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/bankruptcy-court-miscellaneous-fee-schedule; Notice of Fee Changes Effective June 1, 2014, U.S. BANKR. COURT, S.D.N.Y.
(Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/news/notice-fee-changes-effective-june-12014.
479 Administrative fees for filing petitions under Chapters 9, 11, or 15 increased by $504
to $550 (raising the total cost of filing a petition under Chapters 9, 11, and 15 to $1717).
See Notice of Fee Changes Effective June 1, 2014, supra note 478.
480 Resnik, Privatization of Process, supra note 32, at 1832 fig.15.
481 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & STATE JUSTICE INST., THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS (2015) [hereinafter STATE COURT 2012–2013 CIVIL LITIGATION].
482 That study looked at case outcomes in the seventy-five “most populous counties in
the country,” and at about 750,000 dispositions. CAROL J. DEFRANCES, JOHN A. GOERDT,
PATRICK A. LANGAN & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992: TORT CASES IN LARGE COUNTIES 6
(1995).
483 In 1992, attorneys had represented both parties in 95% of the cases; in 2012–2013,
in 24% of the cases. STATE COURT 2012–2013 CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 481, at 31;
CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM’RS & NAT’L CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT
GUIDE TO STATISTICAL REPORTING (Version 2.0) 31–32 (2014).
484 Adjudication for these purposes included a judge or jury trial, summary judgment,
and binding arbitration. STATE COURT 2012–2013 CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 481, at iv.
In the 1992 survey, 62% of the cases were disposed of through settlements, and 3% were
disposed of by judge or jury trial. Id. at 21, 25. Thus, of the almost one million cases,
32,124 trials took place, of which 1109 (3%) were jury trials, and 31,015 (97%) were bench
trials. Id. at 25–26. Jury awards exceeded $500,000 in 17 (3%) of the cases, and 75% of
the jury awards in tort cases were below $152,000. Id. at 28. The 2012–2013 study also
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one year, involved litigants without lawyers, and entailed administrative resolutions rather than adjudication.
These data need to be linked to those mapping the “vanishing trial,” the
decline of “bench presence” in the federal system, and the rise of arbitration
diverting adjudication away from judges. The vitality of courts, both state
and federal, as venues for debating rights and remedies becomes a central
problem for constitutional doctrine and in practice. The questions of what
Article III, the Petition Clause, or the Due Process Clauses require of coordinate branches of government by way of support of access to courts are raised
as part of the current Federal Courts canon, but the inquiry shifts from examples such as detainees at Guantánamo Bay to a broad swath of litigants. Stateside, the issues center on how to interpret constitutional provisions about
“open courts” and “rights to remedies.”
During the second half of the twentieth century, conflicts about the federal courts focused on whether federal judges had wrongly or rightly insisted
that other institutions (Congress, the executive branch, schools, prisons,
religious organizations) acknowledge or implement particular rights. The
heritage in the making requires addressing whether courts have the constitutional obligation to insist on their own vitality and on their capacity to be
responsive to claims of rights to use them. Courts are, of course, moored in
the governments that deploy them, and hence the larger question is about
the sustainability of democratic governments.
Daniel Meltzer was an optimist, and those of us following in his wake
need to continue to imagine flourishing government institutions, able to
assist as well as to respond to those in conflict. Because members of the
academy are both producers as well as consumers of the heritage, we can
insist on thinking about how to implement commitments to the egalitarian
redistribution of authority that courts can provide and that Meltzer admired.
To appreciate Meltzer’s formulation of the importance of the concept of a
“common intellectual heritage” requires considering what heritages need
now to be built.
A step for those of us in the academy is to amend the title of the course,
currently known as “Federal Courts,” that has Daniel Meltzer’s imprint.
Retitling the class “Federal and State Courts in the Federal System” denotes
not only that the variegated relationships of these two court systems is already
embedded in the discussion but also that sources beyond the federal courts
are central to what twenty-first-century lawyers, making a common intellectual heritage, need to know about the challenging work that law has yet to
do.

noted that, as contrasted with 1992, both parties were represented in 24% of the bench
trials. Id. at 25.

